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The number of public and private web archives has increased, and we implicitly trust
content delivered by these archives. Fixity is checked to ensure that an archived resource has
remained unaltered (i.e., fixed) since the time it was captured. Currently, end users do not
have the ability to easily verify the fixity of content preserved in web archives. For instance,
if a web page is archived in 1999 and replayed in 2019, how do we know that it has not
been tampered with during those 20 years? In order for the users of web archives to verify
that archived web resources have not been altered, they should have access to fixity infor-
mation associated with these resources. However, most web archives do not allow accessing
fixity information and, more importantly, even if fixity information is available, it is pro-
vided by the same archive delivering the resource, not by an independent archive or service.
In this research, we present a framework for establishing and checking the fixity on the
playback of archived resources, or mementos. The framework defines an archive-aware
hashing function that consists of several guidelines for generating repeatable fixity infor-
mation on the playback of mementos. These guidelines are results of our 14-month study
for identifying and quantifying changes in replayed mementos over time that affect gener-
ating repeatable fixity information. Changes on the playback of mementos may be caused
by JavaScript, transient errors, inconsistency in the availability of mementos over time,
and archive-specific resources. Changes are also caused by transformations in the content
of archived resources applied by web archives to appropriately replay these resources in a
user’s browser. The study also shows that only 11.55% of mementos always produce the
same fixity information after each replay, while about 16.06% of mementos always produce
different fixity information after each replay. The remaining 72.39% of mementos produce
multiple unique fixity information. We also find that mementos may disappear when web
archives move to different domains or archives.
In addition to defining multiple guidelines for generating fixity information, the frame-
work introduces two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to disseminate fixity
information to web archives. The main difference between the two approaches is that, in the
Atomic approach, the fixity information of each archived web page is stored in a separate file
before being disseminated to several on-demand web archives, while in the Block approach,
we batch together fixity information of multiple archived pages to a single binary-searchable
file before being disseminated to archives. The framework defines the structure of URLs
used to publish fixity information on the web and retrieve archived fixity information from
web archives. Our framework does not require changes in the current web archiving infras-
tructure, and it is built based on well-known web archiving standards, such as the Memento
protocol. The proposed framework will allow users to generate fixity information on any
archived page at any time, preserve the fixity information independently from the archive
delivering the archived page, and verify the fixity of the archived page at any time in the
future.
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Web pages often change or even disappear over time due to the ephemeral nature of the
web. These changes in existing web pages have had major implications on the integrity of
information published online, such as scholarly documents, news articles, and blogs. For
example, Klein et al. [9] conducted a study on over one million references from scientific
articles and found that one in five articles suffers from Reference Rot, referring to links
to web resources that no longer exist (link rot) or that have significantly modified content
(content drift). To mitigate the impact of changing web pages, web archives, such as the
Internet Archive (IA) [10], UK Web Archive [11], and perma.cc [12], have been established
with the goal to preserve the web to allow access to prior states of web resources. Unlike
live web pages, which are expected to change, archived web pages, or mementos (archived
versions of an original web page [13]), should remain unchanged from the time of their
capture. In general, we implicitly trust the archived content delivered by such archives, but
with the current trend of extended use of other public and private web archives [14, 15],
we should consider the question of validity by checking the fixity of archived web pages to
ensure that those resources have remained unaltered since the time they were captured.
Figure 1 shows a motivating example that clarifies the problem we are trying to address
and highlights the importance of verifying the fixity of mementos. A memento is captured
by a private web archive, Michael’s Evil Wayback1, on July 17, 2017 at 18:51 GMT. This
memento is a copy of the original web page:
https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/
Figure 1 demonstrates an unexpected result. When replaying the memento in August 2017,
the CO2, the carbon dioxide level in the Earth’s atmosphere, was 406.31 ppm, but when
replaying the same memento in October 2017, CO2 became 270.31 ppm. So, what was
the value on the original page in July 2017? Which memento represents the“real” archived
1We established this archive to demonstrate different scenarios
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page? Without a mechanism to verify the fixity of this memento, we will not be able to
detect that the content of the memento has been altered.
Another motivating example, which shows the importance of verifying the fixity of me-
mentos, is the story of Joy-Ann Reid, an American cable television host at MSNBC. In
December 2017, she apologized for writing several “insensitive” LGBT blog posts nearly a
decade ago when she was a morning radio talk show host in Florida [16,17]. In April 2018,
Reid, supported by her lawyers, claimed that her blog and/or the archived versions of the
blog in the Internet Archive had been compromised and the content was fabricated [18].
Even though the Internet Archive denied that their archived pages had been hacked [19], a
stronger case could be made if we had an independent service to verify that those archived
blog posts had not changed since they were captured by the archive.
(a) Replaying the archived page in August 2017 (CO2
was 406.31 ppm).
(b) Replaying the same memento in October 2017
(CO2 became 270.31 ppm.
Fig. 1: Replaying a memento at two different times. The content of the memento was
altered, and without a way to verify the fixity of this memento the user can not determine
which one is the real memento.
1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING THE FIXITY OF
MEMENTOS
In the context of web archiving, fixity ensures that mementos have remained unaltered
since the time they were captured [20]. The final report of the PREMIS Working Group [21]
defines information used for fixity as “information used to verify whether an object has
3
been altered in an undocumented or unauthorized way.” A part of the problem is the
lack of standared techniques that users can apply to verify the fixity of web content in
general [22–24]. Jinfang Niu [25] mentioned that none of the web archives declare the
reliability of the archived content in their servers, and some archives, such as the Internet
Archive, WAX2, and Government of Canada Web Archive3, have a disclaimer [26] stating
that they are not responsible for the reliability of the archived content they provide, as
shown in Figure 2. It is important to verify the fixity of mementos for the following three
reasons:
1. The number of public and private web archives is increasing [14,15], and we may not
have the same level of trust in all of these archives.
2. There is a current trend of using web archives for evidentiary purposes in court cases
or to generally prove the existence of a web resource at a particular time in the
past [16, 27–35] (refer to Chapter 1.3.1).
3. There are different security threats against web archives [3, 36–43] that not only af-
fect accessibility to archived collections but also would change the representation of
replayed archived pages over time (refer to Chapter 3.1).
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF WEB ARCHIVES
Because web archives preserve important web resources, we need to verify the fixity of
these resources. In this section, we show multiple examples that emphasize the importance
of web archives.
1.3.1 EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES IN COURT CASES
There is a current trend of using web archives for evidentiary purposes in court cases.
For example, the Internet Archive was used as evidence in the case of Marten Transport
v. PlatForm Advertising [30] where Marten Transport claimed that PlatForm Advertising
used their name without authorization in advertising truck driver jobs. The judge used
archived pages of PlatForm Advertising’s websites from The Internet Archive’s Wayback
Machine [44] as a reliable source of evidence [28,29] after hearing testimony from an employee




Fig. 2: A disclaimer from the Internet Archive stating that the archive is not responsible
for the reliability of the archive resources.
at the Internet Archive. One of the points PlatForm Advertising argued about was that
the testimony was not sufficient for multiple of reasons inclusing the quality of the archived
content as embedded images did not appear in some archived pages. The court rejected this
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argument noting that Marten’s material was on PlatForm Advertising’s website on certain
dates, so even if Internet Archive was not able to capture everything within a web page, it
does not indicate that The Internet Archive adds material that was not on the PlatForm
Advertising’s website other than the Wayback Machine’s banner and some code that is
necessary for the tool to work. Eltgrowth [27] outlines several judicial decisions that involve
evidence (i.e., archived web pages) taken from the Internet Archive (e.g., court cases like
Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp [45], and St. Luke’s Cataract &
Laser Institute v. James C. Sanderson [46]).
1.3.2 PRESERVING FAKE NEWS AND IMPORTANT NEWS ARTICLES
The problem of “fake news” [47] posted on Twitter4, Facebook5, and other social media
sites has been receiving increased attention recently. The online misinformation might have
impacted crucial events, such as the 2016 US Presidential election. For example, according
to The New York Times [48], Gen. Michael Flynn, who was selected by President Donald
Trump to be his national security adviser, has used social media to promote a number
of conspiracy theories about Hillary Clinton. Figure 3(b) shows one example of Flynn’s
unproven stores on Twitter—he wrote “U decide - NYPD Blows Whistle on New Hillary
Emails: Money Laundering, Sex Crimes w Children, etc...MUST READ!”. This tweet is no
longer found in the live web. If we open the tweet
https://twitter.com/GenFlynn/status/794000841518776320.
in a web browser, we will get “Sorry, that page doesn’t exist!” in return, as shown in Figure
3(a). An article from CNN [34] mentioned that Flynn has deleted this tweet from his own
Twitter account, but it can still be viewed in the Internet Archive (Figure 3(b)).
1.3.3 PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT CERTAIN INCIDENTS OR CRIMES
A Boeing 777 belonging to Malaysia Airlines took off from Amsterdam, Netherlands on
Thursday, July 17, 2014, for a 12-hour flight (MH-17) to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The
plane crashed in the Donetsk area of Ukraine after flying for about three hours. All 283
passengers were killed. The Internet Archive has been frequently visiting and capturing





(a) The tweet https://twitter.com/GenFlynn/st
atus/794000841518776320 is disappeared from the
live web .




Fig. 3: Gen. Flynn’s tweet is deleted but found in the Internet Archive.
evidence (Figure 4(a)) was found which may identify who was responsible for the downing.
One of the posts contains information translated as “An AN-26 plane has been shot down ...”
(Figure 4(b)) with a video that was posted by Igor Girkin, a Russian army artillery veteran,
at the time when the crash was reported by the Malaysia Airlines [32]. This post was deleted
two hours after its creation, and it is no longer available on live web. Arthur Bright [31] used
an archived version of the post from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine [44] (Figure
4) to present a case that Igor Girkin might be responsible for the crash of the Malaysian
plane.
1.4 GENERATING FIXITY INFORMATION ON ONLY THE BASE
HTML PAGE
One conventional technique for verifying the fixity of archived resources is to generate
a unique string, or hash value, that represents the content of an archived resource at a
particular time using cryptographic hash algorithms, such as MD5 or SHA-256. The resulting
hash values cannot be converted back to the original content, and their output string has
a fixed size. Other simple fixity-based approaches includes checking the file size, or the file
count. Figure 5 shows an example where the cURL command downloads the HTML of the
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(a) The archived page with the original text.
(b) The archived page translated by Google’s Chrome browser.
Fig. 4: The archived page captured by the Internet Archive might lead to who was respon-





a memento of climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/ on 2017-07-17 at 18:51:30
GMT. Then the hashing function sha256sum generates a SHA-256 hash on the resulting
HTML.
1 $ curl -s http :// wsdl - maturban .cs.odu.edu :11011/ michael / wayback /2017071




Fig. 5: cURL command to generate a SHA-256 hash value on the HTML content only.
By periodically generating and storing hash values separately from the original content,
we can compare these hashes to identify if the resource has been changed from a prior
state. For example, consider a scenario illustrated in Figure 6 where, in August 2017, a




resulting in a hash value that ends with f521. Two months later (i.e., October 2017), the
user recalculates the hash (i.e., following the same commands shown in Figure 5) on the
same memento. This results in a different hash value that ends with 3790.
One possible cause of getting different hash values is demonstrated with the “black hat”
in Figure 6: Michael’s Evil Wayback has tampered with the memento by changing the value
of CO2 from 406.31 ppm (Figure 45(a)) to 270.31 ppm (Figure 45(b)). By applying the
simple approach of computing hashes on the HTML content, the user becomes aware that
the retrieved content in October 2017 cannot be identical to the content retrieved a couple
of months earlier.
There is a major issue with considering only the HTML content in computing the fixity
information. Ainsworth et al. [49] define a composite memento as the set of all resources
comprising an archived page including the base HTML file, images, style sheets, JavaScript
files, iframes, and others. If a hash is not calculated on a composite memento, any change
in one or more embedded resources (e.g., the image illustrated in Figure 7), will not be
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Fig. 6: The content of memento has been tampered with, and the simple approach of
generating hashes based on the HTML content successfully detected that the page has been
altered.
detected. In other words, this approach will produce false negative results indicating that
the memento has not been altered. The approach works properly on HTML content only
or on mementos that consists of only one resource, such as PDFs or ZIP files.
Even when only the HTML content is considered in computing the fixity, there are
scenarios where getting repeatable fixity information is complicated for different reasons
related to the playback of mementos (as explained in Chapter 6), such as content modified by
a third-party service before reaching to the client, unavailability of mementos (i.e., indexes)
sometimes, and transient errors. Getting repeatable fixity information will be even more
complicated if all resources comprising a composite memento are included in computing the
fixity (as explained in Chapter 1.5 and Chapter 6).
There are two ways for us to obtain fixity information of mementos. First, we can
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(a) Replaying the memento before the image has
been tampered with.
(b) Replaying the memento after the image has been
tampered with.
Fig. 7: The simple approach of generating hashes on only the HTML content will not
detect changes that affect embedded resources, such as the image of the historical CO2 level
(marked in red).
calculate fixity information on the playback of a memento (client-side) as shown in Figure
5. The second way is to get the information from the archive, but not many archives
provide access to the fixity information. For example, the Internet Archive CDX server [50]
allows accessing fixity information extracted from the WARC (Web ARChive) files (WARC
format is described in Chapter 2.2.2). Ideally, fixity information should also be stored in
independent archives, but this is not yet available for general web pages.
1.5 DIFFICULTIES OF GENERATING REPEATABLE FIXITY
INFORMATION
We often get repeatable hash values computed on mementos that consists of one resource,
such as a PDF or a ZIP, because the main characteristic of such files is that they can be
downloaded with one HTTP request or in self-contained files, but generating repeatable
hashes on composite mementos is more complicated. Figure 8 shows a shell script that
generates one aggregated hash for a composite memento through the following steps:
1. Download a composite memento (the base HTML file and all embedded resources)
using Wget [51] (line 1 in Figure 8). The output files will be stored in a directory
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hierarchy related to the paths of the files in the server. For example, the file index.html
identified by the URI https://www.example.com/path.to.file/index.html will be
stored in the sub-directory path.to.file which is located under the directory named
www.example.com.
2. Generate a SHA-256 hash on the entity body of each resource. The set of resulting
hashes will be aggregated and stored in the file allhashes.txt (lines 5-10).
3. Read the hash values from allhashes.txt, use them as input to the hashing command
shasum -a 256 which will generate one aggregated SHA-256 hash value that represent
the content of the composite memento (line 12).
1 FILE=$(wget --continue --unlink --page - requisites --timestamping -e
robots =off -k --user -agent =" Mozilla /5.0 ( Macintosh ; Intel Mac OS X
10 _14_6) AppleWebKit /537.36 (KHTML , like Gecko) Chrome /75.0.3770.90
Safari /537.36" $1 2>&1 | egrep 'Saving to: .*' | sed -n 's/.* âĂŸ
\([ˆ ]*\) âĂŹ /\1/p' | tr -d '')
2 echo ""
3 echo " SHA256 hash Resource "
4 echo "---------------------------------------------------------------"
5 for TARGET in $FILE; do
6 CONT=$(cat $TARGET )
7 HASH=$(echo " $CONT" | shasum -a 256 | cut -d' ' -f1)
8 echo "$HASH $TARGET "
9 echo "$HASH" >> " allhashes .txt"
10 done
11 echo "---------------------------------------------------------------"
12 FINAL_HASH =$(cat " allhashes .txt" | shasum -a 256 | cut -d' ' -f1)
13 echo " Aggregated hash: $FINAL_HASH "
14 echo ""
Fig. 8: The shell script aggregated hash.sh for generating a single hash on the content of
a composite memento by aggregating all hash values of the embedded resources in a single
temporary file and hashing the file. This shell script is a modified version of the original
script written by Branwen [1].
Figure 9 shows an example of generating one aggregated hash value on a composite




7URI-M identifies an archived version (memento) of an original resource (as described in Chapter 2.2.3)
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The final aggregated hash of the composite memento ends with 83a1984. We expect to
obtain the same aggregated hash each time we run this script (Figure 9) on the same
memento. However, after running this script on the same memento after a few minutes, we
get a different aggregated hash value, ending with a9974a3. We obtain different hash values
on composite mementos for different reasons related to how the playback of mementos works
(as described in Chapter 2.2.5 and Chapter 6). In Sections 1.5.1, 1.5.2, and 1.5.3, we briefly
describe three of those playback-related issues causing different fixity information.
1.5.1 ARCHIVES TRANSFORM THE CONTENT OF CAPTURED WEB
PAGES
Archives transform the content of the captured web pages to appropriately replay them
in a user’s browser. For example, archives add their own banners to provide metadata
about both the memento being viewed and the original page. Archives also rewrite links of
embedded resources (e.g., images in a page) so that these resources are retrieved from the
archive, not from the original server. Figure 10 shows an example of the live web page:
http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/27/technology/future/spacex-falcon-heavy
-everything-you-need-to-know/index.html
from cnn.com and the replay of three mementos of the web page from different archives.
Each archive adds its banner to the original content. Including archive-specific content (e.g.,
banners which contain dynamic information reflecting the current state of the archive) in the
hash calculation will prevent generating repeatable hashes. For example, the information in
the banner in Figure 11 that the archive webarchive.proni.gov.uk conveyed in 2016 for
the memento:
http://webarchive.proni.gov.uk/20150826163149/http://www.ulster.ac.uk
is different from the information conveyed in 2017 for the same memento. In general, we
should exclude any archive-specific content in hash calculation.
1.5.2 ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTING COMPOSITE MEMENTOS
The HTTP Archive [52] reports that the median number of requests that comprises a
web page is 75. Because we are interested in computing fixity information on composite
mementos (by including all embedded resources), any small change in the replay process
affecting either the base HTML file or an embedded resource will result in different fixity
information. For example, we replayed the memento
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1 $ ./ aggregated_hash .sh https :// web. archive .org/web /20180104003111/
https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide /
2
3 SHA256 hash Resource
4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
5 9 cb44bb4cf52252aee9602e4036e63aa968bd8e777c5a99fb905c246b58282e4 web.
archive .org/web /20180104003111/ https :/ climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/
carbon - dioxide /index.html
6 526 abb641edc0696331c1948c8be4394fc8570663488da99ad6493567c7eae7e web.
archive .org/ _static /js/ wbhack .js
7 85283789 b3433b7e9ccc48a181320121db1ac6e914d5ada6c45d4b872f8b9e6f web.
archive .org/ _static /css/banner - styles .css
8 a7070efc4a17d82f068df64fb5c2de15e1e061a46eba64251d243d69081153b2 web.
archive .org/web /20180104003111 im_/https :/ climate .nasa.gov/ favicon .
ico
9 ffaaf8fc3ebcdde5890547115d3c07365a266dad416f2a30af9b5469c424a469 web.
archive .org/web /20180104003111 im_/https :/ climate .nasa.gov/ system /
internal_resources / details / original /417 _1263_banner -science -1600 x500
.jpg
10 4297294 d0d438ad0cda59975edf024585f06e3fe1df4d05ac122448f22bc4f90 web.
archive .org/web /20180104003111 im_/https :/ climate .nasa.gov/ system /
time_series_images /944 _co2_2002_9_0000_720x360 .jpg
11 ee054aa33fa2b886a531b90362445787ee0ede6c0469d25a65608c1248b2e15d web.
archive .org/ _static /css/ record .css
12 ba67f3fd5d5ead8288150257279315eb1fafc3518f2f6656521c773ce236c68f web.
archive .org/web /20180104011219 im_/https :/ cdnjs. cloudflare .com/ajax/
libs/slick - carousel /1.6.0/ ajax - loader .gif
13 4 f92252c8e879afb62d40d121af584f446b064a5e93f8dfb2c753396798376cc web.
archive .org/web /20180104011219 im_/https :/ cdnjs. cloudflare .com/ajax/
libs/slick - carousel /1.6.0/ fonts/slick.eot
14 ca940d012efb06aa73d863579cb1815957b6f9ad4f350739aaddb8cd5164bb24 web.
archive .org/web /20180104011219 im_/https :/ climate .nasa.gov/ assets /
magnifying_glass_black .png
15 <...235 more resources ...>
16 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Aggregated hash: 3673 d8d59096b07ccc0093d1b5258fec5fe30142c6438f92eb7a2
be2d83a1984
Fig. 9: An example of generating an aggregated hash on a composite memento using the
shell script aggregated hash.sh (Figure 8). The hash of each resource is marked in blue. File
names are marked in green, and the aggregated hash value is marked red. The composite
memento consists of 245 resources (only 10 are shown).
http://perma-archives.org/warc/20170115024943/https://www.justice.gov/
15 times in different days (the memento currently is no longer available in the archive, but
a similar archived page is available at https://perma.cc/4HWW-WXXU). The visual repre-
sentation of each replay is shown in Figure 12. We do not get the same representation each
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(a) From the live web (The screen shot is captured
on January 28, 2018 at 9:28 PM GMT).
(b) In archive.org.
(c) In perma.cc. (d) In archive.is.
Fig. 10: The live web page and its archived versions (three mementos). Each archive has
applied a unique transformation to the original page.
time. We assume that the representation that does not have missing resources is considered
the baseline (i.e., representation 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 11). The other representations (marked
in red) are incomplete for different reasons, such as having missing resources because of
transient errors or being offline for server upgrades. For instance, representations 4, 6, and
14 do not include any image. Representation 15 has three missing images. Because of miss-
ing a CSS file that defines the design of the page (e.g., colors and layouts), representations
12 and 13 look totally different from the baseline. As explained in Chapter 6, there are
other reasons causing incomplete representations of mementos.
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(a) Replayed in 2016. (b) Replayed in 2017.
Fig. 11: The information in the archive’s banner of the memento in 2016 (43 mementos
were available in the archive for the original page http://www.ulster.ac.uk) is different
from the information displayed in 2017 (49 mementos available and the year 2017 appears
in the banner).
1.5.3 ARCHIVES OFTEN DO NOT SERVE A COMPOSITE MEMENTO PACK-
AGED IN A SINGLE FILE
Web archives usually do not provide a way for downloading a composite memento in
a single file (i.e., bulk download). Instead, a composite memento is downloaded through
multiple HTTP requests/responses. The more HTTP requests are needed, the longer it will
take for the composite memento to download, and if the available computing resources in
a server are not sufficient to handle the incoming request load, failed requests would occur
(e.g., timeout errors or 5xx server errors). This will affect generating repeatable fixity
information. A few archives actually serve a composite memento packaged in a single file,
such as the ZIP format by archive.is or the WARC format by perma.cc, but in both cases
the files are generated dynamically upon request which makes the content of the files vary
from time to time (Sections 2.2.6 and Chapter 6). For example, the ZIP file of the memento
http://archive.is/GrnkI is available at http://archive.is/download/GrnkI.zip, and
the WARC file for the memento https://perma.cc/JX4V-WYAV is available at https://per
ma.cc/JX4V-WYAV?type=warc download. The WARC-related metadata WARC-Date in all
WARC records always has the value of the current datetime.
At replay time, archives typically do not serve the content of a composite memento from
a single WARC file. Multiple WARC files may be required to serve one composite memento.
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Fig. 12: A memento is replayed 15 times on different days. We do not get the same
representation each time the memento is replayed. Representations 4, 6, 12-15 have missing
resources. On 9 and 10, the archive was not functioning due to server upgrades.
For example, the composite memento:
https://web.archive.org/web/20130530221910/http://www.cnn.com/
consists of 128 resources including the base HTML file (there are 24 embedded resources
added by the archive, which are not part of the original page). We download the memento
using Squidwarc [53,54], which uses Headless Chrome [55], and store the resulting HTTP re-
quests and responses in a WARC file. We name the resulting WARC file www.cnn.com.warc.
We check the names of WARC files (via the HTTP response header x-archive-src) used
by the archive to serve this composite memento. As Figure 13 shows, the archive uses 20
different WARC files to successfully deliver one composite memento.
The composite memento is aggregated from multiple WARC files at replay time. As
described in Chapter 2.3.3, because of the techniques archives use for replaying mementos
(i.e., indexes of the WARC files), a memento may become temporarily unavailable, the
archive will locate the closest memento in time, which is likely to be in a different WARC
file. This affects generating repeatable fixity information.
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$ cat www.cnn.com.warc | grep "x-archive -src" | sort | uniq -c | sort -
nr
66 x-archive -src: ARCHIVEIT -823 - DAILY -6320 -00000/ ARCHIVEIT -823 - DAILY
-6320 -20130530143046793 -00000 - wbgrp - crawl055 .us. archive .org -6443.
warc.gz
10 x-archive -src: edition .cnn.com -20130529 -201414/ IA -FOC - edition .cnn.
com -20130531002415 -00000. warc.gz
9 x-archive -src: cnn.com -20130518 -085929/ IA -FOC -cnn.com
-20130530185822 -00000. warc.gz
2 x-archive -src: live -20130622100220158 -06734 -20130622153024108/ live
-20130622153024108 -06751. arc.gz
2 x-archive -src: ARCHIVEIT -3611 - NONE -16245 -00000/ ARCHIVEIT -3611 - NONE
-16245 -20130405205913995 -00000 - wbgrp - crawl102 .us. archive .org
-6444. warc.gz
1 x-archive -src: us.cnn.com -20130328 -001336/ IA -FOC -us.cnn.com
-20130616192445 -00000. warc.gz
1 x-archive -src: liveweb -20170911161011/ live -20170911160457 - wwwb -
app7.us. archive .org.warc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130709033519271 -00942 -20130709091502245/ live
-20130709091502245 -00969. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130627111329865 -07186 -20130627183648217/ live
-20130627121528270 -07192. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130619102716920 -06458 -20130619141235018/ live
-20130619130218274 -06472. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130616155345785 -06212 -20130616181918863/ live
-20130616160613414 -06214. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130612053900778 -05874 -20130612111534372/ live
-20130612094027220 -05887. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130530192611915 -04875 -20130530221918640/ live
-20130530214811798 -04889. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130530192611915 -04875 -20130530221918640/ live
-20130530193426196 -04879. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130530185909274 -04872 -20130530225416173/ live
-20130530212951537 -04888. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130530185909274 -04872 -20130530225416173/ live
-20130530210132581 -04886. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: live -20130530185909274 -04872 -20130530225416173/ live
-20130530185909274 -04872. arc.gz
1 x-archive -src: edition .cnn.com -20130529 -201414/ IA -FOC - edition .cnn.
com -20130626194633 -00000. warc.gz
1 x-archive -src: WIDE -20130528090214 - crawl415 /WIDE
-20130528090711 -03612. warc.gzG
1 x-archive -src: ARCHIVEIT -1193 - WEEKLY -13292 -00000/ ARCHIVEIT -1193 -
WEEKLY -13292 -20130530202212164 -00002 - wbgrp - crawl060 .us. archive .
org -6441. warc.gz
Fig. 13: The archive serves one composite memento from 20 WARC files. The number of
embedded resources served from each WARC file is marked in red.
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1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
After describing some difficulties of generating repeatable fixity information, we list our
research questions.
RQ1: Can we identify and quantify the types of changes on the playback of mementos that
prevent generating repeatable fixity information?
RQ2: Given the types of changes identified in the playback of mementos, what steps/guide-
lines should we consider in order to generate repeatable fixity information (defining an
archive-aware fixity-based approach)?
RQ3: How can we store and retrieve fixity information independently from the web archives
from which the associated mementos are preserved?
1.7 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
The organization for the remainder of the proposal is described below.
Chapter 2: Background
We describe the web architecture including content negotiation and how live web pages
are rendered. We give a brief introduction to web archiving, and how archives crawl the
web and replay mementos. We briefly explain the WARC format, the common URI-M
structures, Memento framework definitions, and raw mementos. Then, we give examples to
show the effect of JavaScript of replayed mementos. We describe the Memento aggregators
with examples of TimeGates and TimeMaps. We present a scenario where archives not able
to deliver the right memento. We explain why verifying fixity can help to establish trusted
web archives and describe some conventional approaches used to verify the fixity.
Chapter 3: Related Work
We describe some threats and attacks against web archives that can affect the representation
of replayed mementos. We point to some tools for trusted timestamping using blockchain-
based network. We explain trusty URIs and Multihash to show how URIs can contain
hashes and be used to verify the fixity of web resources. We briefly explain how LOCKSS
(Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe) works which shows the importance of replication.
Chapter 4: Defining an archive-aware hashing function
This chapter describes our archive-aware hashing function for generating fixity information
on the playback of mementos. We start by introducing several initial guidelines that our
archive-aware hashing function should follow for generating fixity information. Then, we in-
troduce additional guidelines based on results from our 14-month study on 16,627 composite
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mementos. This work addresses RQ1 and RQ2.
Chapter 5: Collecting a large dataset of mementos
This chapter describes four methods used to create a dataset of 16,627 URI-Ms from 17
public web archives. Even though we discover many mementos, we explain why we applied
some filters and set some conditions to reduce the number of selected mementos. This
dataset is used in our study (Chapter 6).
Chapter 6: Changes in the playback of mementos
This chapter explains our study toward identifying and quantifying the types of changes
that cause different fixity information on composite mementos. The chapter describes in
details changes caused by JavaScript, TimeMap inconsistency, transient errors, and others.
The chapter also explains several scenarios of mementos moved from their original archives
to other archives. This work addresses RQ1.
Chapter 7: Archive Assisted Archival Fixity Verification Framework
In this chapter, we introduce two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to dis-
seminate fixity information to independent web archives and verify the fixity of mementos.
The chapter describes the evaluation of the two approaches using 16,627 mementos and four
different public web archives. This work addresses RQ3.
Chapter 8: Contributions, Conclusions, and Future Work
This chapter summarizes how we have addressed the research questions. It also specifies




In this chapter, we explain some concepts related to the web architecture and web archiv-
ing. We describe how web pages are rendered and how archived web pages are replayed. We
introduce some issues related to the replay of mementos including the effect of JavaScript on
replayed mementos and why archives do not always give the requested memento. Finally,
we explain how conventional cryptographic hashing algorithms can be used to verify the
fixity of web resources.
2.1 WORLD WIDE WEB
The World Wide Web (WWW) [56], also known as the Web, was designed by Tim
Berners-Lee in 1989. The web is a communication model where a client communicates with
a server to request a resource. Each resource, which is the item of interest on the Web,
is identified by a global identifier called a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) [57]. The
communication between clients and servers to establish connections and exchange messages
is done through the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [58–64]. When you dereference a
URI via HTTP (e.g., “click a link”), the server returns a representation of the resource. A
single resource can have multiple representations. Figure 14 shows the relation between a
resource, identifier, and representation on the Web. The URI identifies a resource without
being associated with a particular representation of the resource.
In general, in response to an HTTP request, a server returns an HTTP response that
should consist of the following:
1. HTTP status code: It indicates whether the HTTP request has been successfully
handled by the server. For example, the status code 404 Not Found indicates that
the requested resource could not be found on the server while 200 OK indicates that
the server, successfully completed the request.
2. HTTP response entity headers: They contain information about the payload (e.g.,
Content-Length and Content-Type), the client/server connection (e.g., Keep-Alive
and Connection), or the server (e.g., Server).
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3. The HTTP response entity body: It is the response payload (i.e., the content of the
requested resource). An HTTP response may not contain an entity body, for instance
for responses with the HTTP status code 304.
Fig. 14: The relation between a resource, URI, and representation on the Web.
A client sends requests to a server through a user-agent, as with the GUI web browser
Google Chrome1 or Mozilla Firefox2. A user-agent may also be a command-line based tool,
such as cURL [65] or Wget [51].
2.1.1 URI REDIRECTION
When a server responds with the HTTP status code 30x to an HTTP request of a re-
source, it indicates that the resource requested has been permanently moved (i.e., returning
the HTTP 301 status code) or temporarily moved (i.e., returning the HTTP 302 status code)




where the client via the user-agent cURL sends HTTP request to https://www.fb.com/.
The server responds with the HTTP status code 301 to https://www.facebook.com/ as
the header Location indicates. cURL’s options --head (or -I) is used to inform the server
to return the HTTP response headers only without the HTTP entity body. The option
--location (or -L) makes cURL follow redirects by recursively sending HTTP requests to
the URI included in the HTTP response header Location if the returned HTTP status code
is 30x. As shown in Figure 15, the server returns 200 OK as a response to the HTTP request
to https://www.facebook.com/.
1 $ curl --head --Location https :// www.fb.com/
2 HTTP /2 301
3 strict -transport - security : max -age =15552000
4 location : https :// www. facebook .com/
5 access -control -expose - headers : X-FB -Debug , X-Loader - Length
6 access -control -allow - credentials : true
7 vary: Origin
8 access -control -allow - origin : https :// www.fb.com
9 access -control -allow - methods : OPTIONS
10 content -type: text/html; charset ="utf -8"
11 x-fb -debug: vnmL3ePSNLurmiRyp2znOHL2ttfuV0rovnuAwAANFTZDfU15kHGaT8tba +
WKrYGTpJ9yBEXnHsZtdO89EyDT0Q ==
12 content - length : 0
13 date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 04:32:50 GMT
14
15 HTTP /2 200
16 set - cookie : fr =11 x1LkeiVSeP9h1me .. BdPnby .Sq.AAA .0.0. BdPnby . AWXvem4J ;
expires =Tue , 28-Jul -2020 04:32:49 GMT; Max -Age =31535999; path =/;
domain =. facebook .com; secure ; httponly
17 set - cookie : sb=8nY - XW3qKTcZl63wc0hJthL0 ; expires =Wed , 28-Jul -2021
04:32:50 GMT; Max -Age =63072000; path =/; domain =. facebook .com; secure
; httponly
18 cache - control : private , no -cache , no -store , must - revalidate
19 pragma : no -cache
20 strict -transport - security : max -age =15552000; preload
21 vary: Accept - Encoding
22 x-content -type - options : nosniff
23 x-frame - options : DENY
24 x-xss - protection : 0
25 expires : Sat , 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
26 content -type: text/html; charset ="utf -8"
27 x-fb -debug: MSHG4LF4wQxdTmfqNAtF9xX054c6aFXodSskOAQXb20bDCkAZiRl25wn +
SJDyLgN58LSatIIbffHwk0GUyviCw ==
28 date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 04:32:50 GMT




Content negotiation [66] is a mechanism to serve multiple representations of a web re-
source. Content negotiation is used by the client (i.e., user-agent) to indicate which repre-
sentation of a resource is preferred, such as content in a specific language or format. The
server, on the other hand, uses content negotiation to convey some information, such as the
format of the delivered content and its size in bytes. Information used for content negoti-
ation is exchanged between the client and server through the HTTP request headers and
HTTP response headers.
If the client does not provide any HTTP content negotiation preferences when request-
ing a resource, the server will respond with the default representation of the resource
(e.g., representation in English). Figure 16 shows an example where cURL is used as
a user-agent to request from the server twitter.com the representation of the resource
http://twitter.com/maturban1. The server returns the default representation of the re-
source, and it is in English as line 12 indicates.
1 curl --include https :// twitter .com/ maturban1
2 HTTP /2 200
3 content - length : 564023
4 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
5 date: Wed , 24 Jul 2019 05:47:15 GMT
6 expires : Tue , 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT
7 last - modified : Wed , 24 Jul 2019 05:47:15 GMT
8 pragma : no -cache
9 server : tsa_b
10
11 <! DOCTYPE html >
12 <html lang ="en" data -scribe -reduced -action -queue =" true">
13 <head >
14 <title > Mohamed Aturban ( @maturban1 ) | Twitter </title >
15 <meta name =" robots " content =" NOODP">
16 <meta name =" description " content =" The latest Tweets from Mohamed
Aturban ( @maturban1 ). Ph.D student in Computer Science (Old
Dominion University ). Member @WebSciDL . Norfolk , Virginia , USA">
17 ...
Fig. 16: The HTTP status code (marked in orange), and the HTTP response entity body
(marked in blue) and headers (marked green) returned from the server in response to the
request to https://twitter.com/maturban1. The representation (or in particular the en-
tity body) is in English. The option --include in cURL is to include the HTTP response
headers in the output.
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Figure 17 shows how HTTP content negotiation can be used to request the same re-
source http://twitter.com/maturban1 but with a different representation (e.g., a repre-
sentation in Arabic language). The client sends to the server the HTTP request header
(Accept-Language: ar) to specify the preferable language. The option --header (or -H)
in cURL is used to include extra header in the HTTP request. The server returns the
representation in Arabic as line 12 indicates (e.g., lang="ar").
1 curl --include --header "Accept - Language : ar" https :// twitter .com/
maturban1
2 HTTP /2 200
3 content - length : 575782
4 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
5 date: Wed , 24 Jul 2019 06:46:06 GMT
6 expires : Tue , 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT
7 last - modified : Wed , 24 Jul 2019 06:46:06 GMT
8 pragma : no -cache
9 server : tsa_b
10
11 <! DOCTYPE html >
12 <html lang ="ar" data -scribe -reduced -action -queue =" true">
13 <head >




15 <meta name =" robots " content =" NOODP">







@ Mohamed Aturban (
@maturban1 ). Ph.D student in Computer Science (Old Dominion
University ). Member @WebSciDL . Norfolk , Virginia , USA">
17 ...
Fig. 17: Through content negotiation (e.g., Accept-Language: ar), the client requests
the representation of the resource in Arabic.
2.1.3 RENDERING LIVE WEB PAGES
A web page typically consists of a base text file, written in HyperText Markup Lan-
guage (HTML) [67], and other embedded files including Cascading StyleSheets (CSS) and
JavaScript (JS) files, and images. HTML is the standard markup language that specifies
how web pages are structured using a set of defined tags and tag attributes. Figure 18 shows
the HTML (marked in blue) of a web page. Figure 19 illustrates the representation of the
web page (i.e., the HTML) rendered in a web browser.
For a web page including its embedded resources to be fully rendered in a web browser,
it goes through the following (simplified) steps:
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1 curl -v https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html
2 * Trying 185.199.110.153...
3 > GET / playground /index.html HTTP /2
4 > Host: maturban . github .io
5 > User -Agent: curl /7.54.0
6 > Accept : */*
7 >
8 < HTTP /2 200
9 < server : GitHub .com
10 < content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
11 < last - modified : Wed , 24 Jul 2019 22:28:50 GMT
12 < etag: "5 d38dba2 -163"
13 < access -control -allow - origin : *
14 < expires : Sun , 11 Aug 2019 03:07:28 GMT
15 < cache - control : max -age =600
16 < x-proxy -cache: MISS
17 < accept - ranges : bytes
18 < date: Sun , 11 Aug 2019 02:57:35 GMT
19 < via: 1.1 varnish
20 < age: 7
21 < x-served -by: cache -dca17765 -DCA
22 < x-cache: HIT
23 < x-cache -hits: 1
24 < x-timer: S1565492255 .111345 , VS0 ,VE0
25 < vary: Accept - Encoding
26 < content - length : 355
27 <
28 <! DOCTYPE html >
29 <html lang ="en">
30 <head >
31 <link rel =" stylesheet " href =" styles .css">
32 <title > Example Web Page </ title >
33 </head >
34 <body >
35 <p> An example web page with a link to <a href =" https ://ws -dl.cs.
odu.edu /"> Old Dominion University </a></p>
36 <p> The university logo is <img src =" https :// www.odu.edu/ images /
logo - university .png" >
37 </body >
Fig. 18: The HTML of the web page https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.
html.
1. The user types the web page’s URI into the address bar of the browser:
https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html
2. The browser sends an HTTP request to the server maturban.github.io requesting
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Fig. 19: Rendering the HTML from Figure 18
the web page /playground/index.html.
3. The server handles the HTTP request and sends back an HTTP response to the
browser. The returned HTTP entity body is the base HTML file index.html (Figure
18).
4. The browser parses the HTML and create a tree-based structure, called the Document
Object Model (DOM) tree [68].
5. Upon creating the DOM, the browser usually issues additional HTTP requests to
obtain the representations of resources embedded on the HTML page. The embedded
resources are usually specified in HTML tags like <img> (for images), <link> (for CSS
files), and <script> (for JavaScript files).
The number of resources embedded in a web page varies from zero to even hundreds. For
example, the current www.cnn.com contains over 100 embedded resources. Web resources
comprising a web page might be served from the same server hosting the base HTML file
or any other server. The HTML page in Figure 18 contains only one image:
https://www.odu.edu/images/logo-university.png
and one style sheet, or CSS file,
https://maturban.github.io/playground/styles.css
which has a set of style rules to be applied to the HTML tags (to change the background
color to light blue and the color of the text in paragraphs to blue). In sum, the browser
requests the representations of three different resources (i.e., the base HTML file, CSS file,
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and image) for the web page https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html to
be fully displayed.
2.2 WEB ARCHIVING
Web archiving is the process of preserving portions of the current web for future gener-
ations. Web archiving is not only concerned about collecting and preserving web pages but
also about how to provide access to those archived resources. The Internet Archive (IA) is
the world’s largest public web archive. It holds hundreds of billions of archived web pages
[69], and it tries to capture the entire web by employing large-scale web crawlers. The IA is
not the only public archive on the web. Other archives were established with different objec-
tives (e.g., focus on preserving special collections). For instance, the UK Web Archive was
established with the objective of archiving only UK websites (e.g., www.parliament.uk) [70].
Other web archives, such as perma.cc and archive.is, capture web pages on demand, so
they only preserve pages submitted by users, not through crawling the web. Other archives,
such as https://archive-it.org, are subscription-based services where a subscriber can
make a separate collection of URIs (i.e., seed URIs), and then the archive crawls these URIs
based on options set by the subscriber.
2.2.1 WEB CRAWLERS
A web crawler is an automated program that is used by web search engines (e.g., Google
and Bing) and web archives to systematically collect and discover web pages. The main
purpose of crawling the web (e.g., via Google Googlebot [71]) by search engines is to index
web pages to be able to respond to users with the most relevant web pages to their queries.
Web archives use web crawlers, such as the Internet Archive’s Heritrix [72], to collect and
preserve original web pages, and allow access to those mementos. In general, an archive’s
web crawler follows the following (simplified) steps to crawl live web pages, or URI-Rs (a
URI-R identifies an original resource from the live Web as defined in Chapter 2.2.3):
1. Insert a given set of URI-Rs (i.e., seed URI-Rs) in a queue.
2. Select (or dequeue) one URI-R from the queue.
3. Dereference the URI-R
4. Write the content of the dereferenced URI-R to a file. The common file format used
by web archives is Web ARChive (WARC) [73] (as described in Chapter 2.2.2).
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5. Extract any new URI-Rs that have not yet been crawled from the content.
6. Insert the newly discovered URI-Rs in the queue.
7. If the queue is not empty, go to step 2.
2.2.2 THE WEB ARCHIVE (WARC) ARCHIVE FORMAT
The Web ARChive (WARC) format [73] specifies a set of rules for aggregating multiple
web resources (e.g., HTML files, images, and stylesheets) with the HTTP request/response
entity and headers of each resource in addition to WARC-related metadata into a single
file. A WARC file is made up of multiple records. Each record should have the metadata
WARC-Type that indicates the type of the record. We describe four types of WARC records:
• warcinfo record: There is typically one warcinfo record in a WARC file, and this
record appears at the beginning of the file. It contains metadata that describes the
file, such as the WARC file’s generator and datetime.
• metadata record: It describes content in other records. The metadata included in this
record is not covered by other records. For example, the metadata record may include
links found in HTML (i.e., outlinks).
• request record: It contains the full HTTP request sent to the server which should
include the HTTP request headers (e.g., Accept-Language) and the request payload
(if any).
• response record: It contains the full HTTP response received from the server. The
record should contain the HTTP status code of the response, the HTTP response
headers, and the HTTP entity body (if any). The entity body can be a text-based file
(e.g., HTML or CSS file), or binary file (e.g., images).
Figures 20 and 21 show examples of four records. These records are part of a WARC file
created by the browser extension WARCreate [74] for the web page https://maturban.gith
ub.io/playground/index.html.
2.2.3 MEMENTO FRAMEWORK DEFINITIONS
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: warcinfo
3 WARC -Date: 2019 -07 -25 T06 :43:46 Z
4 WARC - Filename : 20190725064346105. warc
5 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :57 e1f2f2 -62f8 -df6f -ba86 -2 a722a87064e >
6 Content -Type: application /warc - fields
7 Content - Length : 464
8
9 software : WARCreate /0.2019.1.19 http :// warcreate .com
10 format : WARC File Format 1.0
11 conformsTo : http :// bibnum .bnf.fr/WARC/
WARC_ISO_28500_version1_latestdraft .pdf
12 description : Crawl initiated from the WARCreate Google Chrome
extension
13 http -header -from: warcreate@matkelly .com
14
15 WARC /1.0
16 WARC -Type: metadata
17 WARC -Target -URI: https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html
18 WARC -Date: 2019 -07 -25 T06 :43:46 Z
19 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :6 fef2a49 -a9ba -4b40 -9f4a -5 ca5db1fd5c6 >
20 Content -Type: application /warc - fields
21 Content - Length : 189
22
23 outlink : https :// www.odu.edu/ images /logo - university .png E = EMBED_MISC
24 outlink : https :// maturban . github .io/ playground / styles .css E link/@href
25 outlink : https ://ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ L a/@href
Fig. 20: A part of a WARC file shows two records (warcinfo and metadata). These records
contain WARC-related metadata. The WARC file created by WarcCreate as a resulting of
requesting https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html.
Memento is an HTTP protocol extension that uses time as a dimension to access the web
by relating current web resources to their prior states [13,75]. The Memento protocol is sup-
ported by many public web archives including the Internet Archive. The protocol introduces
two HTTP headers for content negotiation. First, Accept-Datetime is an HTTP Request
header through which a client can request a prior state of a web resource by providing the
preferred datetime (e.g., Accept-Datetime: Mon, 09 Jan 2017 11:21:57 GMT). Second,
the Memento-Datetime HTTP Response header is sent by a server to indicate the datetime
at which the resource was captured. Figure 22 shows an example of an HTTP request with
the header Accept-Datetime and the subsequent response with the Memento-Datetime in
the response headers. The Memento protocol also defines the following terminology:
- URI-R - an original resource from the live Web
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: request
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html
4 WARC -Date: 2019 -07 -25 T06 :43:46 Z
5 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid:edb961e3 -e05f -4e86 -21eb - ff35a9acb1d8 >
6 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = request
7 Content - Length : 332
8
9 GET / playground /index.html HTTP /1.1
10 Upgrade -Insecure - Requests : 1
11 User -Agent: Mozilla /5.0 ( Macintosh ; Intel Mac OS X 10 _14_6) AppleWebKit
/537.36 (KHTML , like Gecko) Chrome /75.0.3770.142 Safari /537.36
12 Accept : text/html , application /xhtml+xml , application /xml;q=0.9 , image/
webp ,image/apng ,*/*;q=0.8 , application /signed - exchange ;v=b3
13
14 WARC /1.0
15 WARC -Type: response
16 WARC -Target -URI: https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html
17 WARC -Date: 2019 -07 -25 T06 :43:46 Z
18 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :8 de6e979 -f774 -ee37 -de60 -7 ecbbfde911c >
19 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
20 Content - Length : 985
21
22 HTTP /1.1 200
23 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
24 date: Thu , 25 Jul 2019 06:43:40 GMT
25 ...
26 Content - Length : 356
27
28 <! DOCTYPE html ><html lang ="en"><head >
29 <link rel =" stylesheet " href =" styles .css">
30 <title > Example Web Page </ title >
31 </head >
32 <body >
33 <p> An example web page with a link to <a href =" https ://ws -dl.cs.
odu.edu /"> Old Dominion University </a></p>
34 <p> The university logo is <img src =" https :// www.odu.edu/ images /
logo - university .png">
35
36 </p></body ></html >
Fig. 21: A part of a WARC file shows the two records (request and response). It
contains the HTTP headers and HTTP entity bodies resulting from requesting https:
//maturban.github.io/playground/index.html.
- URI-M - an archived version (memento) of the original resource at a particular point
in time
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- URI-T - a resource (TimeMap) that provides a list of mementos (URI-Ms) for a
particular original resource
- URI-G - a resource (TimeGate) that supports content negotiation based on datetime
to access prior versions of an original resource
1 curl -vL -H "Accept - Datetime : Thu , 25 Jul 2019 21:29:38 GMT" http :// web
. archive .org/web/https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html
2
3 > GET /web/https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html HTTP /1.1
4 > Host: web. archive .org
5 > User -Agent: curl /7.54.0
6 > Accept : */*
7 > Accept - Datetime : Thu , 25 Jul 2019 21:29:38 GMT
8 >
9 < HTTP /1.1 302 FOUND
10 ...
11 < Location : http :// web. archive .org/web /20190725212938/ https :// maturban .
github .io/ playground /index.html
12 <
13 > GET /web /20190725212938/ https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.
html HTTP /1.1
14 > Host: web. archive .org
15 > User -Agent: curl /7.54.0
16 > Accept : */*
17 > Accept - Datetime : Thu , 25 Jul 2019 21:29:38 GMT
18 >
19 < HTTP /1.1 200 OK
20 < Memento - Datetime : Thu , 25 Jul 2019 21:29:38 GMT
21 ...
22 <
23 <! DOCTYPE html >
24 <html lang ="en">
25 ...
Fig. 22: Time-based content negotiation using the HTTP request header
Accept-Datetime.
2.2.4 TWO COMMON URI-M STRUCTURES
The common URI-M structure used by web archives to identify mementos is illustrated
in Figure 23, especially for web archives [76, 77] that use one of the Wayback Machine’s
implementations, such as OpenWayback [78] or PyWb [7]. The examples below are URI-Ms








Fig. 23: The common URI-M structure used by Wayback Machine web archives.
The other URI-M structure is based on including in the URI-M a string of characters
(e.g., a hash value) that is derived from the content. Archives such as webcitation.org,





Several web archives support both URI-M structures, such as perma.cc3 and archive.is.




3Based on changes made on February 03, 2020 (github.com/harvard-lil/perma/pull/2699),
perma.cc no longer supports the long form URI-Ms.
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are URI aliases for the same memento. The URI-M with hashes are short and can sup-
port deduplication, and because these URI-Ms are derived from the content (e.g., using
cryptographic hash functions), they can be used to verify the fixity of the content.
The other URI-M structure has some advantages and features that are not available
with the URI-Ms with hashes. We can extract some information from only the URI-M, such
as the Memento-Datetime of a memento and its original resource (URI-R). In general, we
consider the datetime string (e.g., 20190609163259 in the URI-M above) as the value of
the Memento-Datetime header because archives usually use this datetime string to refer to
the creation datetime of a memento. However, we may need to dereference a URI-M to get
the actual Memento-Datetime because the URI-M may redirect to a different URI-M, which
contains a different datetime string. The archives can use the information extracted from a
URI-M to return alternative or closest mementos (e.g., using a Memento aggregator) if the
requested memento is not available.
2.2.5 REPLAYING MEMENTOS
The crawling process will result in a set of archived pages stored in WARC files or in
other formats. These files are indexed, which will create other files, such as CDX [79] and
CDXJ [80, 81] to map a particular URI-R to a resource in a WARC file. Currently, the
WARC format is not directly supported by web browsers. Thus, in order to replay the
content of WARC files, many web archives use OpenWayback [78] or PyWb [7]. The replay
process includes indexing WARC files, which helps in looking up archived pages by their
URI-Rs. On the replay of an archived page, one of the main tasks of OpenWayback is to
ensure that all resources comprising the page (e.g., images, style sheets, and JavaScript files)
are retrieved from the archive, not from the live web. Thus, at the time of replaying the page,
OpenWayback rewrites all links to those embedded resources to point to the archive [44].
To illustrate how web archives transform content of original web pages to appropriately
replay them in a user’s browser, we submitted the web page’s URI-R
https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html
to the Internet Archive using the “Save Page Now” feature [82]. The archive usually captures
the root HTML file and all embedded resources included in the page. Table 1 shows the
URI-Rs of the original resources comprising the web page and the corresponding URI-Ms
to the mementos created by the Internet Archive (the Memento-Datetime of each memento
is marked in red).
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Fig. 24: The representation of the memento web.archive.org/web/20190725212938/
https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html (cf. the live web version in Figure
19).
TABLE 1: The mementos of the original resources comprising the web page in Figure 18.
The original resource (URI-R) is shown in blue text and the Memento-Datetime is shown
in red text.













Figure 24 illustrates the representation of the memento replayed in the browser. The
archive transformation process of the original page may include adding multiple HTML tags
and the archive’s banner. As illustrated in Figure 25, the archive-specific code is marked in
red and we used cURL to request the memento. The archive’s banner provides information
about both the memento being viewed and the original page (e.g., the top portion shown
in Figure 24).
Archives can inform clients about resources that are not mementos (e.g., resources added
by the archive) by returning the value:
<http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegotiate>; rel="type"
in the Link HTTP response header. Thus, the clients are aware that time-based content
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negotiation cannot be attempted on these resources [13,83].
1 curl https :// web. archive .org/web /20190725212938/ https :// maturban . github
.io/ playground /index.html
2 <! DOCTYPE html >
3 <html lang ="en">
4 <script src ="// archive .org/ includes / analytics .js?v= cf34f82 " type =" text/
javascript "></script >
5 ...
6 <link rel =" stylesheet " type =" text/css" href ="/ _static /css/banner - styles
.css" />
7 <link rel =" stylesheet " type =" text/css" href ="/ _static /css/ iconochive .
css" />
8 <!-- End Wayback Rewrite JS Include -->
9
10 <link rel =" stylesheet " href ="/web /20190725212938 cs_/https ://
maturban . github .io/ playground / styles .css">
11 <title > Example Web Page </ title >
12 </head >
13 <body >
14 <p> An example web page with a link to <a href =" https :// web. archive
.org/web /20190725212938/ https ://ws -dl.cs.odu.edu /"> Old Dominion
University </a></p>
15 <p> The University logo is <img src =" https :// web. archive .org/web






20 FILE ARCHIVED ON 21:29:38 Jul 25, 2019 AND RETRIEVED FROM THE
21 INTERNET ARCHIVE ON 21:51:15 Jul 25, 2019.





26 playback timings (ms):
27 LoadShardBlock : 75.831 (3)
28 esindex : 0.006
29 captures_list : 97.72
30 ...
31 -->
Fig. 25: The rewritten HTML of the memento web.archive.org/web/20190725212938/
https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html. The code, marked in red, was
added by the archive (i.e., archive-specific content).
As described in Chapter 1.5.1, web archives may transform original web pages differently
depending on the replay tools they are using. For example, archive.is transforms the
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original pages by removing all JavaScript code, so no JavaScript code is executed at replay
time. Berlin [84] explains different approaches used by web archives to transform and reply
archived web pages.
2.2.6 THE EFFECT OF JAVASCRIPT ON REPLAYED MEMENTOS
Early web pages were relatively static [85]. However, web pages continuously adopt
new web technologies and become more interactive. JavaScript, which runs on the client,
adds interactivity to web pages and can manipulate and update the representation of web
pages without reloading them in the browser. About 54.5% of web pages in 2012 included
JavaScript to load embedded resources [86], and by June 2020, the median number of
JavaScript files requests per page is 21 [87]. Withee [88] found that when JavaScript is
disabled, about 45% of web pages are displayed as a white screen, and most content of
about 50% of web pages does not load. When a browser executes JavaScript included in
a web page, it might result in adding new resources to the page. Figure 26(a) shows an
example where the memento
http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20130102002028/http://www.cornell.edu/
is reloaded in the browser with JavaScript disabled (i.e., the browser does not execute
JavaScript code), which affects the representation as the background image is not displayed.
When we reload the same memento with JavaScript enabled, the background image appears
on the page (Figure 26(b)).
URI-Ms for embedded resources can be generated randomly by JavaScript. This impacts
the generation of repeatable fixity information. Figure 27 shows an example where each
time the same memento from Figure 26 is reloaded in the browser, it results in a different
background image. The reason for observing different resources at replay time for this
memento is that values in links to the background images are generated randomly on the
client side by JavaScript.
The other problem caused by JavaScript is that when JavaScript is executed, it dy-
namically generates URIs. These URIs may not be correctly rewritten by the web archive
(Chapter 4.1.9), so resources specified by such URIs will be retrieved from the live web, not
from the archive [84].
2.2.7 RAW MEMENTOS
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(a) JavaScript disabled. (b) JavaScript enabled.
Fig. 26: An example shown an additional resource (the background image) loaded by
JavaScript.
In addition to the rewritten content, many archives allow accessing unaltered, or raw,
archived content (i.e., retrieving the archived original content without any type of transfor-
mation by the archive). The most common mechanism, used by many Wayback Machine
implementations, to retrieve the raw mementos is by adding id [89,90] after the timestamp
in the requested URI-M as Figure 28 shows. As expected, Figure 29 indicates that the
content of the raw memento (e.g., Figure 28)
https://web.archive.org/web/20190725212938id /https://maturban.github.io/
playground/index.html
is the same as the content of its original page (Figure 18)
https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html
as the resulting hash values computed on both resources are identical. This reinforces our
intuition that we are always able to generate repeatable hashes on raw mementos, but
this is not always the case for two reasons. First, we are interested in computing hashes on
composite raw memento, not only the base HTML file. Second, some archives respond to raw
memento requests with an altered (or a custom) HTML base file (difficulties in generating
repeatable hashes are explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). Other archives allow accessing
the raw content through different APIs. For instance, the archive internetmemory.org
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(a) Reload # 1. (b) Reload # 2.
(c) Reload # 3. (d) Reload # 4.
Fig. 27: Because of JavaScript, reloading the memento http://wayback.archive-it.
org/all/20130102002028/http://www.cornell.edu/ multiple times result in different
background images.
responds with the raw content if raw/ is placed before the timestamp in a URI-M. Jones et
al. [91–93] explore the transformation of original content performed by different web archives
and propose several rules for acquiring mementos. The proposals have not been adopted,
and raw mementos access remains unstandardized and ad-hoc.
2.3 MEMENTO FRAMEWORK MECHANICS
In this section, we show multiple TimeGate and TimeMap examples and explain a Me-
mento aggregator. We also introduce an abstract example that illustrates why web archives
do not always give the requested mementos.
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1 curl https :// web. archive .org/web /20190725212938 id_/https :// maturban .
github .io/ playground /index.html
2 <html >
3 <head >
4 <link rel =" stylesheet " href =" styles .css">
5 <title > Example Web Page </ title >
6 </head >
7 <body >
8 <p> An example web page with a link to <a href =" https ://ws -dl.cs.
odu.edu /"> Old Dominion University </a></p>
9 <p> The university logo is <img src =" https :// www.odu.edu/ images /
logo - university .png" >
10 </body >
11 </html >
Fig. 28: The raw HTML from requesting the memento https://web.archive.org/web/
20190725212938id_/https://maturban.github.io/playground/index.html. The code
is the same as the code illustrated in Figure 18.
1 $ curl -s https :// maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html | sha256sum
2 014 da5ab8ef445f32c414690c53e9abe88ba353abf72a132c06d71217450b1a8 -
3
4 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20190725212938 id_/https ://
maturban . github .io/ playground /index.html | sha256sum
5 014 da5ab8ef445f32c414690c53e9abe88ba353abf72a132c06d71217450b1a8 -
Fig. 29: The hash value of the live web page (Figure 18) is identical to the hash of one of
its raw mementos (Figure 28).
2.3.1 TIMEGATE AND TIMEMAP EXAMPLES
Figure 30 shows an example of content negotiation based on time. The client sends an
HTTP request to a TimeGate at the URI-G
http://web.archive.org/web/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon
-dioxide/




The datetime is sent to the server via the HTTP header Accept-Datetime. Even though
the server (or the TimeGate) cannot find a memento captured at the given time, it responds
with the HTTP status code 302 to the URI-M closest to the given Accept-Datetime. The
URI-M is included in the HTTP response header Location, and as the URI-M indicates,
the memento is captured on April 26, 2016 at 23:24:25. Figure 31 shows that the client
receives 200 OK after sending an the HTTP request to the URI-M
http://web.archive.org/web/20160426232425/http://climate.nasa.gov/vital
-signs/carbon-dioxide
The value of the HTTP response header Memento-Datetime indicates the datetime at which
the memento was captured by the archive. The response header Link is a standard HTTP
header [94, 95]. Links included in the Link header are separated by commas. This Link
header is used by the Memento framework to includes links to: an original resource (URI-
R), a TimeMap (URI-T) of the original resource, and a TimeGate (URI-G). It also con-
tains links to the next memento, the previous memento, the first memento made for the
original resource, and the last memento. The HTTP response headers that start with
X-Archive-Orig- are the original headers returned by the server from which the original
page is captured. Some web archives prepend the string X-Archive-Orig- to the original
HTTP response headers so that the client can differentiate between the original response
headers and the response headers that are added by the archive (e.g., Memento-Datetime).
Some archives develop APIs that consider the timestamp include in a requested URI-M
as the value of the HTTP request header Accept-Datetime. Thus, even though a client
does not include the Accept-Datetime header in an HTTP request, the archive will respond
with the URI-M closest to the timestamp included in the requested URI-M. For example,
the two HTTP requests below will result in a 302 redirect to the same URI-M:









1 curl -v -H "Accept - Datetime : Sun , 24 Apr 2016 00:00:00 GMT" http :// web.
archive .org/web/https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide /
2 * Trying 207.241.233.214...
3 * Connected to web. archive .org (207.241.233.214) port 80 (#0)
4 > GET /web/https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide / HTTP
/1.1
5 > Host: web. archive .org
6 > User -Agent: curl /7.54.0
7 > Accept : */*
8 > Accept - Datetime : Sun , 24 Apr 2016 00:00:00 GMT
9 >
10 < HTTP /1.1 302 FOUND
11 < Date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 05:55:01 GMT
12 < Content -Type: text/plain; charset =utf -8
13 < X-Archive -Redirect - Reason : found capture at 20160426232425
14 < Location : http :// web. archive .org/web /20160426232425/ http :// climate .
nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide
15 < Link: <https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel ="
original ", <http :// web. archive .org/web /20160426232425/ http :// climate
.nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue ,
26 Apr 2016 23:24:25 GMT", <http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link
/https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" timemap
"; type =" application /link - format "
16 <
Fig. 30: Memento framework allows content negotiations based on time. A client sends
HTTP request with the header Accept-Datetime to a TimeGate requesting a memento.
The TimeGate returns a URI-M that is closest to the value of Accept-Datetime.
Figure 32 shows the TimeMap of the original resource (URI-R)
http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide.
The TimeMap contains the set of all mementos (URI-Ms) available in the archive for this
URI-R. There are 4,706 mementos captured between October 2014 and July 2019. Only 10
mementos are shown, two per year. In addition to the HTTP entity body, the --include
option (or -i) will include the HTTP response headers in the output.
2.3.2 MEMENTO AGGREGATORS
A Memento aggregator can be used to retrieve TimeMaps aggregated from multiple web
archives. The Memento aggregator from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [96] is
one implementation of a Memento aggregator that provides TimeMaps aggregated from
different web archives both with (a) native support of the Memento protocol and (b) by
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1 $ curl -I http :// web. archive .org/web /20160426232425/ http :// climate .nasa
.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide
2 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
3 Server : nginx /1.15.8
4 Date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 06:42:48 GMT
5 Content -Type: text/html; charset =utf -8
6 Content - Length : 125894
7 Connection : keep -alive
8 X-Archive -Orig - status : 200 OK
9 X-Archive -Orig -content - length : 21162
10 X-Archive -Orig - server : nginx /1.4.6 ( Ubuntu )
11 X-Archive -Orig -etag: " f7bf2ceecf8fed0fa794552186cfd772 -gzip"
12 X-Archive -Orig -date: Tue , 26 Apr 2016 23:24:25 GMT
13 X-Archive -Guessed -Content -Type: text/html
14 X-Archive -Guessed - Charset : utf -8
15 Memento - Datetime : Tue , 26 Apr 2016 23:24:25 GMT
16 Link: <http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/ vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel ="
original ", <http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link/http :// climate .
nasa.gov :80/ vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" timemap "; type ="
application /link - format ", <http :// web. archive .org/web/http :// climate
.nasa.gov :80/ vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" timegate ", <http ://
web. archive .org/web /20141010072816/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/ vital -
signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" first memento "; datetime ="Fri , 10 Oct
2014 07:28:16 GMT", <http :// web. archive .org/web /20160419081121/ http
:// climate .nasa.gov :80/ vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" prev
memento "; datetime ="Tue , 19 Apr 2016 08:11:21 GMT", <http :// web.
archive .org/web /20160426232425/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/ vital -
signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 26 Apr 2016
23:24:25 GMT", <http :// web. archive .org/web /20160429203645/ http ://
climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" next memento ";
datetime ="Fri , 29 Apr 2016 20:36:45 GMT", <http :// web. archive .org/
web /20190728173445/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon -
dioxide />; rel =" last memento "; datetime ="Sun , 28 Jul 2019 17:34:45
GMT"
17 Content -Security - Policy : default -src 'self ' 'unsafe -eval ' 'unsafe -
inline ' data: blob: archive .org web. archive .org analytics . archive .
org pragma . archivelab .org
Fig. 31: The HTTP request to the URI-M returns 200 OK. The HTTP response header
Memento-Datetime is included in the response. As defined by the Memento framework, this
header indicates the datetime at which the memento was created. The link header contains
links to the original resource (URI-R marked in blue), the TimeMap (URI-T) of the original
resource (green), the TimeGate (URI-G in orange), and the links remaining are for the first
memento, the previous memento, the next memento, and the last memento.
proxy support of the Memento protocol. MemGator [97, 98] is another implementation of
a Memento aggregator and an open source project that provides a variety of customization
options, such as allowing users to specify a list of web archives to retrieve TimeMaps from,
43
1 $ curl -include http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link/https :// climate
.nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide /
2 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
3 Server : nginx /1.15.8
4 Date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 21:46:55 GMT
5 Content -Type: application /link - format
6
7 <http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/ vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" original
",
8 <http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link/https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital
-signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" self "; type =" application /link - format ";
from ="Fri , 10 Oct 2014 07:28:16 GMT",
9 <http :// web. archive .org >; rel =" timegate ",
10 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20141010072816/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" first memento "; datetime ="Fri , 10
Oct 2014 07:28:16 GMT",
11 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20150811233214/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 11 Aug
2015 23:32:14 GMT",
12 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20160304214529/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 04 Mar
2016 21:45:29 GMT",
13 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20161111001959/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 11 Nov
2016 00:19:59 GMT",
14 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20171218165218/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Mon , 18 Dec
2017 16:52:18 GMT",
15 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20170526004412/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 26 May
2017 00:44:12 GMT",
16 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20180612130914/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 12 Jun
2018 13:09:14 GMT",
17 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20181214074023/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 14 Dec
2018 07:40:23 GMT",
18 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20190223180808/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Sat , 23 Feb
2019 18:08:08 GMT",
19 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20190723114611/ https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 23 Jul
2019 11:46:11 GMT",
20 ...
Fig. 32: The TimeMap of the URI-R http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-
dioxide. The TimeMap contains 4,706 mementos (only 10 are shown)
44
but it only aggregates TimeMaps from archives that natively support the Memento protocol.
The UK Web Archive also runs a Memento aggregator [99] that allows users to submit a
URI-R and return a UI page with discovered mementos from multiple archives.
Figure 33 shows the TimeMap of the original resource
http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide.
The TimeMap is aggregated from six different public web archives (marked in red). The
total number of aggregated mementos in the TimeMap is 4,816, though only eight are
shown. Most of the mementos (4706) are from the Internet Archive. The second archive that
contributes the second-most to this TimeMap is archive-it.org (91 mementos). The 19
mementos remaining are from archive.is (13), arquivo.pt (3), and perma-archives.org
(3). AlSum et al. study the impact on aggregated TimeMaps so that requests of TimeMaps
are only sent to web archives that likely preserve the requested archived pages [100,101].
2.3.3 ARCHIVES DO NOT ALWAYS GIVE THE CORRECT COMPOSITE
MEMENTOS
As defined in Chapter 1.4, an archived HTML page is a composite memento. It usually
consists of the base HTML file and other embedded resources, such as CSS, JavaScript files
and images. The mechanism that some web archives use to crawl the web (Chapter 2.2.1)
results in a composite memento where the resources comprising the memento have different
Memento-Datetimes (cf. web pages that consist of one resource like PDFs). Ainsworth et
al present an example (Figure 34) where the root HTML page and embedded resources are
captured by the archive at different times which may result in a composite memento that
never existed on the live web [2, 49].
Figure 35 shows an abstract example where the archives serve a composite memento
that has never existed on the live web. At t0, a web page that consists of the base, or the
root, HTML file index.html and the embedded image foo.jpeg is published on the live web.
The archive captures the root page at t1 and the embedded image at t3. The archive tries
to create another memento for the web page. It captures the root page at t7, but before it
captures the embedded image at t9, the live web page including the base HTML file and the
image have been changed (or updated) at t8.
If at t10, a client requests the composite memento created at t1, the archive will return
the memento index.html created at t1 and the archived foo.jpeg closest to t1 which is the
memento (image) created at t3. The composite memento “index.html of t1 + foo.jpeg at t3”
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1 curl -i https :// memgator .cs.odu.edu/ timemap /link/https :// climate .nasa.
gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide /
2
3 HTTP /2 200
4 access -control -allow - origin : *
5 access -control -expose - headers : Link , Location , X-Memento -Count , X-
Generator
6 content -type: application /link - format
7 date: Mon , 29 Jul 2019 22:42:51 GMT
8 x- generator : MemGator :1.0 - rc7
9 x-memento -count: 4816
10
11 <https :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" original ",
12 <https :// memgator .cs.odu.edu/ timemap /link/https :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" self "; type =" application /link -
format ",
13 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20141010072816/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" first memento "; datetime ="Fri , 10
Oct 2014 07:28:16 GMT",
14 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20160304214529/ http :// climate .nasa.gov :80/
vital -signs/carbon -dioxide >; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 04 Mar
2016 21:45:29 GMT",
15 <http :// archive .is /20141101160433/ http :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/
carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Sat , 01 Nov 2014 16:04:33
GMT",
16 <http :// archive .is /20170124235942/ http :// climate .nasa.gov/vital -signs/
carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 24 Jan 2017 23:59:42
GMT",
17 <http :// wayback .archive -it.org/all /20150319152254/ http :// climate .nasa.
gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Thu , 19
Mar 2015 15:22:54 GMT",
18 <http :// wayback .archive -it.org/all /20180504082215/ https :// climate .nasa.
gov/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 04
May 2018 08:22:15 GMT",
19 <https :// arquivo .pt/ wayback /20160515150329/ http :// climate .nasa.gov/
vital -signs/carbon - dioxide //>; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Sun , 15 May
2016 15:03:29 GMT",
20 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20170419235215/ http :// climate .nasa.gov
/vital -signs/carbon - dioxide />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Wed , 19 Apr
2017 23:52:15 GMT",
21 ...
Fig. 33: Retrieving the TimeMap of the URI-R http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/
carbon-dioxide using Memgator. The total TimeMap is aggregated from six different
public web archives contains 4,706 mementos (only eight are shown)
has existed on the live web, so the archive returns the correct composite memento. However,
if at t10, the client requests the composite memento created at t7, the archive will return
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Fig. 34: A composite memento where the Memento-Datetime of the root page (Decem-
ber 09, 2004 19:09:26 GMT) is different from the Memento-Datetime of several embedded
resources. (From [2]).
the memento index.html created at t7 and the archived foo.jpeg closest to t7 which is the
memento created at t9. The composite memento “index.html of t7 + foo.jpeg at t9” has never
existed on the live web, so the archive does not return the correct composite memento.
It is common that some mementos frequently become unavailable in the archive because
the indexes of the WARC files containing these mementos are temporarily unavailable.
We can consider this as changes in TimeMaps since archives respond, at different times,
with different TimeMaps of the same original resource URI-R. Although the TimeMap
inconsistency seems to be unacceptable, archives behave this way for convincing reasons
related to improving performance and responding quickly to clients’ requests. The TimeMap
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Fig. 35: Illustrating how web archive can serve composite mementos that never existed on
the live web (e.g., the composite memento highlighted in red).
inconsistency may also occur for reasons including deduplication and redaction techniques
of mementos, archival restructuring, and transient errors [102]. The TimeMap change may
cause requests to the same memento to redirect to different URI-Ms. For example, in Figure
35, if the image with the Memento-Datetime of t9 is not available at a particular time, the
request might be redirected to the image archived at t3 (if available).
2.4 VERIFYING THE FIXITY IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH
TRUSTED WEB ARCHIVES
The Trusted Repositories Audit & Certification report (TRAC) [103] by the Task Force
on Archiving of Digital Information has introduced criteria for identifying trusted digital
repositories. In addition to the ability to reliably provide access, preserve, and migrate
digital resources, digital repositories, which include web archives, must create preservation
metadata that can be used to verify that content is not tampered with or corrupted (fixity)
according to Sections B2.9 and B4.4. The TRAC report recommends that preserved content
is stored separately from its fixity information, so it is less likely that someone is able to alter
both the content and its associated fixity information. Thus, generating fixity information
and using it to ensure that archived resources are valid will help to establish trust in web
archives. In addition, the number of public and private web archives is increasing [14, 15],
and we may not have the same level of trust in all of these archives.
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2.5 CONVENTIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING
ALGORITHMS VERSUS SIMILARITY ESTIMATION
TECHNIQUES
As described in Chapter 1.4, common cryptographic hashing algorithms [104] such as
MD5 and SHA256 produce entirely different outputs for even near-duplicate documents.
This is useful for purposes like verifying fixity, password verification, finding duplicate
records, and other security objectives. Figure 36 shows an example of how the hashing
algorithm SHA256 produces two different hash values on near-duplicate paragraphs (i.e.,
one word has been changed from “one” to “two”). These hash algorithms demonstrate the
fact that if there is a small change in the input, there would be a large change in the output.
1 $ echo "Klein et al. [31] conducted a study on over one million
references from scientific articles and found that one in five
articles suffers from Reference Rot , referring to links to web
resources that no longer exist or that have significantly modified
content ." | shasum -a 256
2 b4948b7e7c300e3c836aea10f2864713703d09a549f720df7307e15c8a357ad4 -
3
4 $ echo "Klein et al. [31] conducted a study on over one million
references from scientific articles and found that two in five
articles suffers from Reference Rot , referring to links to web
resources that no longer exist or that have significantly modified
content ." | shasum -a 256
5 c4b403726594a86d72c50d98f09f2e3a7c96920535b59daab4061b837097782b -
Fig. 36: The hashing algorithm SHA256 produce entirely different hash values (lines 2 and
5) on near-duplicate documents.
The Merkle tree was introduced by Ralph Merkle in 1979 [146], and it is used in many
applications, such as Blockchain-based networks (e.g., Bitcoin [137, 138]), to generate a
hash value (root hash) on the content of large data structures. As shown in Figure 37, each
leaf node in the Merkle tree is the hash of a block of data, while any non-leaf node (or
intermediate node) is the hash of its child nodes.
Figure 38 shows an example of how the hash of the intermediate node Hash 0 (from
Figure 37) is computed. First, the hash values of the leaf nodes L1 and L2 are computed
(as shown in lines 4 and 6). This produces two hash values Hash 0-0 and Hash 0-1. The
two hash values are then concatenated to each other and hashed, which produces the hash
value of the intermediate node Hash 0 (line 12). The hash value of any intermediate node
in the Merkle tree is computed by following the same steps as described for Hash 0.
In contrast to MD5 and SHA256 functions, the hashing function SimHash [106,107] works
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4 % echo "$L1" | md5sum
5 d3b07384d113edec49eaa6238ad5ff00 -
6 % echo "$L2" | md5sum
7 c157a79031e1c40f85931829bc5fc552 -
8
9 Hash0_0 = d3b07384d113edec49eaa6238ad5ff00
10 Hash0_1 = c157a79031e1c40f85931829bc5fc552
11
12 % echo " $Hash0_0 $Hash0_1 " | md5sum
13 2 d25c7b0aae4ec49c0a551d8d48ab9d7 -
14
15 Hash0=2 d25c7b0aae4ec49c0a551d8d48ab9d7
Fig. 38: An example of how the intermediate node Hash 0 (from Figure 37) is computed.
so that it produces similar hash values for similar documents. For instance, if there is a
small difference between two documents, SimHash will generate hash values that are slightly
different. SimHash is one of the document similarity techniques used by Google crawlers to
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detect near-duplicate web pages for reducing redundancy in search results. Figure 39 shows
the resulting hash values by applying SimHash (a Python module [108]) on the same input
used in Figure 36.
1 $ python
2 >>> import re
3 >>> from simhash import Simhash
4 >>> def get_features (s):
5 ... width = 3
6 ... s = s.lower ()
7 ... s = re.sub(r '[ˆ\w]+', '', s)
8 ... return [s[i:i + width] for i in range(max(len(s) - width + 1,
1))]
9 ...
10 >>> print '%x' % Simhash ( get_features ('Klein et al. [31] conducted a
study on over one million references from scientific articles and
found that @one@ in five articles suffers from Reference Rot ,
referring to links to web resources that no longer exist or that





15 >>> print '%x' % Simhash ( get_features ('Klein et al. [31] conducted a
study on over one million references from scientific articles and
found that @two@ in five articles suffers from Reference Rot ,
referring to links to web resources that no longer exist or that
have significantly modified content .')). value
16 668 d8cddd9e6a685
Fig. 39: The hashing algorithm SimHash produces slightly different hash values (lines 11
and 16) on near-duplicate documents. The characters marked in red indicate how different
the two documents are.
There are other similarity estimation techniques, such Minhash [109]. SimHash and
MinHash are widely used, and both algorithms are based on Locality Sensitive Hashing
(LSH) [110]. Choosing one of these hashing techniques over the other depends on the
application in hand. For example, in 2007, Google used SimHash for web crawling to detect
duplicate web pages and used Minhash for Google News personalization [107, 111, 112]. To
measure similarity between two documents, MinHash produces multiple hash values per
document, while SimHash produces a single hash per document. Thus, SimHash requires
less memory than MinHash. However, MinHash outperforms SimHash for documents with
high similarity [113].
The SimHash and Minhash algorithms are originally designed for text-based near-duplicate
detection. Other algorithms (e.g., pHash [114,115]) are introduced to detect near-duplicate
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images. The pHash algorithm generates 64-bit integer (hash) on an image through multi-
ple steps that include: reducing the size of the image to 32x32 pixels, converting it to a
grayscale, and constructing the final hash value. If the 64-bit hash values of two images
are the same, then both images are very similar (not necessarily identical). The similarity
score of two images is calculated by counting the number of different corresponding bits.
Therefore, the similarity score of two images is between zero and 64: zero indicates very
similar images, and 64 indicates that both images are very different.
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter we presented some basic concepts related to our research. We briefly
explained the web architecture and how live web pages are rendered. Also, we described
how archives crawl the web and replay mementos. We introduced some issues related to
the replay of mementos including the effect of JavaScript on replayed mementos and why
archives sometime do not give the correct mementos. We presented the WARC file format.
Then, we briefly explained the Memento framework and Memento aggregators. We described




In this chapter, we describe some threats and attacks against web archives that can
affect the representation of replayed mementos. We explain how cryptographic hashes in
URIs (e.g., using trusty URIs and Multihash) can help to verify the fixity of published web
resources. We point to some tools for trusted timestamping mementos using blockchain-
based network. We briefly explain how the opinion poll protocol works in the LOCKSS
system, which emphasizes the importance of replication.
3.1 WEB ARCHIVING SECURITY ISSUES
In this section we describe multiple security threats against web archives, which em-
phasizes the importance of verifying the fixity of archived pages. Several vulnerabilities
were discovered in the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine by Lerner et al. [3] that can be
leveraged by attackers to modify a user’s view at the time when a memento is rendered in
a browser:
• Archive-Escapes: Archived web pages are supposed to be retrieved from the archive.
However, there may be links generated by JavaScript on the client (at replay time)
that are not rewritten by the archive (Chapter 2.2.6). Such links will be loaded from
the live web. Brunelle et al. [5] also provide some examples that illustrate the effect of
live resources linked from archived pages. Therefore, if attackers can own and control
the original server that hosts the live resource linked from the archive, then they can
inject malicious code (e.g., JavaScript) to change the client’s rendered view of the
archived page.
• Same-Origin Escapes: Before or at the time of archiving a web page (i.e., at crawl
time), the attacker may able to inject the malicious code in a third-party <iframe>
which cannot modify the main HTML file because of the Same-Origin Policy in the
live web, but once the page is archived, both the main HTML file and the <iframe>
will be loaded from archive.org at replay time, and the Same-Origin Policy becomes
ineffective.
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• Archive-Escapes + Same-Origin Escapes: The attacker can use Same-Origin
Escapes to create the first attack Archive-Escapes by injecting malicious JavaScript
code, which can control the representation of the replayed archived page.
• Anachronism-Injection: If a composite memento contains at least one resource
that has never been captured by the archive, then the attacker, who has access to the
original server hosting that never-archived resource, can publish a malicious version
of that resource, and then submit it to the archive. The archive will capture the
malicious resource which will be embedded in the composite memento.
We describe one example of such attacks. Figure 40 shows how the presentation of a
memento can be changed by the Archive-Escapes attack. Lerner et al. [3] developed a proof-
of-concept implementation of the Archive-Escapes attack. They found that the memento
(root URI-M)
http://web.archive.org/web/20110901233330/reuters.com
has the live web embedded resource
http://cdn.projecthaile.com/js/trb-1.js
The URI-R to the embedded resource was not rewritten by the archive because it is generated
on the client-side by JavaScript (as explained in Chapter 2.2.5). Using whois [116], the
authors found that the domain name projecthaile.com was not owned. They purchased
this domain name and injected malicious code in trb-1.js. The browser will try to load
all resources embedded in the page. Thus, when loading trb-1.js, the malicious code in
the JavaScript will change the representation of the memento. The Archive-Escapes attack
causes the user’s view to be completely controlled by the malicious code without even the
need to compromise the Internet Archive from which the memento is delivered.
Lerner et al. suggested some defenses that could be deployed by either web archives
or web publishers to prevent the exploit of these vulnerabilities. As a result, the Internet
Archive mostly solved this issue by using the Content-Security-Policy HTTP header [43].
The Content-Security-Policy response header notifies a user-agent (e.g., a web browser)
to not load resources except from specified domains (e.g., an archive’s domain).
The problem of having live web resources linked from archived pages may still occur in
the Internet Archive and other archives because there are several methods that can load live
web resources into archived pages as explained by Nelson [38,42].
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(a) Before the Archive-Escapes attack.
(b) After the Archive-Escapes attack.
Fig. 40: A proof of concept of Archive-Escapes attack. The main image in the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20110901233330/reuters.com has changed after insert-
ing malicious code (from Lerner et al. [3]).
Cushman and Kreymer created a shared repository [117] in May 2017 to describe poten-
tial threats [36,118] in web archives. They described seven different threats (some of which
overlap with those from Lerner et al. [3]):
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1. Archiving local server files: When crawling a web page, the archive may find links
to local resources in the archive itself (e.g., via http://localhost:8090/<file-path>),
and these resources should not be captured and should not be publicly available.
2. Hacking the headless browser: Web archives use web crawlers, such as the In-
ternet Archive’s Heritrix [72], to collect web pages. However, several web archives
including archive.is and Webrecorder (now named Conifer) [119] have started to
employ more modern headless browsers (e.g., PhantomJS [120]) which all have known
vulnerabilities.
3. Stealing user secrets during capture: After crawling a composite page by a user-
driven crawler, the standard cross-domain policies will not be effective at replay time,
which may result in stealing the user’s sensitive information. (This vulnerability is
related to the Same-Origin Escapes attack.)
4. Cross-site scripting to steal archive logins: If the domain name used to let users
log in to the archives is the same as the domain name used by the archive to replay
archived pages, then the admin of an archived page may be able to steal login infor-
mation of the archive users (e.g., login cookie) because, similar to the Same-Origin
Escapes attack, the cross-domain policies will be ineffective.
5. Live web leakage on playback: As explained in Chapter 4.1.9, JavaScript may
create links to live web resources that are not rewritten by the archive causing the
Archive-Escapes attack.
6. Showing different page contents when archived: It is possible that the original
server identifies that a web page is being crawled by the archive, the server then can
reply with content that is different from the normal content of the page. It is also
possible that the page is designed so that it knows it is being replayed from the archive,
so it shows different content.
7. Banner spoofing: Malicious code can also be used to change the appearance of the
archive’s banner. This is similar to the Archive-Escapes.
Some of the attacks, described above, may not have direct impact on generating repeat-
able fixity information. For example, by stealing a user’s login, the attacker may not be
able to change the content of archived pages. However, other attacks may directly change
the appearance of replayed web pages causing different fixity information. Therefore, we
need a technique that allows users to verify the fixity of archived pages. The attacks and
vulnerabilities that may prevent us from generating repeatable fixity information on the




• Archive-Escapes + Same-Origin Escapes
• Anachronism-Injection
• Live web leakage on playback
• Banner spoofing
The authors provide recommendations on how to avoid such threats. For example, the
first threat “Archiving local server files” occurs when a web crawler finds links that point
to local files (e.g., http://localhost:8080/path/to/file), which should not be public.
To protect local files, a web crawler should only use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS) [121, 122] when collecting web pages. The other solution is to run a web crawler
in a virtual machine (VM) [123], which adds another layer of protection by preventing the
running crawler from accessing local files.
Rosenthal et al. [37] described several threats against the content of digital preservation
systems (e.g., web archives). The authors indicated that designers of archives must be aware
of threats, such as media failure, hardware failure, software failure, communication errors,
failure of network services, media hardware obsolescence, software obsolescence, operator
error, natural disaster, external attack, internal attack, economic failure, and organizational
failure.
3.2 IDENTITY DERIVED FROM CONTENT (HASHES IN URIS
FOR FIXITY)
There have been approaches for embedding fixity information (e.g., hash values) in the
URI of a web resource. In this case, the URI has two purposes. First, it is used to retrieve,
via an HTTP request, the resource from the server. Second, the URI is used to verify that
the delivered content is actually the requested content.
In this section we describe two approaches, the trusty URI and Multihash, which are




Kuhn et al. [124, 125] define a trusty URI as a URI that contains a cryptographic hash
value of the content it identifies. The authors introduced this technique of using trusty
URIs to make digital artifacts, especially those related to scholarly publications, immutable,
verifiable, and permanent. With the assumption that a trusty URI, once created, is linked
from other resources or stored by a third party, it becomes possible to detect if the content
that the trusty URI identifies has been tampered with or manipulated on the way (e.g.,
trusty URIs to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks [126]). In addition, trusty URIs can
verify the content even if it is no longer found at the original URI but still can be retrieved
from other locations, such as Google’s cache and web archives.
In their second paper [125], they introduce two different modules to allow creating trusty
URIs on different kinds of content. In module F, the hash is calculated on the byte-level file
content, while in the module R, the hash is calculated on RDF graphs. Kuhn et al. introduce
the module R to indicate that there should be different guidelines for generating hash values
on different types of content instead of having only one byte-level-based technique. For
example, users should use the module R on RDF files. This allows producing the same
hash value for a single RDF graph even if the RDF graph is serialized in different RDF file
formats, which is not possible when using the module F. While calculating the hash value
on content of type F (byte-level file content) is a straightforward task, multiple steps are
required to calculate the hash value on content of type R (RDF graphs). This includes such
as converting any serialization (e.g., N-Quads [127] or TriG [128]) into RDF triples [129,130],
sorting of RDF triples lexicographically, serializing the graph into a single string, replacing
newline characters with “\n”, and dealing with self-references and empty nodes.
Figure 41 illustrates the general structure of trusty URIs. The artifact code, everything
after r1, is the part that makes this URI a trusty URI. The first character in this code (R)
is to identify the module. R, in the example in Figure 41, indicates that this trusty URI
was generated on a RDF graph. The second character (A) is to specify the version of this
module. The remaining characters from “5” to “0” represent the hash value calculated on
the content. All hash values are generated by the SHA256 algorithm.
There are multiple trusty URI implementations in different languages including Python,
Java, and Perl [131–133]. For example, the Python implementation of trusty URIs Trustyuri-
python computes (via the script ProcessFile.py) a hash value, or artifact code, on the content
of a file and renames the file based on the resulting hash. The library also can verify (via
CheckFile.py) a trusty URI by comparing a hash value included in the trusty URI with a
current hash value calculated on the content obtained after dereferencing the trusty URI.
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Fig. 41: The general structure of trusty URIs. The character in red is the module type,
the character in blue is the module version, and the characters in green are the hash value.
To illustrate how trusty URIs work, we use Trustyuri-python. First, we download
one of our research papers [134] using cURL as shown in Figure 42 (line 1). Second,
we run the Python script ProcessFile.py which will generate a hash value on the con-
tent of the PDF file tpdl-2015.pdf and rename it based on the resulting hash value to
tpdl-2015.FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao.pdf. Third, we publish
the trusty file on the web at the trusty URI http://www.cs.odu.edu maturban/pubs/tpd
l-2015.FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao.pdf. Anyone with this trusty
URI can verify the fixity of the content using CheckFile.py. As shown in Figure 43, the
output Correct hash: FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh-9gqFVao indicates
that the hash value in the trusty URI is identical to the hash value of the content obtained
from dereferencing the trusty URI. Thus, the trusty URI is verified.
1 $ curl --silent https :// www.cs.odu.edu /˜ maturban /pubs/tpdl -2015. pdf --
output tpdl -2015. pdf
2 $ python ProcessFile .py tpdl -2015. pdf
Fig. 42: The cURL downloads one of our research paper. The downloaded file will be named
tpdl-2015.pdf. The Python script ProcessFile.py computes a hash value on the content
of the file tpdl-2015.pdf and renames tpdl-2015.pdf based on the resulting hash value that
ends with Gm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao.pdf).
To see how the library detects any change in the original content, we replace all occur-
rences of the number “61” in the original paper tpdl-2015.pdf with the number “71” via the
commands shown in Figure 44. Figure 45 shows part of the first page of the paper before
and after changes. The library detects that the original resource has been changed as shown
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1 python CheckFile .py http :// www.cs.odu.edu /˜ maturban /pubs/tpdl -2015.
FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao .pdf
2
3 Correct hash: FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao
Fig. 43: Verify a trusty URI using the Python script CheckFile.py.
in Figure 46 using the Python script CheckFile.py.
1 $ pdftk tpdl -2015. FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao .pdf
output tmp.pdf uncompress
2 $ sed -i "s/61/71/g" tmp.pdf
3 $ pdftk tmp.pdf output tpdl -2015.
FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao .pdf compress
Fig. 44: Modify the content of the trusty file by replaying all occurrences of “61” with
“71”.
Even though trusty URIs can be used to detect altered documents, there are some limi-
tations. First, trusty URIs can be generated on only two types of content, RDF graphs and
byte-level content (i.e., no modules have been introduced for HTML documents). Second,
one hash function SHA-256 is used to generate the hash value, which might not be suitable
for some use cases or when the algorithm becomes vulnerable.
3.2.2 MULTIHASH
Multihash [135] is a protocol introduced by Juan Benet mainly to create self identifying
hashes for IPFS content [136], but the protocol can be utilized to identify other content like
regular web pages. Figure 47 shows the structure of self-described hashes by Multihash [135].
The elements of this structure include the following:
• Hash function code: This is an integer to indicate the hash function used to generate
the hash value. For example, 0x11, 0x12, and 0x13 identify SHA1, SHA2-256, and
SHA2-512, respectively. The default codes are available on Github1.




(a) The paper before the change is made.
(b) The paper after the change is made.
Fig. 45: A small change is made to the paper
• Hash function output: This is the actual hash value.
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1 $ python CheckFile .py http :// www.cs.odu.edu /˜ maturban /pubs/tpdl -2015.
FAofcNax1YMDFakhRQvGm1vTOcCqrsWLKeeICh9gqFVao .pdf
2 $ *** INCORRECT HASH ***
Fig. 46: Verifying a trusty URI using the Python script CheckFile.py.
Fig. 47: The structure of self-described hashes by Multihash.
The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) uses Multihash as a mechanism to generate
hashes calculated on the content of files and directories on the IPFS network. For instance,
the first two characters “Qm” in the IPFS address
/ipfs/QmZTR5bcpQD7cFgTorqxZDYaew1Wqgfbd2ud9QqGPAkK2V
have the information about the hash function (i.e., SHA256) used to generate the hash
value ZTR5bcpQD7cFgTorqxZDYaew1Wqgfbd2ud9QqGPAkK2V and the size of the hash value,
or digest.
IPFS files can be accessed through the public gateway https://ipfs.io/ipfs/<hash>
where <hash> is a Multihash hash of a file or a directory. For example, to download the file
identified by the hash
QmZTR5bcpQD7cFgTorqxZDYaew1Wqgfbd2ud9QqGPAkK2V
from the IPFS network, we can use cURL:
$ curl https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmZTR5bcpQD7cFgTorqxZDYaew1Wqgfbd2ud9QqGPAkK2V
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There are some differences between the trusty URI described in Chapter 3.2.1 and Mul-
tihash:
• Trusty URIs are generated using SHA256 only while Multihash provides the ability to
use any popular hash algorithm.
• Hashes generated by Multihash can be in any configured size while in trusty URIs
only a hash output of size 256 bits is used
• Trusty URIs support self-references (i.e., when trusty URIs are included in the con-
tent).
• Well-defined modules are introduced to create trusty URIs on byte-level content and
RDF graphs while in Multihash only byte-level content is supported
3.3 TRUSTED TIMESTAMPING
Timestamping is recording the date and time of when an event occurs. For example,
the HTTP Response headers Date and Last-Modified are examples of timestamps refer-
ring to different events (i.e., Date indicates when a server generated a response message,
while Last-Modified is the datetime of when the resource was last modified). A “trusted”
timestamp is a timestamp initially created and verified by a third-party trustworthy service.
Blockchain-based networks (e.g., Bitcoin [137,138]) have been receiving increased attention
recently as trustworthy systems for initiating and validating timestamps of digital docu-
ments. Once a file is timestamped in the blockchain, anyone should be able to prove the
existence of the file at a particular point in time.
Generating a hash value on the content of a memento is one of the crucial parts in
the process of timestamping the memento. As shown in Figure 48, the memento is not
directly timestamped in the blockchain. Instead, a hash value calculated on the content of
the memento is the data to be timestamped. Thus, it is important to be able to reproduce
the same hash of a particular memento over time. The difficulties of generating repeatable
hashes is discussed in Chapter 6.
The Bitcoin blockchain [137] is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system built using the
Blockchain technology [138]. A ledger that contains all transactions in Bitcoin is duplicated
across all nodes in the network (i.e., there is no central agency). The timestamp associated
with each transaction indicates when the transaction is accepted in the Bitcoin. Services,
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Fig. 48: Timestamping a hash value that summarizes a memento in the blockchain.
such as OriginStamp [139], Chainpoint [140,141], and OpenTimestamps [142,143], generate
trusted timestamps in Bitcoin for digital documents. Even though timestamping steps might
vary from one service to another, they follow a common procedure:
1. Receiving a file, a hash, or plain text from a user
2. Generating a hash value of received content
3. Converting the hash to a Bitcoin address
4. Issuing a Bitcoin transaction using the Bitcoin address as a money sender or receiver
To verify timestamps in Bitcoin at any point in the future, the first three steps mentioned
above are performed. The fourth step then would include issuing a query through the
Bitcoin API to obtain information about any transactions on the given Bitcoin address.
We consider the timestamp associated with the Bitcoin transaction as a trusted timestamp.
Being incorruptible is the key characteristic of Bitcoin as any change in a transaction or a
block requires computational power that exceeds the entire network, which is theoretically
possible but unlikely to occur practically. The other important feature of Bitcoin is the
decentralization of a distributed ledger which contains all transactions ever made in Bitcoin
(i.e., the ledger is duplicated across all nodes).
Tools have been developed to generate trusted timestamps in blockchain-based networks.
OriginStamp [144] allows users to submit plain text, a hash value, or any file format (e.g.,
PDF/PNG files). The data is not sent to the OriginStamp’s server. Instead, it is hashed in
the user’s browser and only the resulting hash is transmitted to the server. Once delivered, it
will be added to the list of all hashes submitted by other users. Once per day, OriginStamp
generates a single aggregated hash of all received hashes. This hash is then converted to a
Bitcoin address that will be a part of a new Bitcoin transaction (i.e., the source or destination
of a transaction in Bitcoin). The timestamp associated with the transaction is considered
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a trusted timestamp. OriginStamp provides an instant timestamping in the Bitcoin if a
user is willing to pay a Bitcoin transaction fee. A user can verify a timestamp through
OriginStamp’s API or by visiting their website. The server first receives a hash from a user,
then OriginStamp converts the hash to a Bitcoin address and sends a query to Bitcoin’s
API. If any transaction involved the given address is returned, the timestamp associated
with the transaction can be used as a proof of existence. In addition to the process of
verifying timestamps through OriginStamp’s website, users may verify timestamps directly
in Bitcoin.
Other services, such as Chainpoint, Proof of Existence [145], and OpenTimestamps,
are based on the same concept of using blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin) to timestamp digital
documents. Some differences between these tools include:
• Cost - The OriginStamp service can be used with no charge unless users want an
instant submission to the blockchain. Users of Proof of Existence, on the other hand,
have to pay some fees for the service.
• Generation of aggregated hashes - In OriginStamp, an aggregated hash is computed
by storing all hashes received within a day (i.e., 24 hours) in a file, which then will be
hashed to generate a single aggregated hash. Chainpoint and OpenTimestamps use a
Merkle Tree [146] to generate one aggregated hash (i.e., root hash).
• The number of Bitcoin transactions v. hashes - Services like OriginStamp, Chain-
Point, and OpenTimestamps support issuing either one Bitcoin transaction per sub-
mitted hash or one transaction per aggregated hash. Other tools, such as Proof of
Existence, create one Bitcoin transaction per hash.
• Use - OriginStamp and Proof of Existence provide online services through their web-
sites that allow users to create or verify trusted timestamps using a web browser.
Chainpoint and OpenTimestamps require installing client software in order to use the
timestamping service.
• Blockchain-based network - Bitcoin is commonly used by all of these services to gen-
erate trusted timestamps. In addition, Chainpoint can create timestamps using other
blockchain networks like Ethereum [147].
Even though users of the tools mentioned above can pass data by value, such as plain
text, any file format, or a hash value, they are not allowed to submit data by reference (i.e.,
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passing a URI of a web page). In other words, these services are not directly timestamping
web pages. The only exception is an additional service [4] established by OriginStamp.
The service works by receiving a URI from a client and hashing the content of the web
page identified by the URI before submitting to the blockchain. Figure 49 (from [4]) shows
the UI of this service where users can search for timestamped web pages by entering a
URI. There are two disadvantages of this additional service. First, the service is no longer
available on the live web2. Second, the hash is only generated on the HTML content of the
main file identified by the URI, ignoring all embedded resources like images, scripts, and
style sheets [4]. As illustrated in Chapter 1.4, not including embedded resources in hash
calculation may leave the page vulnerable to undetected changes.
Fig. 49: A list of timestamped web pages. Users can search for a particular web page by
typing a URI or text (from [4]).
Collomosse et al. introduced ARCHANGEL [148]. The main difference between other
timestamping services and ARCHANGEL is that it was developed with the objective to
timestamp mainly archived pages at time of content deposition using blockchain. The
authors introduced a prototype implemented using Ethereum, and they plan to investigate
different ways to generate hash values on different format, such as PDFs, images, and videos.
The authors did not describe whether the approach can work with composite mementos.
Branwen [1] wrote a shell script to calculate a hash value by considering all resources
constructing a web page (e.g., images and stylesheets) in addition to the base HTML file.
2https://www.isg.uni-konstanz.de/web-time-stamps/
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This seems to be a reasonable solution for timestamping web resources, but without consid-
ering other factors, such as the effect of JavaScript on replayed web pages, transient errors,
and content added by a third-party services, it is difficult to produce a repeatable hash for
the same web page over time.
In summary, timestamping in blockchain-based networks can be used to generate trusted
timestamps, but regarding timestamping archived web pages we showed that state-of-the-
art timestamping services in blockchain-based networks do not allow users to submit URIs
(i.e., not accepting data by reference). Second, it is hard to generate repeatable hash values
on the content of archived web page as will be explained in Chapter 6.
3.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLICATION
Preserving only a single copy of a digital resource makes it subject to threats described
in Chapter 3.1. To maintain archived resources and make them accessible for a long period
of time, multiple copies of the same resource should be preserved [37]. For example, the
Internet Archive makes a complete copy of the Wayback Machine (all mementos captured
between 1996 and 2002), in addition to thousands of other digital resources including films
and television broadcast, available at Bibliotheca Alexandrina [149]. The Internet Archive
has other backup collections available in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and University of
Toronto and University of Alberta in Canada [150,151].
The Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe (LOCKSS) system [152] is a peer-to-peer digital
preservation system used by libraries worldwide to preserve published scholarly content.
The system allows each subscribed library to have its own copy of a document if the library
has access permission from a publisher. Thus, the number of copies of a document in
LOCKSS network depends on the number of libraries that have access to the document and
collect it. The auditing mechanism in LOCKSS allows libraries, or nodes, in the network
to compare same content with each other through a particular voting protocol, the opinion
poll protocol. If a node identifies a corrupted document (i.e., it does not agree with the
majority), it can request a valid copy from an other node (that agrees with the majority).
The node that receives a repair request will send a valid copy only if it is aware that the
requester used to maintain an uncorrupted copy. Here are the simplified steps that a node
in LOCKSS follows for verifying the fixity of an archival resource, or an archival unit (AU),
and repairing it if damaged [153]:
1. A LOCKSS peer (or poller) starts a poll for verifying the fixity of the content of an
AU.
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2. Because each node has a list of a small number of peers that maintain the same AU,
it invites these peers to the poll.
3. Each of these peers (or voters) can accept to participate in the poll or reject if it is
busy with other tasks.
4. Each voter computes a hash value on the content of its own version of the AU and
sends it back (i.e., the vote) to the poller.
5. Based on the votes received, the poller makes one of the three decisions (voters do not
need to be informed about the poll’s results):
(a) If the majority of voters agree with the poller’s version of the AU, the fixity of
the AU is verified and it waits for the next regular poll.
(b) If the majority of voters disagree with the poller’s version of the AU, the fixity of
the AU fails and the poller will randomly select one of the voters that disagrees
with it to repair the damaged AU. The selected voter sends its version of the AU
to the poller, and the poller then starts a poll on the received AU.
(c) If the majority of votes do not agree nor disagree with the poller’s version of the
AU, human interaction is required.
6. If the poller does not have enough votes (e.g., less than a certain threshold) to start a
poll, the voters can invite other peers to the poll.
These are several reasons why the LOCKSS opinion poll protocol cannot be used to
verify the fixity of mementos preserved in public web archives:
• LOCKSS peers communicate with each other, for example, to repair damaged archival
units, invite other peers to a poll, and other activities. On the other hand, web archives
generally do not communicate with each other, and they may use different set of tools
and APIs.
• In general, the number of peers in LOCKSS (more than 200 peers) is greater than
the number of public web archives (fewer than 40 independent web archives [154]).
Moreover, the number of web archives that support on-demand archiving is around
six archives.
68
• Each LOCKSS peer is considered independent and allowed to participate in polls.
However, not all web archives are independent. For example, archive-it.org is a
subscription-based service developed by the Internet Archive. Several European web
archives might be managed by the same organization (e.g., European Union).
• Some web archives might be independent but not “trusted” (e.g., Michael’s Evil Way-
back introduced in Chapter 1) resulting in even smaller margins.
• Discovering copies of an AU in LOCKSS is faster than discovering mementos in web
archives. In LOCCKS, each peer keeps a list of peers that have copies of an AU. In
web archives, we have to use tools like Memento aggregators to discover mementos.
3.5 COMPUTING FIXITY INFORMATION USING WEB
PACKAGING
Web packaging [155, 156] is an emerging standard. It has been introduced with the
objective to distribute web pages packaged in a way that allows receivers (e.g., a user-
agent) to verify that the content is from a particular origin and to view the content offline.
The web packaging specification defines three related layers:
1. Signed HTTP exchanges [157]: This allows an origin to sign an HTTP Exchange
(i.e., an HTTP request and corresponding response) with its cryptographic private
key.
2. Bundled HTTP exchanges [158]: Multiple signed (or unsigned) HTTP exchanges
are aggregated into a single “bundle” along with metadata to indicate how the bundle
should be interpreted.
3. Loading Signed Exchanges [159]: This specifies several algorithms for validating
digital signatures.
In addition to the WARC format, a bundle in web packaging can be viewed as another
way of aggregating web resources in a single file. Web packaging can also be considered
as replacement of WARC format in the future [160]. Alam et al. [161] suggest some im-
provements to the current web packaging specification so that it meets the need of the web
archiving community, such as extending Loading Signed Exchanges to support time-based
content negotiation.
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Related to our work of verifying the fixity of composite mementos, web packaging theo-
retically can be used to download a composite memento, packaged in a bundle, with a single
HTTP request. This should reduce playback-related changes, such as transient errors and
TimeMap changes. However, we are not able to use web packaging (i.e., bundles) to deliver
composite mementos because web packaging currently is not supported by any web arch-
ive even though web packaging might become an Internet standard in the near future [162].
Browsers that support web packaging in the future can render composite mementos, received
in bundles, without the need to load more resources from the archive.
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented some threats and attacks against web archives that can
affect the archived content at ingest time, in the archive, or at the replay time. We ex-
plained two mechanisms that use cryptographic hash values in URIs (i.e., trusty URIs and
Multihash). These hash values are computed on the content of resources that the URIs
identify, so they can be used to verify the fixity of resources. We point to some tools (e.g.,
OriginStamp, Chainpoint, and OpenTimestamps) for trusted timestamping mementos us-
ing blockchain-based network. We briefly explain how the opinion poll protocol works in




DEFINING AN ARCHIVE-AWARE HASHING FUNCTION
This chapter contributes toward addressing RQ1 and RQ2:
RQ1: Can we identify and quantify the types of changes on the playback of mementos
that prevent generating repeatable fixity information?
RQ2: Given the types of changes identified in the playback of mementos, can we define
the final guidelines for generating repeatable fixity information (defining an archive-aware
hashing function)?
This chapter describes our archive-aware hashing function for generating fixity infor-
mation on the playback of mementos. Developing an archive-aware hashing function that
works on archived web pages is important as conventional hashing functions (e.g., MD5) are
not suitable for replayed archived web pages as described in Chapter 1.4 and 1.5, and in
details in Chapter 6. We, initially, introduce several guidelines that the hashing function
should follow for generating fixity information (Chapter 4.1). We notice that even if these
predefined guidelines are considered, our archive-aware hashing function still produces dif-
ferent aggregated hash values on the same mementos over time. For that, we conduct a
study (Chapter 6) to understand, identify, and quantify changes on the playback of me-
mentos causing different fixity information. The study is conducted on a dataset of 16,627
composite mementos selected from 17 public web archives. (Chapter 5 describes multiple
methods we used to collect the dataset.) We download each composite memento several
times and compute their fixity information using our initial archive-aware hashing function.
The results of the study highlight the need to add additional guidelines (Chapter 4.2) for
generating fixity information. The new guidelines include the use of multiple hash values
representing each composite memento. These hash values can help us detect which resource
in a composite memento has changed over time.
Chapter 7 describes our framework that we use to store and discover fixity information.
The framework also explains how we can verify the fixity of archived pages using fixity
information previously generated and pushed into web archives.
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4.1 INITIAL GUIDELINES FOR GENERATING FIXITY
INFORMATION ON THE PLAYBACK OF MEMENTOS
In this section, we describe several guidelines we should follow to generate fixity infor-
mation on the playback of mementos.
4.1.1 FIXITY INFORMATION SHOULD BE GENERATED ON A COMPOS-
ITE MEMENTO
When generating fixity information on a composite memento, it is important that we
include all resources comprising the composite memento. If we consider only the base HTML
file, changes in embedded resources (e.g., an image) will not be detected. In other words, we
will get false negative results indicating that the composite memento has not been changed
as illustrated in the following scenario.
We first pushed the web page (Figure 50(a))
https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-trade-goods-and-servi
ces-april-2020
into a private web archive, Evil Wayback1 (evil-wayback.github.io), on June 15, 2020.
The URI-M of the memento is
https://evil-wayback.github.io/web/20200615114013/www.bea.gov/news/
2020/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-april-2020/
We replayed the memento at two different times, on June 15, 2020 and June 17, 2020, which
resulted in two slightly different representations as shown in Figures 50(b) and 50(c).
Figure 51 shows an example of calculating the hash on only the base HTML file. The
cURL command downloads the HTML of the memento, and then the hashing function
sha256sum generates a SHA-256 hash on the resulting HTML. As expected, this simple
technique does not detect changes in the embedded image as it produces the same hash
value that ends with 221a on June 15, 2020 and on June 17, 2020.
Figure 52, on the other hand, shows a shell script that generates one aggregated hash on
a composite memento by including all embedded resources in the hash calculation through
the following steps:
1. Download a composite memento, including the base HTML file and all embedded
resources, using Wget [51] (line 1 in Figure 52). The output files will be stored locally
in a directory hierarchy related to the paths of the files in the server.
1We created this archive to demonstrate different scenarios
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(a) The live web page on June 15, 2020.
(b) Replaying the archived page on June 15, 2020.
(c) Replaying the archived page on June 17, 2020.
Fig. 50: Replaying a memento at two different times. An image in the memento has




2 Mon Jun 15 17:20:37 EDT 2020
3 $ curl -s https :// evil - wayback . github .io/web /20200615114013/ www.bea.gov
/news /2020/ us - international -trade -goods -and -services -april -2020/ |
shasum -a 256
4
5 01 c8cd5606e22bb69799ba567cb41aae3d9873aea6215dba19acdbb0b56e221a -
6
7 $date
8 Wed Jun 17 19:01:14 EDT 2020
9 $ curl -s https :// evil - wayback . github .io/web /20200615114013/ www.bea.gov
/news /2020/ us - international -trade -goods -and -services -april -2020/ |
shasum -a 256
10 01 c8cd5606e22bb69799ba567cb41aae3d9873aea6215dba19acdbb0b56e221a -
Fig. 51: cURL command to generate a SHA-256 hash value on only the HTML content. It
produces the same hash value as there are no changes in the HTML of the archived page.
2. Generate a SHA-256 hash on the entity body of each resource. The set of resulting
hash values will be aggregated and stored in the file allhashes.txt (lines 5-10).
3. Read the hash values from allhashes.txt, use them as input to the hashing command
shasum -a 256 which will generate one aggregated SHA-256 hash value that represent
the content of the composite memento (line 12).
We used the shell script from Figure 52 to generate a single aggregated hash value on
June 15, 2020 and June 17, 2020. As shown in Figure 53, the resulting aggregated hash
values (marked in red) are different because of changes in the image trad0420.png (marked
in red in Figures 50(b) and 50(c)). The resulting hash values of the image on June 15th
and June 17th are marked in green in Figure 53. The example shown in Figure 53 indicates
that it is important to include all resources comprising a composite memento in the hash
calculation.
4.1.2 EXCLUDE ARCHIVE-SPECIFIC CONTENT
Including all resources embedded in a composite memento in the hash calculation should
help identify changes over time. However, we need to identify embedded resources added by
web archives. As explained in Chapter 1.5.1 and Chapter 2.2.5, web archives add archive-
specific resources to the original content and also transform the original content to appropri-
ately replay them in the browser. Including archive-specific content in the hash calculation
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1 FILE=$(nice -n 20 wget --continue --unlink --page - requisites --
timestamping -e robots =off -k --user -agent =" Firefox 6.4" "$1" 2>&1 |
egrep 'Saving to: .*' | sed -e 's/ Saving to: âĂŸ //' | tr -d 'âĂŹ ')
2
3 for TARGET in $FILE; do
4 if [ -f " $TARGET " ]; then
5 CONT=$(cat $TARGET )
6 HASH=$(echo " $CONT" | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')
7 echo "$HASH" >> " allhashes .txt"




12 FINAL_HASH =$(cat " allhashes .txt" | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')
13
14 echo "Final hash: $FINAL_HASH "
Fig. 52: The shell script aggregated hash.sh for generating a single hash on the content of
a composite memento by aggregating all hash values of the embedded resources in a single
temporary file and hashing the file. This shell script is a modified version of the original
script written by Branwen [1].
may prevent generating repeatable hash values. For example, Figure 54 shows the Internet
Archive’s banner (marked in red), which is used by the archive to convey information to
users about the archived page. For instance, in Figure 54(a), the archive indicates that
the displayed page is an archived page captured on February 12, 2020 from the original
page https://www.cnn.com. The banner also shows the number of available mementos for
the original page (marked in green) in the archive. As shown in Figure 54, we replayed
the archived page at two different times on June 17, 2020 at 12:04 PM GMT and at 12:55
PM GMT. Within about 50 minutes, the number of available mementos in the archive for
https://www.cnn.com has increased from 298,983 to 298,986. Thus, if we include such
information (e.g., from the archive’s banner) in the hash calculation, we may get different
aggregated hash values.
There are various techniques that we can use to identify archive-specific resources:
1. Archives that support the Memento protocol should respond with the HTTP Link
response header containing http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegotiate and also
rel="type" to requests of resources that are not mementos and are excluded from HTTP
content negotiation based on the time dimension. For example, we should exclude the
file wayback-toolbar-logo.png as it is not a memento, as shown in Figure 55.
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1 $date
2 Mon Jun 15 17:21:44 EDT 2020
3 $ ./ aggregated_hash .sh https :// evil - wayback . github .io/web /2020061511401




















23 Wed Jun 17 19:03:45 EDT 2020
24 $ ./ aggregated_hash .sh https :// evil - wayback . github .io/web /2020061511401


















Fig. 53: Using the shell script aggregated hash.sh (Figure 52) to generate an aggregated
hash on a composite memento. The hash of the image trad0420.png is maked in green. The
aggregated hash value is marked red. The resulting aggregated hash values are different
because of changes in the image trad0420.png.
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(a) Replaying the archived page on June 17, 2020 at 12:04 PM GMT.
(b) Replaying the archived page on June 17, 2020 at 12:55 PM GMT.
Fig. 54: Replaying an archived CNN page from the Internet Archive on June 17 at 12:04
PM GMT and at 12:55 PM GMT. The archive’s banner shows that the number of available
mementos in the archived (marked in green) has increased from 298,983 to 298,986. Thus,
including archive-specific resources, such as the archive’s banner, in hash calculation will
affect the process of generating repeatable fixity information.
2. Archives that support the Memento protocol also include the HTTP response header
Memento-Datetime for mementos. Those responses without this header are not mementos
and are likely archive-specific resources. For example, as shown in Figure 55, there is
no Memento-Datetime response header, so the image wayback-toolbar-logo.png is not a
memento. The image is added by the archive as a part of the archive’s banner.
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1 curl -I https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive / images / toolbar /
wayback -toolbar -logo.png
2
3 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
4 Date: Mon , 06 Nov 2017 22:35:53 GMT
5 Server : Apache - Coyote /1.1
6 Link: <http :// mementoweb .org/terms/ donotnegotiate >; rel =" type"
7 Accept - Ranges : bytes
8 ETag: W /"4549 -1486118270000"
9 Last - Modified : Fri , 03 Feb 2017 10:37:50 GMT
10 Content -Type: image/png
11 Content - Length : 4549
12 Content - Language : en
Fig. 55: One way to identify archive-specific resources is to look at the HTTP Response
header “Link” that contains http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegotiate.
3. The third technique for identifying archive-specific resources, especially for archives that
do not support the Memento protocol, is by looking at the URI of a resource retrieved
from the archive. Archives usually use a particular URI-M structure (described in Chap-
ter 2.2.4). If the URI of a resource does not match the archive’s URI-M structure, then
the resource is not a memento, and it should be excluded from the hash calculation. For
example, as explained in Chapter 2.2.4 (Figure 23), the URI-M structure used by the
Internet Archive consists of the domain name, archival collection identifier, timestamp,
and URI-R. For instance, the URI-M
https://web.archive.org/web/19961120150251/http://www.usnews.com:80/
is a URI to a memento, while the URI
https://web.archive.org/ static/images/toolbar/wayback-toolbar-logo.png
is not a URI to a memento (e.g., no timestamp included in the URI).
We want to avoid including archive-specific content in hash calculations for two reasons.
First, as mentioned, this type of content does not belong to the original page. Second, the
archive-specific resources, such as the Wayback Machine’s banner, are expected to change
over time due to, for example, updates in the archival replay system (e.g., the Wayback
Machine software). In addition, archive-specific resources may carry dynamically-generated
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information corresponding to the current state of an archive. Thus, we need to avoid
including these archive-specific resources when calculating fixity information.
4.1.3 USE THE ORIGINAL HTTP ENTITY BODIES AND HEADERS, IF
AVAILABLE
At replay time, web archives transform the content of an original web page by rewriting
all links in the page (Chapter 2.2.5) so that all resources comprising the page (e.g., links to
images) are retrieved from the archive, not from the live web. In addition to rewriting links,
archives may add HTML comment tags to indicate that the page is being retrieved from the
archive as shown in Figure 56. These HTML comment tags always contain current date and
time resulting in an aggregated hash value that is different on each replay. Therefore, we
should retrieve original content from web archives instead of the transformed and modified
content.
1 <!--
2 FILE ARCHIVED ON 06:01:32 Feb 12, 2020 AND RETRIEVED FROM THE
3 INTERNET ARCHIVE ON 08:45:42 Jun 17, 2020.
4 JAVASCRIPT APPENDED BY WAYBACK MACHINE , COPYRIGHT INTERNET ARCHIVE
.
5




10 playback timings (ms):
11 PetaboxLoader3 . resolve : 66.907 (2)
12 RedisCDXSource : 150.069 (7)
13 esindex : 0.144 (7)
14 LoadShardBlock : 1288.393 (24)
15 PetaboxLoader3 . datanode : 490.328 (25)
16 exclusion . robots : 2.797 (7)
17 load_resource : 180.865
18 exclusion . robots . policy : 2.64 (7)
19 CDXLines .iter: 90.396 (12)
20 -->
Fig. 56: The Internet Archives inserts HTML comment tags to convey information, such
as the memento creation/retrieval date and time.
Most web archives allow users to access the original pages without rewriting their content
(i.e., accessing raw mementos as described in Chapter 2.2.7). The most common mechanism
to retrieve the raw mementos is by adding id [89,90] after the timestamp in the requested
URI-M. Retrieving and using raw mementos in generating fixity information will help us get
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more consistent and repeatable hash values. For example, Figure 57 shows that generating
fixity information on the base HTML file of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/19961120150251/http://www.usnews.com:80/
results in the same hash value when id is used to request the memento from the archive.
Otherwise, we get a different hash value each time the memento is retrieved. Figure 58
shows an example of replaying the memento with and without the id option. The raw
memento is not replayed properly (Figure 58(b)) because all URIs in the base HTML file
are not rewritten to be relative to the archive.
1 $ date
2 Wed Jun 17 05:33:08 EDT 2020
3 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105 id_/http :// www.cnn.
com :80/ | shasum -a 256
4 166056 cfe7c161d9669e75c8a6208e6ad705f3c330f96664ded3370fb85b8b15 -
5 $ date
6 Wed Jun 17 05:51:23 EDT 2020
7 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105 id_/http :// www.cnn.
com :80/ | shasum -a 256
8 166056 cfe7c161d9669e75c8a6208e6ad705f3c330f96664ded3370fb85b8b15 -
9 $ date
10 Wed Jun 17 06:01:32 EDT 2020
11 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105 id_/http :// www.cnn.




15 Wed Jun 17 05:35:00 EDT 2020
16 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105/ http :// www.cnn.com
:80/ | shasum -a 256
17 7 fffc863900ce2389013cc856eb0bb08c8867fd71a755627e5160b58bb503fcf -
18 $ date
19 Wed Jun 17 05:51:35 EDT 2020
20 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105/ http :// www.cnn.com
:80/ | shasum -a 256
21 c7f8463570907308266934a518eff6cc3716aefa9a5400d9d6b46be94ca14a85 -
22 $ date
23 Wed Jun 17 06:01:42 EDT 2020
24 $ curl -s https :// web. archive .org/web /20100923005105/ http :// www.cnn.com
:80/ | shasum -a 256
25 63 fcf404221d001e71cc8f830d38dd926bc6ee274daba5f62fa9c53370c6b533 -
Fig. 57: An example of considering a raw memento (downloaded using id ) in the hash
calculation, which always results in the same hash value (the first three HTTP requests).
In contrast, we get a different hash value each time the rewritten memento is used in the
hash calculation (the last HTTP requests).
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(a) The rewritten memento https://web.archive.
org/web/20100923005105/http://www.cnn.com:
80/.
(b) Requesting the raw memento using the
id option https://web.archive.org/web/
20100923005105id_/http://www.cnn.com:80/.
Fig. 58: Rewritten mementos vs raw mementos.
4.1.4 IF RAW MEMENTOS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, WE MAY EXTRACT
ORIGINAL CONTENT FROM REWRITTEN MEMENTOS
Some web archives, such as webcitation.org, do not serve raw mementos. In order to
generate repeatable fixity information, we need to extract the original content by removing
any code added by web archives. Jones et al. [91–93] explore how several web archives
transform original content and introduce several rules for acquiring mementos. Web archives
may provide mementos in multiple file formats. For example, archive.is does not allow
accessing the raw content. However, it serves a composite memento packaged in a ZIP file.
The content stored in the ZIP file is transformed by the archive, but the content that usually
changes (e.g., the banner) is not included in the ZIP file. In December 2019, the archive.is
had a major update in its service, including the use of a real web browser to capture web
pages, instead of the PhantomJS headless browser [163]. As a result, the archive no longer
provides the ZIP file for mementos created after December 1, 2019.
For some archives that do not provide access to raw mementos, it may be difficult, or
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even impossible in some cases, to extract the content of the original page from a trans-
formed/rewritten archived page. Archive.is, for example, transforms the original page by
removing any JavaScript code and HTML attributes, and converting style sheets to inline
properties [84], which is different from how the Wayback Machine transform the original con-
tent. Berlin [84] describes different techniques used by web archives to transform archived
web pages.
In general, if we do not have access to raw mementos, we should exclude archive-specific
content, that we can identify, from being included in the hash calculation.
4.1.5 VERIFY THAT ARCHIVES REPLY WITH THE ACTUAL ORIGINAL
CONTENT IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR RAW MEMENTOS
Web archives may reply with the HTML 30x Redirect status codes to requests of
mementos for two reasons:
1. Archival 30x Redirect: At crawl time, web archives capture web resources with
30x Redirect responses (i.e., the original resources reply with the HTTP 302 Found
or 301 Moved Permanently status codes). Therefore, at replay time, archives should
respond with the same original status code (i.e., 30x Redirect) to requests of such
archived resources.
2. Non-archival 30x Redirect: Archives may respond with 30x Redirect to requests
of mementos that are not available or cannot be served at the time of the request (i.e.,
the request redirects to the closest available memento).
In general, archives commonly return responses that include rewritten HTTP entity
bodies and headers to requests for rewritten mementos regardless of the original HTTP
status codes. For example, one of the archived pages of http://www.carper.senate.gov/




When requesting this memento, as expected, the archive replies with the rewritten HTTP
entity body and headers so that all links are relative to the archive as shown in Figure
60. However, we notice different behavior by archives in response to requests for either
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raw mementos whose original HTTP status codes are 30x redirect or raw mementos that
should return non-archival HTTP 30x redirect. We explain below how the three archives
vefsafn.is, webharvest.gov, and archive.org react differently to requests for such raw
mementos:
• vefsafn.is: The archive returns a custom HTML page with 200 OK for requests for
raw mementos. This occurs especially when the HTTP status code of the original
response is 302 Redirect (i.e., archival 302). When the archive returns 200 for re-
quests for raw mementos, it is an indication that the archive has successfully processed
the request and returned the raw content, but this is not always the case as Figure
61(a) illustrates. The returned page by the Icelandic Web Archive vefsafn.is is not
the raw version. It contains links pointing to the closest memento that satisfies the
request. Such behavior might be applied by the archive to prevent redirects to the
live web, but the rewritten content, most likely, affects the hash calculation, resulting
in different hash values.
• webharvest.gov: The archive simply returns the HTTP status code of the origi-
nal resource, which actually may be 30x Redirect to the live web as Figure 61(b)
(webharvest.gov) shows. Unlike vefsafn.is, the archive webharvest.gov does not
use a custom HTML page to handle requests for raw mementos.
• archive.org: As shown in Figure 61 (archive.org), the archive returns 302 Redirect
with a rewritten HTML page (marked in blue in Figure 61(c)), which is different
from how vefsafn.is handles the raw memento requests. Unlike webharvest.gov,
archive.org does not respond with 302 Redirect that redirects to the live web.
We do not consider any resources retrieved from the live web in hash calculation. Thus,
the 302 Redirects to the live web by webharvest.gov do not affect generating repeatable
hashes. Similarly, the technique that archive.org uses to respond to raw requests does
not affect hash calculation because the archive returns a 302 Redirect to the closest raw
memento. Although this 302 Redirect response unexpectedly has a rewritten HTML page,
its content is fixed (i.e., the content is not expected to change over time). However, the
custom HTML page returned by vefsafn.is might prevent generating repeatable hashes
because the returned HTML page has content that is expected to change (e.g., the banner).
4.1.6 AVOID MEMENTOS SERVED FROM CACHE
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1 $ curl --silent -IL http :// www. carper . senate .gov/ | egrep -i "( HTTP
/1.1| Date :|ˆ Location :)"
2
3 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
4 Location : https :// www. carper . senate .gov/
5 Date: Fri , 03 Jul 2020 10:24:38 GMT
6 HTTP /1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
7 Location : http :// www. carper . senate .gov/ public /
8 Date: Fri , 03 Jul 2020 10:24:38 GMT
9 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
10 Location : https :// www. carper . senate .gov/ public /
11 Date: Fri , 03 Jul 2020 10:24:38 GMT
12 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
13 Date: Fri , 03 Jul 2020 10:24:38 GMT
Fig. 59: The HTTP request to the live web page http://www.carper.senate.gov/ re-
sulted in multiple HTTP redirects.
1 $ curl --silent -IL https :// www. webharvest .gov/ congress115th
/20181221213254/ http :// www. carper . senate .gov/ | egrep -i "( HTTP
/1.1|ˆ Location :)"
2
3 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
4 Location : / congress115th /20181221213254/ http :// www. carper . senate .gov/
public /
5 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
6 Location : / congress115th /20181221213257/ http :// www. carper . senate .gov/
public /
7 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
8 Location : / congress115th /20181221213257/ https :// www. carper . senate .gov/
public /
9 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
10 Location : / congress115th /20181221213240/ https :// www. carper . senate .gov/
public /
11 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
Fig. 60: The HTTP request to the archived web page https://www.webharvest.gov/
congress115th/20181221213254/http://www.carper.senate.gov/.
Web archives may use web caching for performance purposes to speed up subsequent
requests. For example, the Wayback Machine’s HTTP Response header X-Page-Cache
indicates whether the returned content is delivered from cache (X-Page-Cache: HIT) or
not (X-Page-Cache: MISS). Although caching has powerful benefits, the returned content
may not reflect what is actually in the archive. Figure 62 shows content that is not served
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(a) vefsafn.is. (b) webharvest.gov.
(c) archive.org.
Fig. 61: Three archives react differently to requests for raw mementos. The archive
vesafn.is returns a custom HTML page with 200 OK which might cause different hashes.
The archive webharvest.gov issues 302 Redirect to the live web, while archive.org re-
turns 302 Redirect (with a rewritten “unexpected to change” HTML page—marked in
blue) to the closest raw memento that satisfies the request. The way that webharvest.gov
and archive.org react to requests for raw mementos does not affect the hash calculation
until they install a new version of Wayback and configuration changes.
from the cache (i.e., X-Page-Cache: MISS). The issue is that cache hits produce a risk of
calculating the same hash even if the archived page has changed. For example, we issued
different HTTP requests for the same memento (Figure 63). The first response was actually
not from the cache with computed MD5 hash ending in 7afd3, while the two responses
that follow were from the cache. The MD5 hash value calculated on the content of each of
the two responses were identical to the first hash value, because the content served from
the cache is an exact copy of the content returned upon the first request. Now, because
the content on the cache is only stored for a “short” period of time (depending on how the
caching system is configured) before it is discarded (or updated), the fourth response was
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not a cache hit. The archived page seems to be changed since we obtain a different MD5
hash value ending in b1059. Thus, we should not consider content served from the cache
when computing a memento’s fixity information.
1 curl -i http :// web. archive .org/web /20130724144801/ http :// www.cnn.com/
2
3 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
4 Server : Tengine /2.1.0
5 Date: Mon , 02 Oct 2017 11:10:15 GMT
6 Content -Type: text/html; charset =utf -8
7 Content - Length : 147311
8 Connection : keep -alive
9 X-Archive -Orig - expires : Wed , 24 Jul 2013 14:48:55 GMT
10 X-Archive -Orig -vary: Accept - Encoding
11 X-Archive -Orig -last - modified : Wed , 24 Jul 2013 14:47:16 GMT
12 X-Archive -Orig -cache - control : max -age =60, private
13 X-Archive -Orig -date: Wed , 24 Jul 2013 14:46:36 GMT
14 Memento - Datetime : Wed , 24 Jul 2013 14:48:01 GMT
15 Link: <http :// www.cnn.com />; rel =" original ", <http :// web.archi
16 ve.org/web/ timemap /link/http :// www.cnn.com />; rel =" timemap "; ...
17 X-App - Server : wwwb -app23
18 X-ts: ----
19 X-Archive - Playback : 0
20 X- location : All
21 X-Page -Cache: MISS
22
23 ...
Fig. 62: The memento is not served from the cache as the HTTP Response header
X-Page-Cache:MISS indicates.
4.1.7 EXCLUDE RESOURCES WITH INCORRECT HTTP STATUS CODES
Web archives may respond with inaccurate HTTP status codes, which affects generating
repeatable fixity information. For example, for resources that are not found in the arch-
ive (e.g., non-archival 404), the archive should respond with the HTTP 404 status code.
However, we have encountered cases in which the archive responds with 200 OK (instead of
404). In this case, the archive replies with soft 404—responding with 200 OK status code
and an HTTP entity indicating that the resource was not found in the archive [164]. For





2 Mon Oct 2 01:15:18 EDT 2017
3 % curl --silent http :// web. archive .org/web /20130724144801/ http :// www.




8 Mon Oct 2 01:16:29 EDT 2017
9 % curl --silent http :// web. archive .org/web /20130724144801/ http :// www.




14 Mon Oct 2 01:19:31 EDT 2017
15 % curl --silent http :// web. archive .org/web /20130724144801/ http :// www.




20 Mon Oct 2 02:10:24 EDT 2017
21 % curl --silent http :// web. archive .org/web /20130724144801/ http :// www
22 .cnn.com/ | md5
23 dda6a9bf091d412cbdc2226ce3eb1059
Fig. 63: The first cURL request was not served from the cache (i.e., X-Page-Cache: MISS)
while the second and third request were cache HITs. After about an hour, the fourth request
was a cache MISS and produces a different hash. This example shows that cache HITs
produce the same hash even though the memento might have changed.
returned a 200 status code as shown in Figures 64 and 65 with an entity body indicating
the resource is not available in the archive. Most web archives, such the Internet Archive,
do not use or return soft 404 unless it is how the original server responds at crawl time.
In general, if we are able to detect responses with soft 4xx/5xx, they should not be part
of the hash calculation.
4.1.8 INCLUDE SELECTED HTTP RESPONSE HEADERS IN HASH CAL-
CULATION
We should include values of important HTTP response headers in hash computation. For
instance, by hashing the HTTP header Location, we can identify if mementos are served
from different locations, and we want to keep track of such behavior. Another important
header is Content-Type through which we can identify if the format of the resource has
changed. For example, an archive may start serving a video in the MPEG-4 format [165]
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: http :// www. collectionscanada .gc.ca/ webarchives
/20061026030606/ http :// www. regulations .gov/ fdmspublic / component /main
4 WARC -Date: 2017 -12 -28 T01 :13:26 Z
5 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :4 e530b30 -eb6c -11e7 -8926 -079 a54998c73 >
6 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
7 Content - Length : 11037
8
9 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
10 Date: Thu , 28 Dec 2017 01:13:15 GMT
11 Server : Apache - Coyote /1.1
12 ETag: " pv4e2543f6d7ff101f765de8e5085241b1 "
13 Vary: Accept - Encoding
14 Content - Language : en -US
15 Content -Type: text/html; charset =UTF -8
16 Content - Length : 10604
17
18 <! DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-// W3C // DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict //EN"
19 "http :// www.w3.org/TR/ xhtml1 /DTD/xhtml1 - strict .dtd">





25 <strong >URL :</ strong > <span class =" nowrap ">http :// www. regulations .gov/
fdmspublic / component /main </span ><br /><br /></p>
26 <!--<h2 ></h2 >-->
27 <p><strong >Sorry , no documents with the given url were found in this




Fig. 64: Our WARC records show that the Canadian archive replies with soft 404—
returning 200 Ok with an entity body indicating that the resource is not available in the
archive.
that was previously served using a different format, such as MPEG-2 [166]. Rosenthal
et al. [167] implemented a proof-of-concept system that demonstrated how an archive can
use HTTP content negotiation to transparently migrate resources from one MIME type
to another (e.g., image/gif to image/png). This can be useful if a format type becomes
obsolete (as recently happened with Adobe Flash [168]) or otherwise legally encumbered (as
happened with GIF [169]). Other HTTP response headers that should be included in hash
calculation are the original headers that begin with X-Archive-orig-.
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Fig. 65: The Canadian archive responds with soft 404 to the request of a memento that
is not available in the archive (i.e., returning 200 OK with an HTTP entity indicating that
the resource is not in the archive).
4.1.9 EXCLUDE ANY RESOURCES FROM THE LIVE WEB
At replay time, a web archive rewrites all URIs found in an original web page so they
point to the archive, not to the live web. However, there are URIs, generated by client-side
JavaScript code, that will not be rewritten by the archive. Therefore, the web resources
specified by such URIs will be retrieved from the live web. Because live web resources often
change or disappear over time, we do not want to include such resources when computing
fixity information.
Brunelle et al. [5] introduced multiple examples of mementos that when replayed in the
browser have embedded resources retrieved from the live web, not from the archive. For
example, the memento
http://web.archive.org/web/20080903204222/http://www.cnn.com/
is from 2008. When replayed in 2012, the memento included an embedded resource (loaded
by JavaScript) that was retrieved from the live web, which was about the 2012 presiden-
tial election between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (Figure 66), not about the 2008
presidential election between Barack Obama and John McCain.
The Internet Archive uses the HTTP header Content-Security-Policy (explained in
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Chapter 3.1) to avoid loading live web resources linked from archives. However, the issue
may still occur in the Internet Archive and other archives.
Fig. 66: An archived CNN web page from 2008. When it is replayed in 2012, the adver-
tisement image was about the 2012 presidential election, not about the 2008 presidential
election (from [5]).
4.1.10 FIXITY INFORMATION CANNOT BE COMPUTED FOR MEMEN-
TOS WITH TRANSIENT ERRORS
Before generating fixity information on a composite mementos, we should verify that
the base HTML file and all resources embedded in the composite memento are retrieved
without any transient errors. A transient error is a temporary error that is expected to
disappear after a short period of time. The HTTP 500 Server Error is an example of a
transient error. It indicates that the server (or the archive) has experienced an unexpected
condition preventing it from completing the request. Figures 67 and 68 show an example of
a transient error where the memento
https://webharvest.gov/congress111th/20110111060640/http://house.gov/
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is replayed/downloaded 20 times. There was a transient error in download 11 since the
archive replied with HTTP 503 Service Unavailable. We do not see this transient error
in the other downloads.
Fig. 67: An example of a transient error. Replaying a memento 20 times. The archive
replies with HTTP 503 Service Unavailable at download 11.
1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// www. webharvest .gov/ congress111th /2011011106064
4 0/ http :// house.gov //
5 WARC -Date: 2018 -01 -31 T00 :27:29 Z
6 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :856 f9220 -061d -11e8 -b159 -57 a39c6ec8eb >
7 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
8 Content - Length : 307
9
10 HTTP /1.1 503 Service Unavailable
11 Date: Wed , 31 Jan 2018 00:27:19 GMT
Fig. 68: A transient error example of HTTP 503 Service Unavailable returned by the
archive on January 31, 2018.
Transients errors may affect either the base HTML file (i.e., the root URI-M) as shown




which is embedded in the memento
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170302155612/http://cereals.a
hdb.org.uk/
was requested at two different times. The HTTP entity of the image was successfully
delivered on December 01, 2017 (Figure 69(a)). However, because of a transient error, only
part of the HTTP entity body was delivered on December 07, 2017 (Figure 69(b)). We can
identify this type of transient error by comparing the Content-Length response header of
the resource with the actual size of the HTTP entity body. If the actual size of the entity is
smaller than the value of the Content-Length response header, then the entity body is not
successfully delivered. For instance, Figure 70 shows the actual size (459,640 bytes) of the
HTTP entity body and headers of the image illustrated in Figure 69(b), which is smaller
than the actual size of the entity body (642,336 bytes).
(a) The image was successfully delivered on December
01, 2017.
(b) The image was not successfully delivered on De-
cember 07, 2017.
Fig. 69: The image is downloaded two time. Because of an transient error, only part of
the HTTP entity body of the image was delivered on December 07, 2017.
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid:fd24929e -d651 -11e7 -8f56 - e839354e74f7 >
4 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive . nationalarchives .gov.uk
/20170303010736 id_/https :// cereals .ahdb.org.uk/media /1157842/
corporate -strategy -1. jpg
5 WARC -Date: 2017 -12 -01 T04 :42:08 Z
6 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
7 Content - Length : 643398
8
9 HTTP /1.0 200
10 Content -Type: image/jpeg
11 Content - Length : 642336





17 WARC -Type: response
18 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid:fc89d63d -db35 -11e7 -9c4a - e839354e74f7 >
19 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive . nationalarchives .gov.uk
/20170303010736 id_/https :// cereals .ahdb.org.uk/media /1157842/
corporate -strategy -1. jpg
20 WARC -Date: 2017 -12 -07 T10 :04:18 Z
21 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
22 Content - Length : 459640
23
24 HTTP /1.0 200
25 Content -Type: image/jpeg
26 Content - Length : 642336
27 Date: Thu , 07 Dec 2017 10:04:18 GMT
Fig. 70: A transient error example of an incomplete entity body. We can identify this type
of error by comparing the value of Content-Length with the actual size of the entity body.
In this example, the entity body is incomplete on December 07, 2017 because the actual size
of the entity (459,640 bytes) is smaller than the value of Content-Length (642,336 bytes).
Transient errors also include situations where there is no response from the archive to
HTTP requests for mementos. For example, Figures 71 shows that there is a “timeout”
error to the request of a memento from the Canadian archive webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca
on March 26, 2020, and Figure 72 shows that the HTTP request to the homepage of the
WebCite archive www.webcitation.org resulted in the transient error “curl: (6) Could not
resolve host”. They are transient errors because they disappeared after a short time.
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1 $ date
2 Thu Mar 26 02:31:40 EDT 2020
3 $ curl -I http :// webarchive .bac -lac.gc.ca :8080/ wayback /20060127185447/
http :// www.boaa.gc.ca/
4 curl: (7) Failed to connect to webarchive .bac -lac.gc.ca port 8080:
Operation timed out
Fig. 71: A “timeout” transient error example.
1 $ date
2 Mon Jul 01 01:33:15 EDT 2019
3 $ curl -I www. webcitation .org
4 curl: (6) Could not resolve host: www. webcitation .org
Fig. 72: A transient error example showing that the host does not resolve.
4.1.11 ARCHIVED WEB PAGES MAY BE IN FLUX
On the playback of a composite memento, there may be one of more embedded resources
that have not been captured by the archive (e.g., 404 Not Found). Some web archives
simply return the HTTP 404 Not Found to requests for these resources without any further
actions. However, other web archives behave differently by trying to capture these resources
from the live web, but they will not make these resources available before the next request
of the composite memento. Therefore, replaying mementos at least once before computing
fixity information can trigger services in the archives to capture embedded resources that
have not been archived. For example, the image
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209193553im /http://wac.450F.edgecastcdn.n
et/80450F/noisecreep.com/files/2009/06/aaron a042209eb 200.jpg
which is embedded in the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209193553/http://noisecreep.com/aaron-har
ris-of-isis-talks-twitter/
returns 404 Not Found on November 17, 2017, and it becomes 200 OK on November 18,
2017, as shown in Figure 73. We notice that the creation date (Memento-Datetime) of
the image is November 18, 2017, which indicates that archives may change during our
observations.




2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// web. archive .org/web /20141209193553 im_/http ://
wac .450F. edgecastcdn .net /80450 F/ noisecreep .com/files /2009/06/
aaron_a042209eb_200 .jpg
4 WARC -Date: 2017 -11 -17 T00 :34:17 Z
5 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :0 bc5bfe0 -cb2f -11e7 -8c10 - b775c1a97b16 >
6 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
7 Content - Length : 241
8
9 HTTP /1.1 404 NOT FOUND
10 X-ts: ----
11 Server : Tengine /2.1.0
12 X-App - Server : wwwb -app23
13 Date: Fri , 17 Nov 2017 00:33:54 GMT





19 WARC -Type: response
20 WARC -Target -URI: https :// web. archive .org/web /20141209193553 im_/http ://
wac .450F. edgecastcdn .net /80450 F/ noisecreep .com/files /2009/06/
aaron_a042209eb_200 .jpg
21 WARC -Date: 2017 -11 -18 T10 :33:14 Z
22 Content - Length : 406
23
24 HTTP /1.1 302 FOUND
25 Date: Sat , 18 Nov 2017 10:32:49 GMT
26 Location : https :// web. archive .org/save/ _embed /http :// wac .450F.




29 WARC -Type: response
30 WARC -Target -URI: https :// web. archive .org/save/ _embed /http :// wac .450F.
edgecastcdn .net /80450 F/ noisecreep .com/files /2009/06/
aaron_a042209eb_200 .jpg
31 WARC -Date: 2017 -11 -18 T10 :33:14 Z
32 âĂę
33 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
34 Date: Sat , 18 Nov 2017 10:32:51 GMT
35 Content -Type: image/jpeg
36 Content - Location : /web /20171118103250/ http :// wac .450F. edgecastcdn .net
/80450 F/ noisecreep .com/files /2009/06/ aaron_a042209eb_200 .jpg
Fig. 73: Replaying a composite memento on November 17, 2017. One of the embedded
images returns 404 Not Found on November 17, 2017 before it becomes 200 OK the next
day.
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Based on these initial guidelines for generating fixity information on the playback of
mementos, we conducted a study (Chapter 6) to determine if these guidelines can produce
repeatable fixity information. We used 16,627 composite mementos selected from 17 public
web archives. We downloaded each composite memento 39 times within 14 months. Af-
ter each download of a composite memento, we generated an aggregated hash value that
represented content of the composite memento. We expected the resulting 39 aggregated
hash values of each composite memento to be identical. However, the result of our study
indicates that 88.45% of mementos produced multiple unique aggregated hash values even
after considering the initial guidelines.
One of the main reasons for getting different aggregated hash values on the same com-
posite memento over time is JavaScript. When JavaScript code is executed (e.g., in a web
browser), it may load additional resources in the composite memento. These resources may
be selected randomly by JavaScript, which would result in different aggregated hash values.
For example, as shown in Figure 74, each time the memento
https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20190102192824/https://www.rochester.edu/
is replayed, a different background image is loaded by JavaScript. Figure 75 shows the
corresponding JavaScript code. The function Math.random() is used to select an image
randomly from a pool of nine images.
The other reason for getting different aggregated hash values on the same composite
memento over time is changes in TimeMaps as explained in Chapter 2.3.3. Web archives
may not be able to serve some mementos because, for example, their index files are tem-
porarily unavailable. Therefore, web archives may respond at different times with different
TimeMaps.
For example, the JavaScript file
https://web.archive.org/web/20120306231221/http://an.yandex.ru/system/co
ntext.js
which is embedded in the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20120306231221/http://www.echo.msk.ru:80/blo
g/milov/865094-echo
is requested on January 31, 2018. The redirect points to
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(a) Reload # 1. (b) Reload # 2.
(c) Reload # 3. (d) Reload # 4.
Fig. 74: Each time the memento http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/




before it redirects to
https://web.archive.org/web/20120305025731/http://an.yandex.ru/system/co
ntext.js
which returns 200 OK. When requesting the same JavaScript file
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1 var random_images_array = [
2 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /seven.jpg" .../ div >',
3
4 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images / eleven .jpg" .../ div >',
5
6 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images / hero_three2x .jpg" .../ div >',
7
8 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /homepage -quad.jpg" .../ div >',
9
10 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /homepage -student - smiling .jpg"
.../ div >',
11
12 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /homepage -student -lab.jpg" .../
div >',
13
14 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /homepage -research - faculty .jpg"
.../ div >',
15
16 '<div class ="hero -site yellow "><div class ="hero -image"><img
src =" assets / hero_images /homepage - eastman .jpg" .../ div
>',
17 ];
18 function getRandomImage (imgAr) {
19 var num = Math.floor( Math. random () * imgAr. length );
20 var img = imgAr[ num ];
21 var imgStr = img; console .log( imgStr );
22 document .write( imgStr ); document .close ();
23 }
24 getRandomImage ( random_images_array , '/ images /');
Fig. 75: Because of the function Math.random(), each time the JavaScript code is executed,
an image will be selected randomly (out of 9 images).
https://web.archive.org/web/20120306231221/http://an.yandex.ru/system/co
ntext.js




which returns 200 OK. Therefore, the same entity is served from two different URI-Ms over
time.
Although the inconsistency in the returned TimeMaps may be unacceptable, it is bene-
ficial as it makes web archives respond quickly to memento requests.
As a result of our study, we introduce additional guidelines:
• Because of the effect of JavaScript and changes in TimeMaps, there can be more than
one correct aggregated hash value calculated on the playback of a composite memento
over time.
• When generating fixity information on the playback of a composite memento, we can
generate multiple aggregated hash values that are calculated using different hashing
techniques:
1. URI-M-based hashing (Chapter 6.7.1): Only the URI-Ms of resources embedded
in a composite memento are included in the hash calculation.
2. Entity-based hashing (Chapter 6.7.2): Only the HTTP entity bodies of resources
embedded in a composite memento are included in the hash calculation.
3. Complete hashing (Chapter 6.1): The HTTP entity bodies and headers, URI-Ms,
and the HTTP status codes of resources embedded in a composite memento are
included in the hash calculation.
• The fixity information generated on a composite memento should include not only
the multiple aggregated hash values, but also fixity information generated on each
resource embedded in the composite memento.
We introduce an archive-aware hashing function (Figure 76) that consists of multiple
steps:
• It follows the guidelines defined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to generate fixity information
on the playback of archived web pages. The archive-aware hashing function should
produce multiple aggregated hash values on the playback of a composite memento
using multiple hashing techniques (Chapter 6.7.2). It should also produce fixity infor-
mation for each resource comprising the composite memento.
• The resulting aggregated hash values should be stored in a specific file, or manifest,
in any standard serialization format (e.g., JSON) along with other metadata about
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the memento. This file then is published at a well-known web location (e.g., at the
Archival Fixity server in Figure 76) before it is pushed into multiple web archives
(Chapter 7).
• The manifest file then is disseminated to web archives using one of the two approaches,
Atomic and Block (Chapter 7).
In general, we want web archives to monitor web archives where a memento is preserved
in a particular archive (e.g., archive.org) and its fixity information are preserved by other
web archives, such as archive.is and perma.cc. The evaluation of our framework is
described in Chapter 7.
Fig. 76: The archive-aware hashing function.
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter describes our archive-aware hashing function for generating fixity informa-
tion on the playback of mementos. We start by introducing several initial guidelines that our
archive-aware hashing function should follow for generating fixity information. We also pro-
vide examples and explanation of reasons that prevent generating repeatable fixity informa-
tion including the impact of transient errors, caching servers, archive-specific resources, live
web leakage, the rewriting process at replay, reconstructing composite mementos, changes
in HTTP response headers and entities, and handling raw mementos. Next, we introduce
additional guidelines based on results from our 14-month study on 16,627 composite me-
mentos. We introduce these additional guidelines because of the effect of JavaScript and
changes in TimeMaps on producing repeatable fixity information.
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CHAPTER 5
COLLECTING A LARGE DATASET OF MEMENTOS
Even though web archives hold billions of archived web pages [69], obtaining a sample
of mementos can be difficult. This chapter describes four methods used to create a dataset
of 16,627 URI-Ms of 3,698 URI-Rs from 17 public web archives [170]. We discovered many
more mementos, but we explain why we applied filters and set conditions to reduce the
number of selected mementos. We use this collection in our study of identifying changes in
the replay of mementos over time (Chapters 6 and 7)
To obtain a memento, lookup by URI-R is widely supported by most web archives, but
this requires a user to know the URI of an original page. Table 2 shows a list of 17 public
web archives which we classify in the following categories:
• General: Archives preserve any web page discovered through large-scale web crawlers.
• On-demand: In general, only web pages (URI-Rs) submitted by users are captured,
but the archive might also create archived collections or obtain a copy of collections
captured by other archives.
• Subscription-based: Each subscriber makes a separate collection of URI-Rs (i.e.,
seed URI-Rs) and can indicate how frequently these URI-Rs should be crawled in
addition to other options. The archive usually crawl more pages by following links
found in the already crawled web pages identified by the seed URI-Rs.
• National: Archives preserve a government or country’s web content. They might
capture web pages with one or more specific Top-Level Domains (TLDs).
• Organizational: Archives preserve web pages that are about specific organizations,
such as the European Union. This category also includes archives maintained by
universities and state governments to preserve their own websites.
Table 3 shows the actual number of collected mementos (URI-Ms) per archive and also
the distribution of selected mementos through time. We explain in the rest of this section
how we obtained this set of 16,627 mementos.
During the process of collecting mementos, we obtained many archived pages, but be-
cause of the following requirements for our target study, we only selected 16,627 mementos:
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TABLE 2: A set of 17 public web archives.
Archive URI Archive Name Purpose
swap.stanford.edu Stanford Web Archive Portal General




arquivo.pt The Portuguese Web Archive National
collectionscanada.gc.ca Library and Archives Canada National
digar.ee The Estonian Web Archive National
nationalarchives.gov.uk The National Archives National
vefsafn.is The Icelandic Web Archive National
webarchive.loc.gov Library of Congress Web
Archives National
webarchive.org.uk The UK Web Archive (UKWA) National
webarchive.proni.gov.uk Public Record Office of
Northern Ireland (PRONI) National
webharvest.gov Congressional & Federal
Government Web Harvests National
archive-it.org
Archive-It - Web Archiving






europarchive.org The European Archive Organizational
1. Downloading mementos is a slow operation and since the bottleneck is the archives
themselves, parallelization will not help. We chose a target of completing the download
of all mementos from all the archives within 40 hours. We also planned to do no more
than two such downloads per week in order to limit the load on the archives.
2. Since we want to study changes in the playback of mementos over time, we chose 200
as the minimum number of URI-Rs per archive.
3. The number of selected mementos from each web archive should not exceed 1,600.
This condition should help reducing the difference between large archives and small
archives in terms of the number of sampled mementos.
5.1 COLLECTING THE INITIAL SET OF URI-RS
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TABLE 4: URI-R source count.




MOZ 2017-06-08 500 500
Memento damage 2017-06-08 1,535 1,535
HTTP Archive 2017-04-15 6,657,856 6,657,856
WAHR
#climatemarch 2017-04-19 –2017-05-03 175,278 41,674






#WomensMarch 2017-01-12 –2017-01-28 2,403,637 526,903
#YMMfire 2016-08-20 335,276 45,327
Total 15,434,243 8,220,606
We collected URI-Rs from four different sources. The first 500 URI-Rs were from Moz
[171], which provides a list of the top 500 domains on the web. The second set consists
of 1,535 URI-Rs from a previous study [172] about investigating memento damage. The
third set contains 6,657,856 URI-Rs that are publicly available in the HTTP Archive [173].
The final set of URI-Rs (8,774,352) is from the Web Archives for Historical Research group
(WAHR) [174].
We included the first two sources even though they are relatively small compared to
the other two sources because (1) we wanted our final selected set of URI-Rs to have
some top/well-known web pages (i.e., URI-Rs from Moz), and (2) the URI-Rs from the
study of memento damage contains a mixture of URI-Rs with different path lengths (e.g.,
www.example.com/path/to/file.html). The main characteristic of URI-Rs that belong
to the first and third source (i.e., Moz and HTTP Archive) is that the URI-R consists of a
domain name only (e.g., www.example.com). The URI-Rs from WAHR are extracted from
tweets about the hashtags #climatemarch, #MarchForScience, #porteouverte, #paris,
#Bataclan, #parisattacks, #WomensMarch, and #YMMfire between December 11, 2015
and May 3, 2017. Table 4 shows the number of collected URI-Rs including the number of
URI-Rs by hashtag from the WAHR source. The total number of unique URI-Rs from all
four sources is 8,220,606.
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1 $ python canonicalize .py http :// www. example .com
2 com , example )/
3
4 $ python canonicalize .py http :// www. example .com :80
5 com , example )/
6
7 $ python canonicalize .py www. EXAMPLE .com
8 com , example )/
Fig. 77: An example showing three different URI-Rs that map to the same URI-R (in
SURT format [6]) using the canonicalization function from [7]
We merged all 8,220,606 unique URI-Rs from the four sources into a single list. The
order of how URI-Rs are placed on the list is as follows:
1. Moz’s URI-Rs were placed on the top of this list followed by URI-Rs from our Memento
damage study.
2. We repeatedly selected 10 URI-Rs from HTTP Archive and 10 URI-Rs from WAHR,
choosing 10 from a different hashtag each round.
The order of URI-Rs in the list is important because we decided to work with a smaller
number of URI-Rs for our study.
5.2 MEETING THE DATASET REQUIREMENTS
From this initial set of 8,220,606 URI-Rs, we used four different methods in sequence to
meet the requirements outlined earlier.
5.2.1 METHOD 1: SELECT THE 10,000 URI-RS
To limit the total number of URI-Rs, we chose to start with the first 10,000 unique URI-
Rs from our initial dataset of 8,220,606 that met certain conditions. URI-Rs must be canon-
icalized to determine whether or not a URI-R with a particular domain name and file path
length has already been selected. We used the canonicalization function that is part of PyWb
[7]. The function indicates that http://www.example.com, http://www.example.com:80,
and www.EXAMPLE.com are the same, as shown in Figure 77. The output of this canonical-
ization function is in Sort-friendly URI Reordering Transform (SURT) format [6].
In addition to the canonicalization function, we issued an HTTP HEAD request to
discover if two URI-Rs redirect to the same web resource. As Figure 78 shows, sending a
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1 $ curl -sIL fb.com | egrep -i "( HTTP /|ˆ location :)"
2 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
3 Location : https :// www. facebook .com/
4 HTTP /2 200
Fig. 78: An example showing two different URI-Rs that redirect to the same URI-R.
HTTP HEAD request to www.fb.com redirects to https://www.facebook.com/ (which we
already had), and we selected only the latter.
Also, the selected URI-Rs must contain a variety of file path lengths that we group into
the following five sets, each of which contains 2,000 URI-Rs:
• s0: Path length of zero
- www.example.com
• s1: Path length of one
- www.example.com/file1.html
• s2: Path length of two
- www.example.com/1/file2.html
• s3: Path length of three
- www.example.com/1/2/file3.html
• s4+: Path length of four or more
- www.example.com/1/2/3/file4.html
The final two conditions for selecting the first 10,000 URI-Rs are as follows:
1. URI-Rs with the same file path length should not have the same domain name. For
example, if www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpPG0bKHYKc has already been selected, then
www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFhiV5X5QM4 will not be selected. This may help to col-
lect more unique URI-Rs and vary the content we plan to study.
2. The TimeMaps of selected URI-Rs must contain at least one memento, as our further
work is to study any change or transformation in the content of mementos over time.
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To retrieve TimeMaps, we used the LANL Memento aggregator1. Once a TimeMap is
downloaded, we reduced the number of mementos in the TimeMap to one memento per year
from each archive. TimeMaps returned from LANL’s aggregator have more information and
metadata than we need for our further study. Therefore, we wrote two Python scripts, avail-
able on Github2. The script timemap.py extracts only URI-Ms and their Memento-Datetime
from the returned TimeMaps, while the second script yearly-filter.py filters TimeMaps
by selecting one memento (the first) per year by archive. Figure 79 shows an example of a
TimeMap with 64 mementos of the URI-R http://www.futureofmusic.org/about/positi
ons.cfm, and Figure 80 shows the corresponding TimeMap after filtering. It contains only
10 mementos.
Table 5 shows the number of selected URI-Rs per source and path length, and Table 6
shows that 13% of the selected URI-Rs currently have either the HTTP status code 4xx or
5xx. Even though these URI-Rs are no longer live, they are archived.
TABLE 5: The initial collected set of URI-Rs per source by path length (results of Method
1).
Path length
Source s0 s1 s2 s3 s4+ Total
MOZ 286 17 3 2 1 309
HTTP Archive 1,581 42 70 2 0 1,695
Memento Damage 114 63 62 42 60 341
#climatemarch 4 74 98 89 99 364





8 758 716 855 711 3,048
#WomensMarch 3 723 734 749 734 2,943
#YMMfire 3 161 144 122 152 582
Total 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 10,000
Table 7 (column Method 1) shows the list of 16 web archives from which the mementos
of our 10,000 URI-Rs are collected (there is one archive, nationalarchives.gov.uk, that
has not been counted yet because it has not contributed any mementos). The total number
of URI-Rs in the table exceeds 10,000 because a URI-R often has mementos in multiple





2 % python timemap .py http :// www. futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm >
full - timemap .txt
3 % cat full - timemap .txt
4 20120328211040 http :// www. webcitation .org /66 VfNacdz
5 20141021161223 http :// archive .is /20141021161223/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
6 20141021175005 http :// archive .is /20141021175005/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
7 20141021175817 http :// archive .is /20141021175817/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
8 20141106145319 http :// archive .is /20141106145319/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
9 20141106151301 http :// archive .is /20141106151301/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
10 20070114182707 https :// web. archive .org/web /20070114182707/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
11 ... <18 mementos from 2007 -2008 > ...
12 20090122061339 https :// web. archive .org/web /20090122061339/ http ://
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
13 20090228213737 https :// web. archive .org/web /20090228213737/ http ://
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
14 20120607045812 https :// web. archive .org/web /20120607045812/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
15 20120607045828 https :// web. archive .org/web /20120607045828/ http ://
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
16 20130323010922 https :// web. archive .org/web /20130323010922/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
17 20130323011136 https :// web. archive .org/web /20130323011136/ http ://
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
18 20131231022915 https :// web. archive .org/web /20131231022915/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
19 20140819212552 https :// web. archive .org/web /20140819212552/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
20 20150320143837 https :// web. archive .org/web /20150320143837/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
21 20160325184708 https :// web. archive .org/web /20160325184708/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
22 20070114182707 https :// web. archive .org/web /20070114182707/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
23 20070209043456 https :// web. archive .org/web /20070209043456/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
24 ... <26 duplicate mementos from web. archive .org > ...
Fig. 79: The TimeMap of http://www.futureofmusic.org/about/positions.cfm con-
tains 64 mementos from three different archives: https://web.archive.org, https:
//archive.is, and https://www.webcitation.org.
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1 % cat full - timemap .txt | python yearly - filter .py > yearly - filter .txt
2 % cat yearly - filter .txt
3 20120328211040 http :// www. webcitation .org /66 VfNacdz
4 20141021161223 http :// archive .is /20141021161223/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
5 20070114182707 https :// web. archive .org/web /20070114182707/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
6 20080109053549 https :// web. archive .org/web /20080109053549/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm#ed
7 20090122061339 https :// web. archive .org/web /20090122061339/ http ://
futureofmusic .org :80/ about/ positions .cfm
8 20120607045812 https :// web. archive .org/web /20120607045812/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
9 20130323010922 https :// web. archive .org/web /20130323010922/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
10 20140819212552 https :// web. archive .org/web /20140819212552/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
11 20150320143837 https :// web. archive .org/web /20150320143837/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
12 20160325184708 https :// web. archive .org/web /20160325184708/ http :// www.
futureofmusic .org/about/ positions .cfm
Fig. 80: The TimeMap of https://www.futureofmusic.org/about/positions.cfm after
filtering. It contains only 10 mementos (the first memento per year is selected from each
archive).
TABLE 6: The final URI-R HTTP status codes of the initial collected set of URI-Rs
(results of Method 1).
HTTP status code
Path length 200 4xx/5xx Total
s0 1,870 130 2,000
s1 1,651 349 2,000
s2 1,715 285 2,000
s3 1,720 280 2,000
s4+ 1,731 269 2,000
Total 8,687 1,313 10,000
unique URI-Rs is still 10,000. The total number of URI-Ms in all TimeMaps is 12,988,039.
This number drops to 48,199 URI-Ms after applying the one memento per year filter.
From Table 7, we notice that several archives have a small number of URI-Rs and URI-
Ms. Since we want to study the playback fidelity of the web archives, we chose 200 as the
minimum number of URI-Rs per archive. After applying Method 1, we used three additional
methods to discover more mementos from web archives that have fewer than 200 URI-Rs.
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TABLE 7: The four methods used to collect URI-Rs/URI-Ms. The table indicates (shown
in bold) that (1) seven archives satisfy the condition of 200 URI-Rs by Method1 (2) five
additional archives satisfy the condition of 200 URI-Rs by Method 2, (3) four other archives
satisfy the condition by Method 3, and (4) the last archive that satisfies the condition of
200 URI-Rs by Method 4.
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
Archive URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs
web.archive.org 32,139 9,790 40,258 10,353 45,155 10,924 45,155 10,924
archive.is 2,322 1,284 3,229 1,526 3,471 1,654 3,471 1,654
archive-it.org 3,500 804 7,986 1,355 8,994 1,593 8,994 1,593
archive.bibalex.org 3,363 568 6,176 941 7,286 1,148 7,286 1,148
webarchive.loc.gov 2,721 418 7,122 934 7,766 1,062 7,766 1,062
arquivo.pt 1,410 324 3,154 758 3,430 895 3,430 895
webcitation.org 1,125 472 1,858 725 1,954 775 1,954 775
europarchive.org 407 106 911 287 992 324 992 324
swap.stanford.edu 609 132 1,176 283 1,233 304 1,233 304
vefsafn.is 19 7 1,520 246 1,715 294 1,715 294
webharvest.gov 84 21 743 227 826 248 826 248
webarchive.org.uk 12 5 27 8 907 228 907 228
digar.ee 333 129 513 223 518 228 518 228
webarchive.proni.gov.uk 138 48 316 141 480 213 480 213
nationalarchives.gov.uk 0 0 0 0 1,011 200 1,011 200
collectionscanada.gc.ca 8 6 59 50 359 200 359 200
perma.cc 9 6 101 71 154 111 290 200
Total 48,199 14,120 75,149 18,128 86,251 20,401 86,387 20,490
5.2.2 METHOD 2: DISCOVER ADDITIONAL URI-RS FROM THE HTML
OF ALREADY COLLECTED MEMENTOS
For each archive that has not satisfied the 200 URI-Rs condition, we downloaded the raw
content of already collected mementos from the archive and extracted all URI-Rs found in
the HTML. Using the LANL Memento aggregator, we requested the TimeMap of each URI-









1 $ python extract_urirs .py http :// wayback . vefsafn .is/ wayback
/20041020191800 id\_/http :// www.w3.org/
2 http :// www.csail.mit.edu/
3 http :// www. google .com/
4 http :// www.ilog.com/
5 http :// www.inria.fr/
6 http :// jigsaw .w3.org/css - validator /
7 http :// www.w3.org/ People / Raggett /tidy/
8 http :// validator .w3.org/
9 http :// www.w3.org /2004/ MWeb/ Overview .html
10 http :// purl.org/rss /1.0/
11 ...
Fig. 81: An example of extracting URI-Rs from the HTML of the memento http://
wayback.vefsafn.is/wayback/20041020191800id_/http://www.w3.org/ (only 9 URI-
Rs, out of 138, are shown). Notice that we used the option id in the URI-M to retrieve
the archived unaltered, or raw, content of the memento.
Three archives are not included in the list above. The first reason being that Method 2 can-
not be applied for nationalarchives.gov.uk because the archive has not yet provided any
mementos. The second is that the archives europarchive.org and digar.ee satisfied the
condition of 200 URI-Rs after applying Method 2 to swap.stanford.edu and vefsafn.is,
respectively.
As shown in Table 8, any new discovered URI-Rs/URI-Ms with this method caused the
information from all archives to be updated even for archives that already had more than
200 URI-Rs. Figure 81 shows an example of URI-Rs extracted from the HTML of the
memento
https://wayback.vefsafn.is/wayback/20041020191800id /http://www.w3.org/
The URI-Rs are extracted from the attribute href in the <a> tags (using the Python
script extract urirs.py3). We downloaded the TimeMap of the URI-R www.inria.fr/
which had not previously been selected. As Figure 82 shows, the TimeMap does not
only contain mementos from vefsafn.is but also mementos from eight other archives:
web.archive.org, archive.bibalex.org, webcitation.org, webarchive.loc.gov, archi
ve-it.org, archive.is, vefsafn.is, and digar.ee.




TABLE 8: After applying Method 2 to seven archives, five archives satisfy the condition of
200 URI-Rs (shown in bold). Notice that applying this method to one archive may increase
the number of URI-Rs in other archives (e.g., applying method 2 for vefsafn.is makes











Archive URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs
web.archive.org 34,819 9,968 36,385 10,075 39,092 10,265 40,258 10,353
archive.is 2,330 1,289 2,562 1,359 3,093 1,479 3,229 1,526
archive-it.org 5,108 979 5,999 1,095 7,373 1,271 7,986 1,355
archive.bibalex.org 4,169 675 4,764 762 5,827 891 6,176 941
webarchive.loc.gov 4,432 590 5,297 698 6,598 860 7,122 934
arquivo.pt 1,762 456 2,158 553 2,935 689 3,154 758
webcitation.org 1,290 532 1,415 593 1,737 689 1,858 725
europarchive.org 476 137 603 202 842 265 911 287
swap.stanford.edu 651 145 797 200 1,072 261 1,176 283
vefsafn.is 19 7 19 7 1,270 200 1,520 246
webharvest.gov 647 200 698 212 711 214 743 227
digar.ee 339 134 362 153 491 212 513 223
webarchive.proni.gov.uk 144 52 156 58 224 84 316 141
perma.cc 58 38 74 50 76 52 101 71
collectionscanada.gc.ca 26 22 40 35 42 37 59 50
webarchive.org.uk 12 5 12 5 12 5 27 8
nationalarchives.gov.uk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





Table 7 (column Method 2) shows the new archives that satisfy the condition of 200
URI-Rs and the four archives which still do not satisfy the condition.
5.2.3 METHOD 3: DISCOVER URI-RS IN ARCHIVES’ PUBLISHED LISTS
Some archives make lists of URI-Rs they collect available on the web. Archives may also
publish lists of URI-Ms associated with each URI-R. We found these published collections
for three archives (Table 9) that had not yet met the 200 URI-R minimum.
We downloaded the published list of URI-Rs only (URI-Ms were not included in this
list) from the archive webarchive.org.uk. Then, using the LANL Memento aggregator
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1 $ python timemap .py http :// www.inria.fr/
2 19961230035541 https :// web. archive .org/web /19961230035541/ http :// www4.
inria.fr :80/
3 19961230035541 http :// web. archive . bibalex .org :80/ web /19961230035541/
http :// www4.inria.fr/
4 20140729051225 http :// www. webcitation .org /6 RQAbDGPm
5 20020808175122 http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all /20020808175122/ http :// www.
inria.fr/
6 20100731132417 http :// wayback .archive -it.org/all /20100731132417/ http ://
www.inria.fr/
7 19961230035541 http :// archive .is /19961230035541/ http :// www.inria.fr/
8 19961013190926 https :// arquivo .pt/ wayback /19961013190926/ http :// www.
inria.fr/
9 20110325131647 http :// veebiarhiiv .digar.ee/a /20110325131647/ http :// www.
inria.fr/
10 ...
Fig. 82: Downloading the TimeMap of the URI-R http://www.inria.fr/.
TABLE 9: Archives’ published lists of URI-Rs and URI-Ms used in Method 3.












we retrieved TimeMaps of the first 192 URI-Rs that contain at least one memento in the
UK Web Archive. Table 7 (column Method 3) shows that this method helps two archives
to reach 200 URI-Rs (i.e., webarchive.proni.gov.uk and webarchive.org.uk), but at
the same time, a new web archive appears in the TimeMaps, nationalarchives.gov.uk,
raising the total number of archives to 17.
Next, we downloaded lists of URI-Rs and URI-Ms made available by the two web archives
collectionscanada.gc.ca and nationalarchives.gov.uk. We only extracted the num-
ber required to reach 200 URI-Rs per archive. With this method, we did not need a Me-
mento aggregator since the archives already provide a list of mementos, but for the sake of
consistency, we used LANL Memento aggregator to download TimeMaps, so we can update
information for the other archives. Table 7 (column Method 3) shows the four new archives
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TABLE 10: Applying Method 3 (using archives’ published lists) for three archives.
Method 3
webarchive.org.uk collectionscanada.gc.ca nationalarchives.gov.uk
Archive URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs URI-Ms URI-Rs
web.archive.org 41,988 10,572 43,615 10,739 45,155 10,924
archive.is 3,370 1,590 3,426 1,619 3,471 1,654
archive-it.org 8,339 1,431 8,910 1,561 8,994 1,593
archive.bibalex.org 6,630 1,009 7,043 1,091 7,286 1,148
webarchive.loc.gov 7,344 989 7,721 1,039 7,766 1,062
arquivo.pt 3,298 819 3,379 855 3,430 895
webcitation.org 1,892 746 1,944 765 1,954 775
europarchive.org 963 311 986 320 992 324
swap.stanford.edu 1,198 292 1,232 303 1,233 304
vefsafn.is 1,626 270 1,703 289 1,715 294
webharvest.gov 743 227 826 248 826 248
webarchive.org.uk 812 201 812 201 907 228
digar.ee 515 225 518 228 518 228
webarchive.proni.gov.uk 460 201 462 203 480 213
nationalarchives.gov.uk 3 1 3 1 1011 200
collectionscanada.gc.ca 59 50 359 200 359 200
perma.cc 104 73 154 111 154 111
Total 79,344 83,093 19,773 19,007 86,251 20,401





Table 7 (column Method 3) also shows that for perma.cc we only needed to discover 89
additional URI-Rs to reach 200 URI-Rs. Table 10 shows how the number of URI-Rs/URI-Ms
has increased after applying Method 3.
5.2.4 METHOD 4: SEND TIMEMAP REQUESTS DIRECTLY TO AN ARCH-
IVE
The LANL Memento aggregator may serve cached TimeMaps [96], which may result in
TimeMaps that do not contain recently created mementos. For this reason we decided to
request TimeMaps for the already selected URI-Rs directly from perma.cc. Figure 83 shows
an example of requesting the TimeMap of the URI-R www.whitehouse.gov from perma.cc
(the domain perma-archives.org is no longer used in TimeMaps or TimeGates based
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on changes on the replay tool made in February 2020 [175]). The TimeMap contains 57
mementos. As shown in Table 7 (column Method 4), we were able to obtain the additional
89 URI-Rs for:
17. perma.cc
1 $ curl https :// perma - archives .org/warc/ timemap /*/ http :// www. whitehouse .
gov/
2 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc/ timemap /*/ http :// www. whitehouse .gov />;
rel =" self "; type =" application /link - format "; from ="Thu , 27 Aug 2015
17:14:18 GMT",
3 <http :// www. whitehouse .gov />; rel =" original ",
4 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc/ timegate /http :// www. whitehouse .gov />;
rel =" timegate ",
5 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20150827171418/ http :// www. whitehouse .
gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Thu , 27 Aug 2015 17:14:18 GMT",
6 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20150827171418/ https :// www. whitehouse .
gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Thu , 27 Aug 2015 17:14:18 GMT",
7 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20150831171426/ https :// www. whitehouse .
gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Mon , 31 Aug 2015 17:14:26 GMT",
8 ...
9 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20180302185657/ https :// whitehouse .gov
/>; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 02 Mar 2018 18:56:57 GMT",
10 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20180302185657/ https :// www. whitehouse .
gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Fri , 02 Mar 2018 18:56:57 GMT",
11 <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20180828214528/ https :// www. whitehouse .
gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Tue , 28 Aug 2018 21:45:28 GMT
Fig. 83: An example of requesting the TimeMap of https://www.whitehouse.gov, which
contains 57 mementos (only 6 are shown).
5.3 FILTERING THE FINAL SET OF MEMENTOS
At this point, the selected dataset contained 86,387 URI-Ms, obtained from 20,490 to-
tal and 11,222 unique URI-Rs from 17 different web archives. For our preliminary study,
we downloaded the rewritten and raw mementos 10 times. We ran 17 parallel processes
where each process downloaded mementos from a specific archive. We found that down-
load time varied between web archives. For example, it took about 40 hours to down-
load 733 mementos from webharvest.gov and 12 hours to download 1,011 mementos from
nationalarchives.gov.uk. Thus, we decided to change the number of mementos per arch-
ive to what could be downloaded within 40 hours, and the number of mementos must not
exceed 1,600 per archive. This produced 18,472 mementos. Unfortunately, we did not check
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1 $ curl -I http :// web. archive . bibalex .org/web /20051026134855/ http :/ www.
anchorage .gc.ca/
2 HTTP /1.1 503 Service Unavailable
3 Server : Apache - Coyote /1.1
4 Content -Type: text/html; charset =utf -8
5 Transfer - Encoding : chunked
6 Date: Sun , 31 Mar 2019 13:25:47 GMT
7 Connection : close
Fig. 84: Non archival HTTP 503 example. The HTTP response header Memento-Datetime
is not included in the returned response.
the HTTP status when selecting mementos to make sure they are “200 OK” or archival
4xx/5xx responses (i.e., they have the HTTP response header Memento-Datetime for the
archives that support the Memento protocol). After selecting the 18,472 mementos, we
found that about 10%, 1,975, of these mementos had the HTTP status code of non-archival
4xx or 5xx (1,498 are from archive.bibalex.org) as the example in Figure 84 shows. Thus,
we removed most of the 4xx/5xx mementos and kept only 130 (out of 1,975). We selected
the 130 mementos from multiple archives. Even though these mementos had non-archival
4xx/5xx HTTP status codes, we want to keep track of such mementos in our study (as will
be described in Chapter 6) to see if their status codes change. We did not keep all 1,975
mementos because they will impact final results of our study since these mementos do not
have any embedded resources (e.g., images). We could not replace those removed mementos
because by this time we had already used the selected dataset in our study, and it was not
possible to recover any excluded mementos. This resulted in 16,627 mementos remaining.
Table 11 shows the final numbers of selected URI-Rs and URI-Ms per archive (available
on GitHub4). The table shows that three archives have fewer than 200 URI-Rs for the
following reasons:
• perma.cc: It took about 40 hours to download 182 mementos from perma.cc, including
the raw mementos.
• archive.bibalex.org: We removed 1,498 mementos because they returned the “503
Service Unavailable” HTTP response code.
Figure 85 shows the distribution of URI-Ms between 1996 and 2017. The main reason
for having fewer mementos in years 1996-2005 is because many web archives did not exist
during those early years [14, 15]. Figure 86 shows the number of URI-Rs per path length.
4https://github.com/oduwsdl/mementos-fixity/blob/master/final urims.txt
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The number of distinct URI-Rs is 3,698, and of those, 1,996 (54%) have a path length of
zero and the remaining 1,702 URIs (46%) have a path length greater than or equal to one.
Figure 87 shows the median number of resources (e.g., images, CSS/JavaScript files,
and iframes) comprising composite mementos in our dataset per year. As expected, the
figure indicates that web pages contain fewer resources in early years 1996-2006 compared
to recent years. There was a mean of 42 embedded resources per page, with a median of
32. On March 1, 2019, HTTP Archive’s report [52] indicates that the median number of
requests per page is 75, which is almost double the number that we report from our dataset
in Figure 87 (i.e., the median number of embedded resources is about 39 for the recent
years 2012-2017). The difference between the median number of resources comprising live
web pages (reported by HTTP Archive) and the median number of resources comprising
archived web pages (our dataset) can be explained as follows:
• According to the HTTP Archive forum [176], all HTTP requests are included in cal-
culating the median regardless of returned HTTP status codes, while in our median
calculation we do not count 30x Redirect responses.
• At replay time, a composite memento might have missing resources that have not been
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Fig. 85: URI-Ms per year. Note that we collected mementos in November 15, 2017. For
this reason, the number of mementos from 2017 is less than the number of mementos in
other years, 2010-2016 (i.e., no mementos with a Memento-Datetime value after November
15, 2017).
Fig. 86: URI-Rs per path length (54% of URI-Rs are with zero path length).
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captured yet. Thus, the archive will not be able to serve those resources at replay time.
Furthermore, URI-Rs that are generated on the client-side by JavaScript will not be
retrieved from the archive [5] (for not being rewritten) or from the live web (for being
blocked for security).
• If archives do not execute JavaScript when crawling web pages, URI-Rs that are
generated by JavaScript will not be discovered and captured. This is one of the reasons
for observing more embedded resources in live web pages than mementos [84,177].
Fig. 87: The median number of embedded resources per memento per year.
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we explained our four methods for selecting a dataset of 16,627 URI-Ms
from 17 public web archives. First, we used the LANL Memento aggregator to download
TimeMaps of an initial set of 10,000 URI-Rs. We only selected particular mementos from the
downloaded TimeMaps by applying a one memento per year filter. The mementos collected
by the first method were selected from 16 public web archives. There were seven archives
that satisfied the condition of 200 URI-Rs per archive after applying this first method.
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Second, we downloaded the raw content of already collected mementos and extracted
all URI-Rs found in the HTML. Similar to the first method, we used the LANL Memento
aggregator to download TimeMaps of the discovered URI-Rs. We applied this method to
seven archives. It resulted in other five archives satisfying the condition of 200 URI-Rs per
archive (at this time we only saw 16 web archives, 12 of them had at least 200 URI-Rs).
Third, we used archives’ published lists of URI-Rs/URI-Ms. We applied this method
to three archives. This method includes the use of the LANL Memento aggregator to
update information (i.e., URI-Rs/URI-Ms) on other archives. A new archive appeared in
the downloaded TimeMaps, so the total number of seen archives became 17. This method
helped four additional archives to satisfy the 200 URI-Rs condition.
Finally, we sent TimeMap requests of already selected URI-Rs directly to the last archive
that did not have 200 URI-Rs. We did not use the LANL Memento aggregator because it
might use cached TimeMaps. This method added the final archive to the list of 17 archives
that satisfy the 200 URI-Rs condition.
We then filtered the final selected mementos by excluding any memento with the non-
archival HTTP status code 4xx/5xx, which resulted in a final set of 16,627 URI-Ms. We
used this dataset in our study of identifying and quantifying the types of changes that cause
different fixity information on composite mementos.
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CHAPTER 6
CHANGES IN THE PLAYBACK OF MEMENTOS
This chapter explains our study toward addressing RQ1:
RQ1: Can we identify and quantify the types of changes on the playback of mementos
that prevent generating repeatable fixity information?
We compute fixity information (hashes) at replay time (client-side) rather than getting
fixity information from the archive for two reasons. First, we do not expect hashes generated
by archives at crawl time to match those generated on the playback of mementos [178].
Second, if an archive has been compromised then it is likely the corresponding hashes have
been also compromised.
In our 14-month study, we observe 16,627 mementos between November 2017 and Jan-
uary 2019. These mementos selected from 17 public web archives. We download each
memento 39 times and compute its hash value (for a total of 648,453 hash calculations)
to understand and analyze archives’ behavior on their replayed archived resources. Even
though we avoid archive-specific content in hash calculation when possible and consider only
resources that we expect not to change, such as unaltered original content (i.e., raw memen-
tos), we find that 88.45% of mementos produce more than one unique hash value. About
16% of mementos always produce different hashes. Our study also shows that archived col-
lections or archives may migrate to other archives. The migration process of mementos from
one archive to other might cause multiple mementos to disappear. This study points to the
need for defining a new archive-aware hashing function, as conventional hashing functions
are not suitable for replayed archived web pages.
6.1 METHODOLOGY FOR GENERATING FIXITY
INFORMATION
We observe the playback of mementos over time and try to understand why it is difficult
to generate repeatable fixity information on replayed mementos. Moreover, we want to
identify and quantify the types of changes that cause the same mementos to produce different
fixity information (e.g., hash values) when replayed at different times.
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We used the dataset of 16,627 mementos (described in Chapter 5). Those mementos
were downloaded 39 times. We used Merkle trees [146] to generate a single hash for each
memento after each download resulting in a total of 39 hashes per memento. This hash
value can be viewed as a value that summarizes a memento’s content at a particular point
in time. The initial assumption of mementos is that they should not change over time, or in
other words, for a memento, we should always be able to calculate the same hash each time
the memento is downloaded. The next step is to identify the types of changes that cause
the same memento to map to different hashes.
Rewritten mementos (rewritten.warc)
We used Squidwarc [53,54] to download mementos and save them as WARC files. Squid-
warc uses Google Chrome in headless mode (Headless Chrome) to replay mementos. The
headless browsing allows loading an entire web page faster as it runs without the need of
the UI. Another powerful feature of Headless Chrome is its ability to execute JavaScript,
which leads to the discovering of URIs to embedded resources that otherwise would not be
discovered by tools that do not execute JavaScript, such as Wget [51]. We use the term
“rewritten” to refer to the content of a memento replayed in Headless Chrome. This content
has been rewritten by the archive. Any rewritten.warc should contain the HTTP requests
and responses (HTTP headers and entity bodies) for all resources comprising a composite
memento. Figure 88 illustrates an example that shows the representation of the memento:
https://web.archive.org/web/19961120150251/http://www.usnews.com:80/
Table 12 shows the list of all embedded resources including the base HTML file (resource
no. 1) involved in constructing the composite memento. The last column “Transformation”
in the table indicates the type of modification performed by the archive. The “rewritten”
label implies that links to embedded resources are rewritten or that the archive modifies
the code by inserting HTML tags, “original” resources are in the original form and have not
been modified by the archive, and “archive-specific” refers to resources that are added by
the archive.
Raw mementos (raw.warc)
For each rewritten.warc, we created a corresponding file, raw.warc, that contains the
WARC records from the raw version of the mementos. The term “raw” refers to the unaltered
archived content (described in Chapter 2.2.7). We were not able to create raw.warc files for
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Fig. 88: The memento https://web.archive.org/web/19961120150251/http://www.
usnews.com:80/.
mementos from https://collectionscanada.gc.ca/collectionscanada.gc.ca (before
May 2018) and webcitation.org because these archives do not serve the raw content. Based
on some changes [179] made by the Library and Archives Canada collectionscanada.gc.ca
in May 2018, the raw mementos become available. archive.is also does not allow accessing
the raw content, but it serves mementos in different file formats, including ZIP and PNG. We
decided to store the content of the ZIP file in raw.warc because even though the content in
the ZIP file is transformed, the contents that would change (e.g., banner) are not included.
We used the Python module Requests to request and download the raw mementos.
Generating Hashes
We have two files, rewritten.warc and raw.warc, created for each downloaded memento.
We used both files to create Merkle Trees [146] and generate one aggregated hash value
(i.e., root hash). Any leaf node of a Merkle tree is the hash of data, while any non-leaf
node is a hash of its children nodes (i.e., its children’s hashes). As Figure 89 and Algorithm
1 show, our technique of generating the root hash of a memento is based on four Merkle
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TABLE 12: The embedded resources that comprise the memento web.archive.org/web/
19961120150251/http://www.usnews.com:80/ including the base HTML file. All URIs
with a leading slash are relative to the URI web.archive.org.
No URI Status MIME Transformation
1 /web/19961120150251/http://www.usnews.com:80/ 200 text/html rewritten
2 /static/js/analytics.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
3 /static/js/wbhack.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
4 /static/js/timestamp.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
5 /static/js/graph-calc.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
6 /static/js/auto-complete.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
7 /static/js/toolbar.js?v=1513849547.0 200 application/javascript archive-specific
8 /static/images/toolbar/wayback-toolbar-logo.png 200 image/png archive-specific
9 /static/images/toolbar/wm tb prv off.png 200 image/png archive-specific
10 /static/images/toolbar/wm tb nxt on.png 200 image/png archive-specific






usnews/GRAPHICS/logo.gif 200 image/gif original
14 /static/css/record.css 200 text/css archive-specific
15
/web/19961120150251im /http://www.usnews.com:80/
usnews/graphics/24hrc15.gif 302 → 404
16
/web/19961120150251im /http://www.usnews.com:80/
usnews/graphics/netscape.GIF 302 → 404
17
/web/19961120150251im /http://www.usnews.com:80/






usnews/GRAPHICS/REAL.GIF 200 image/gif original
20
archive.org/includes/fonts/Iconochive-Regular.w
off?-ccsheb 200 application/octet-stream archive-specific
21
/ wb/sparkline?output=json&url=http://www.usnew
s.com:80/&collection=web 200 application/json archive-specific
trees (marked in different colors), where the output of a Merkle tree becomes the input to
another Merkle tree. There are multiple ways to generate a single aggregated hash, but we
chose to use the Merkle tree for two main reasons. First, the Merkle tree design is perfectly
suited for generating a hash of hashes, and it is used in different well-known technologies,
such as Blockchain [138]. Second, the binary hash tree structure of the Merkle tree can be
used to quickly detect which resources may cause the same memento to produce different
hash values.
For each resource in rewritten.warc and raw.warc, a Merkle tree (marked in brown in Fig-
ure 89) is built on the HTTP response headers of a resource. For instance, the values Hash5
and Hash8 are generated on the HTTP response headers of ResourceA and ResourceB,
respectively. As described in Chapter 4.1.8, it is important to include some HTTP response
headers in hash computation.
Next, another Merkle tree (marked in blue in Figure 89) is used to calculate the hash
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TABLE 13: The API used to access the raw content from archives.















archive.is ZIP file: no raw content;we used this file instead
webcitation.org
collectionscanada.gc.ca unavailable
of each resource. The input to this Merkle tree includes: (1) the resulting hash value on
the HTTP response headers generated from the previous step (e.g., Hash5), (2) the hash
of the HTTP entity body of the resource (e.g., Hash6), and (3) the hash of the resource’s
URI-M (e.g., Hash7). In some cases the entity body will not be involved in hash calculation
when it is not available (e.g., there is often no HTTP entity body for responses with the
HTTP status code 302 Redirect). After this step, we should have a single hash for each
resource in rewritten.warc and raw.warc (e.g., Hash3 of ResourceA and Hash4 of ResourceB
in Figure 89).
The next step is to create a Merkle tree (marked in red) that consists of all resources’
hashes in each WARC file. This step will result in only two hashes: one hash for rewrit-
ten.warc (e.g, Hash1) and the other hash for raw.warc (e.g, Hash2).
The final step is to calculate the final hash (i.e., Root Hash) using a Merkle tree (marked
in green in Figure 89) where the input of this tree is the hash of rewritten.warc and the
hash of raw.warc. The resulting hash can be considered as a summary of the content of a
memento at a particular time.
We used the Python implementation [180] of Merkle tree to generate one aggregated
hash value (root hash) on a composite memento. As the following lines of code show, the
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Fig. 89: Generating the root hash of a memento using Merkle trees (marked in different
colors) where the output of a Merkle tree becomes input to another Merkle tree. The brown
Merkle tree is for generating a hash on HTTP response headers of each resource. The blue
Merkle tree generates an overall hash for each resource. The red Merkle tree generates a hash
that represents rewritten.warc and another hash for raw.warc. The root hash is generated
by the green Merkle tree.
hash of any intermediate node (non-leaf node) in the Merkle tree is computed by first,
combining the hashes of its children as line 9 illustrates (i.e., adding the two hexadecimal
representations of the hash values of the children nodes) and then hashing the results as
shown in line 3:
1 # 3.6 If the current right hash is not a '' <- empty string
2 if current_right != '':




7 # 3.9 Create the new list of transaction
8 if current_right != '':
9 temp_transaction . append ( current_hash . hexdigest () +
current_right_hash . hexdigest ())
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The same concept is repeated until we get the root hash. The SHA256 hashing function is
used in this Python implementation to calculate hash values.
Algorithm 1 Generate a Root Hash Using Four Merkle Trees
Require: WARCrewritten, WARCraw
Ensure: Hashroot
1: function ROOT Hash(WARCrewritten, WARCraw)
2: Hashrewritten ← WARC Hash(WARCrewritten)
3: Hashraw ← WARC Hash(WARCraw)




8: function WARC Hash(Resources[ ])
9: Hashresources ← [ ]
10: N ← length(Resources)
11: for k ← 1 to N do
12: Hdrs ← extractHdrs(Resourcesk)
13: HashHdrs ← merkleTree(Hdrs) . The hash on selected headers
14: Entity ← extractEntity(Resourcesk)
15: HashEntity ← hash256(Entity)
16: URIM ← extractURIM(Resourcesk)
17: HashURIM ← hash256(URIM)
18: Hashrsrc ← merkleTree(HashHdrs, HashEntity, HashURIM)
19: . The overall resource hash
20: Hashresources.insert(Hashrsrc)
21: end for
22: HashW ARC ← merkleTree(Hashresources) . The overall WARC hash
23: return HashW ARC
24: end function
In addition to using Merkle trees to generate root hashes, we consider the following
rules since not all archives support the Memento protocol or use the same tool for replaying
mementos:
• webcitation.org and collectionscanada.gc.ca: Only resources in rewritten.warc
are considered in the hash calculation since these archives do not provide the raw
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content. But raw mementos became available for collectionscanada.gc.ca after
download 24, so we included raw.warc in the hash calculation after this point.
• archive.is: This archive does not provide the raw content, so we only used the
content of the ZIP file stored in raw.warc in the hash calculation. We do not use
rewritten.warc in the hash calculation for two reasons. First, it is not used to extract
raw.warc unlike other archives. Second, both the regular rewritten version stored in
rewritten.warc and the ZIP file stored in raw.warc are actually rewritten, so instead of
using two rewritten versions in the hash calculation, we decided to only use raw.warc
because it has fewer archive-specific resources compared to rewritten.warc. For exam-
ple, archive.is does not include the archival banner in the ZIP file.
• The remaining archives: The HTTP entity body of resources in rewritten.warc is
considered only if it is in the original form and has not been modified by the archive.
Without taking this rule into account, it is hard to compute repeatable hashes since
archives may insert information that is different each time we request the same resource
(e.g., the retrieval time in Figure 25). If the HTTP entity of a resource is modified
by the archive, then only selected HTTP response headers are considered in the hash
calculation. We expect resources with certain MIME types, such as images, to remain
unaltered.
6.2 DEFINING TYPES OF CHANGES
For each memento, we have 39 hash values generated after downloading the mementos
39 times. We compared consecutive hashes; the first hash is compared with the second hash,
the second hash is compared with the third hash, and so on. Each time two consecutive hash
values were different, we identified one type of change causing different hashes for the same
memento. In general, the change could occur on the base HTML file, embedded resources
(e.g., images), or HTTP response headers. Before introducing our categorization of changes
in mementos, we define, and explain in detail below, the following attributes:
• S : The set of all resources (the base HTML file and embedded resources) that comprise
a composite memento.
• URI-M : A memento of an original resource.
• C : The returned HTML status code to a memento request.
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• H : The set of HTTP response headers that we do not expect to change includes
Memento-Datetime, Content-Type, Location, and all original response headers that
start with X-Archive-orig-.
• R: The HTTP entity body of a memento.
In general, the attribute S is associated with each composite memento, while the at-
tributes URI-M, C, H, and R are associated with each memento. When replaying a memento
at different times, we expect each attribute defined above (S, URI-M, C, H, and R) to always
have the same value. We defined different types of changes based on how these attributes
change. In other words, we compared an attribute’s value observed at a particular time to
the value of the same attribute observed at a different time and identified differences.
Set
∆S = (S’, URI-M, C, H, R): One or more resources in the set comprising a composite
memento has changed. This may include observing new resources added, resources replaced
with others, or missing resources that were previously part of the composite memento.
Figure 90 shows an example of the Set, change where the memento
https://webharvest.gov/congress112th/20130119060624/http://www.fws.gov/
is downloaded at three different times. At each time, a different background image is
displayed. The reason for observing different resources at replay time for the memento is
that values in URI-Ms are generated randomly on the client-side by JavaScript as shown in
Figure 91. This code results in selecting the image bannerbluemnt.jpg on February 28, 2018,
the image bannertiger.jpg on July 08, 2018, and the image bannereagle.jpg on August 25,
2018. The background image (i.e., the URI-M to the background image) is actually selected
randomly every time the page is reloaded.
Status code
∆C = (S, URI-M, C’, H, R): The HTTP status code of one or more resources comprising
a composite memento has changed.
One of the reasons for changes in the HTTP status code of a resource is the technique
web archives use to crawl or capture web pages. It is not uncommon to encounter a situ-
ation where the embedded resources within a composite memento have different values for
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(a) On 2018-02-28. (b) On 2018-07-08.
(c) On 2018-08-25.
Fig. 90: Downloading the memento https://www.webharvest.gov/congress112th/20
130119060624/http://www.fws.gov/ at three different times produced three different
background images.
Memento-Datetime. This is because archives, as part of the process of crawling web pages,
place all discovered but not yet crawled URIs in a queue so that they are processed later.
Thus, it is likely that we see some archived resources with 404 Not Found at a particular
time that then become 200 OK when revisited at a later time.
Figure 92 shows an example of an HTTP status code change of the image
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209193553im /http://wac.450F.edgecastcdn
.net/80450F/noisecreep.com/files/2009/06/aaron a042209eb 200.jpg
which is embedded in the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209193553/http://noisecreep.com/aaron-h
arris-of-isis-talks-twitter/.
The HTTP status code of the image was 404 the first time it was requested on November 17,
2017 (as illustrated in the red square on Figure 92(a)). When requesting the same memento
for the second time on November 18, 2017, the HTTP status code of the same embedded
image became 200 as shown in Figure 92(b)). The Internet Archive has performed the
following steps in order to successfully serve the image the second time it was requested:
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1 function random_imglink (){
2 myimages [1] ="/ congress112th /20130119060624/ http :// www.fws.gov/home/
feature /home - banner /open - spaces / bannerbluemnt .jpg ";
3 myimages [2] ="/ congress112th /20130119060624/ http :// www.fws.gov/home/
feature /home - banner /open - spaces / bannereagle .jpg ";
4 myimages [3] ="/ congress112th /20130119060624/ http :// www.fws.gov/home/
feature /home - banner /open - spaces / bannertiger .jpg ";
5
6 var ry=Math.floor(Math. random (1)* myimages . length )
7
8 if (ry ==0)
9 ry=1
10
11 document .write('<a href ='+'"'+ imagelinks [ry]+'"'+'><img src ="'+ myimages
[ry]+'" border ="0" alt =" The Open Spaces Blog. A Talk on the Wild
Side. Click to Read "></a>')
12 }
Fig. 91: Because of the function Math.random(), each time the JavaScript code is executed,
an image will be selected randomly.
1. No memento was found for the image in the archive when it was requested for the first
time on November 17, 2017.
2. In response, the archive responded with a 302 Redirect to a specific resource
https://web.archive.org/save/ embed/http://wac.450F.edgecastcdn.net
/80450F/noisecreep.com/files/2009/06/aaron a042209eb 200.jpg
3. Following redirects, the browser requested this resource from the archive.
4. This resource (i.e., web.archive.org/save/ embed/<URI-R>) triggered a service in
the archive for capturing the image from the live web. This service is similar to the
Internet Archive’s “Save Page Now” feature (archive.org/web) through which users
can submit any URI-R to the archive.
5. The archive successfully captured the image from the live web and responded with




The archived image’s Memento-Datetime (November 18, 2017 10:32:50 GMT) is very
close to the request’s datetime (November 18, 2017 10:33:14 GMT).
6. The browser requested the image and received 200 OK as a response from the archive.
(a) The image was 404 Not Found On 2017-11-17. (b) The image became 200 OK On 2017-11-18.
Fig. 92: The memento web.archive.org/web/20141209193553/http://noisecreep.
com/aaron-harris-of-isis-talks-twitter/ was downloaded at two different
times. We noticed two different HTTP status codes of the same embedded image
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209193553im_/http://wac.450F.edgecastcdn.
net/80450F/noisecreep.com/files/2009/06/aaron_a042209eb_200.jpg.
This example indicates that just by requesting mementos, we may actually change the
archive, since these requests trigger a service in the archive to capture resources that have
not yet been archived. There is a trade-off between capturing resources at the request time
(as in the example of Figure 92) and simply returning 404 Not Found. From the regular
viewer’s perspective, the archive takes the right action by capturing any missing resources
in a composite memento. On the other hand, for a user interested in computing fixity
information, this action affects generating repeatable hashes.
In addition, the HTTP status code may change because of transient errors. Archives
frequently respond with 500 Error if unable to serve resources at certain times. Also, the
HTTP status code change can occur when archives apply updates to their replay services.
For example, after deploying an upgraded version of PyWb, the archive webarchive.org.uk
starts responding with 307 Temporary Redirect (Figure 93) to requests that previously
returned 302 Found (Figure 94).
It is possible that different archival redirects for the same HTTP request eventually
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redirected to a URI-M with an HTTP status code of 200 and a value of the Memento-Datetime
header of December 10, 2001 07:18:11 GMT. When the same image was requested on De-
cember 14, 2017, it redirected to a different URI-M with an HTTP status code of 415 and
a value of the Memento-Datetime header of December 25, 2000 19:58:25 GMT.
1 ...
2 WARC -Type: request
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive
/20130423035544 im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=
e419bddc -31bc -45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
4 ...
5 WARC -Type: response
6 ...
7 HTTP /1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
8 Location : https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive /20130423030302
im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=e419bddc -31bc
-45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
9 Date: Fri , 30 Nov 2018 21:49:45 GMT
10 Server : nginx /1.14.0
11 ...
12 WARC -Type: request
13 WARC -Target -URI: https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive
/20130423030302 im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=
e419bddc -31bc -45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
14 ...
15 WARC -Type: response
16 ...
17 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
18 ...
Fig. 93: The HTTP response code was 307 on 2018-11-30.
Headers
∆H = (S, URI-M, C, H’, R): One or more HTTP response headers, that we do not
expect to change, has changed.
Some HTTP response headers are not expected to change, which include Memento-Datetime,
Content-Type, and the original headers that begin with the string X-Archive-orig-.
133
1 ...
2 WARC -Type: request
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive
/20130423035544 im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=
e419bddc -31bc -45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
4 ...
5 WARC -Type: response
6 ...
7 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
8 Date: Fri , 19 Oct 2018 21:27:35 GMT
9 Server : Apache - Coyote /1.1
10 Location : https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive /20130423030302
im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=e419bddc -31bc
-45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
11 ...
12 WARC -Type: request
13 WARC -Target -URI: https :// www. webarchive .org.uk/ wayback / archive
/20130423030302 im_/http :// www.local.gov.uk/image/ image_gallery ?uuid=
e419bddc -31bc -45a8 -8174 -5 fa393c5758e & groupId =10171& t =1353597690550
14 ...
15 WARC -Type: response
16 ...
17 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
18 ...
Fig. 94: The HTTP response code was 302 on -2018-10-19.
However, we show an example in Figures 97 and 98 of changes in the response header
Content-Type when requesting the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20071111211818/http://images.sohu.com:80/chat
online/market/sohu/140140-1.html
multiple times. On December 30, 2017, the value of the response header Content-Type
was text/html; charset=utf-8. The value changed to text/html; charset=gb2312 on
January 31, 2018.
Representation
∆R = (S, URI-M, C, H, R’): The returned HTTP entity body of one or more resources
comprising a composite memento has changed.
Figure 99 shows an example of the Representation change where we requested the raw
content of the same memento multiple times from perma.cc. We were expecting to always
be presented with same raw content, but we noticed a different HTTP entity returned each
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1 WARC -Type: request
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20001225075832 /http ://
www. senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
3 ...
4 WARC -Type: response
5 ...
6 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
7 Location : http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20011210071811 /http :// www.
senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
8 ...
9 WARC -Type: request
10 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20011210071811 /http ://
www. senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
11 ...
12 WARC -Type: response
13 ...
14 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
15 ...
Fig. 95: Part of a WARC file shown the request of the image on 2017-12-07. It ends up at
a resource with the HTTP status code 200 OK.
1 WARC -Type: request
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20001225075832 /http ://
www. senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
3 ...
4 WARC -Type: response
5 ...
6 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
7 Location : http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20001225195825 /http :// www.
senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
8 ...
9 WARC -Type: request
10 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .loc.gov/all/ 20001225195825 /http ://
www. senate .gov/ resources / sidebar_top .gif
11 ...
12 WARC -Type: response
13 ...
14 HTTP /1.1 415 Unsupported Media Type
15 Date: Thu , 14 Dec 2017 05:09:41 GMT
Fig. 96: The HTTP request of the same image (Figure 95) on 2017-12-14 ends up at a
resource with different HTTP status code 415 Unsupported Media Type.
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// web. archive .org/web /20071111211818/ http ://
images .sohu.com :80/ chat_online / market /sohu /140140 -1. html
4 WARC -Date: 2017 -12 -30 T07 :16:53 Z
5 ...
6
7 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
8 Date: Sat , 30 Dec 2017 07:16:35 GMT
9 X-App - Server : wwwb -app45
10 Memento - Datetime : Sun , 11 Nov 2007 21:18:18 GMT
11 Server : Tengine /2.1.0
12 X-Archive -Guessed - Charset : utf -8
13 Content -Type: text/html; charset =utf -8
14 X-Archive -Orig -date: Fri , 09 Nov 2007 12:24:22 GMT
15 ...
Fig. 97: A change in the response header Content-Type. The value of the header was
text/html; charset=utf-8 on 2017-12-30, as our WARC file shows.
1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// web. archive .org/web /20071111211818/ http ://
images .sohu.com :80/ chat_online / market /sohu /140140 -1. html
4 WARC -Date: 2018 -01 -31 T01 :08:13 Z
5 ...
6
7 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
8 Date: Wed , 31 Jan 2018 01:07:54 GMT
9 X-App - Server : wwwb -app42
10 Memento - Datetime : Sun , 11 Nov 2007 21:18:18 GMT
11 Server : Tengine /2.1.0
12 X-Archive -Guessed - Charset : gb2312
13 Content -Type: text/html; charset = gb2312
14 X-Archive -Orig -date: Fri , 09 Nov 2007 12:24:22 GMT
15 ...
Fig. 98: The value of the response header Content-Type changed to text/html;
charset=gb2312 on 2018-01-31.
time. The actual change in the returned content has not been caused by the archive, but by
Cloudflare, a third-party service used by the archive. This service modifies content being
returned to the user by applying Email Address Obfuscation [181] to hide any email address
included in the content and help to prevent spam.
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1
2 curl -s http :// perma - archives .org/warc /20171026200017 id_/https :// www.
usa.gov/federal - agencies /a
3 | egrep -i "(cdn -cgi |ˆ Date :)"
4 Date: Tue , 15 May 2018 21:00:45 GMT






11 curl -s http :// perma - archives .org/warc /20171026200017 id_/https :// www.
usa.gov/federal - agencies /a
12 | egrep -i "(cdn -cgi |ˆ Date :)"
13 Date: Tue , 15 May 2018 21:00:50 GMT






20 curl -silent http :// perma - archives .org/warc /20171026200017 id_/https ://
www.usa.gov/federal - agencies /a
21 | egrep -i "(cdn -cgi |ˆ Date :)"
22 Date: Tue , 15 May 2018 21:00:51 GMT





Fig. 99: An example of the type of change Representation (Changes in the HTTP entity).
Figure 100 shows another example of HTTP entity change. At replay time, the arch-
ive archive.is refers to itself inconsistently using different TLDs, such as .li, .is, and
.today. In particular, this change occurs in the content of the index.html in the returned
ZIP file.
Furthermore, we may observe HTTP entity changes because of transient errors as shown
in Figure 101. The image
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170303010736id /https://cere
als.ahdb.org.uk/media/1157842/corporate-strategy-1.jpg




(a) The archive uses .li on 2017-12-30.
(b) The archive uses .is on 2018-01-30.
(c) The archive uses .today on 2018-02-05.
Fig. 100: Downloading the ZIP file http://archive.is/download/BRWpm.zip of the me-
mento http://archive.is/BRWpm at three different times. Each time the archive refers to
itself differently in the index.html in the ZIP file.
was requested at two different times. The HTTP entity of the image was transferred incom-
pletely the first time it was requested (Figure 101(a)), while the entity was complete when
requested for the second time (Figure 101(b)).
(a) Incomplete HTTP entity on 2017-12-07. (b) Incomplete HTTP entity on 2017-12-16.
Fig. 101: We noticed a change in the HTTP entity body of the im-
age http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170303010736id_/https:
//cereals.ahdb.org.uk/media/1157842/corporate-strategy-1.jpg because of




∆URI-M = (S, URI-M’, C, H, R): One or more resources in the set comprising a com-
posite memento redirects (i.e., through an HTTP 30x Redirect) to a different memento
with a different Memento-DateTime.
This type of change, in particular, refers to archival redirects that do not result in
different HTTP entity. For example, Figure 102 illustrates the scenario where the same
HTTP request for an image was sent at two different times. Each time the archive returned
a 302 Redirect to a different URI-M, but the HTTP entities of these two responses were
identical.
(a) An image with Memento-Datetime: Fri, 02
Dec 2016 20:54:58 on 2017-12-01.
(b) Another image with Memento-Datetime: Thu,
01 Dec 2016 21:31:53 on 2017-12-07.
Fig. 102: The image https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20161201183709im_
/https://www.ap.org/assets/images/ap-16166678969150-promo-rt.jpg, which is em-
bedded in the memento wayback.archive-it.org/all/20161201183709/https://www.
ap.org/en-us/, has been retrieved from the archive through two different URI-Ms with
different Memento-Datetime values. Both entity bodies of the image are identical.
In general, we identify two URI-Ms as “different” if either their URI-Rs or the values of
Memento-Datetime are different. However, there are other cases where two lexigraphically
different URI-Ms canonicalize to the same value. For example, we requested the same
URI-M
http://perma-archives.org/warc/20170303200708/http://id.loc.gov/
at two different times on March 27, 2018 (Figure 103) and July 08, 2018 (Figure 104). The
only difference between the two responses is that the archive perma.cc started serving over
HTTPS (instead of HTTP) on or around July 08, 2018. In such cases, without canonicalizing
URI-Ms (e.g., HTTP = HTTPS), they will produce different hashes. Considering these two
different URI schemes as the same is commonly done in the web archiving community. Figure
105 shows another example where the archive webharvest.gov was using the subdomain
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www on December 30, 2017. The archive started dropping www around January 30, 2018
(Figure 106).
1 WARC -Type: response
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// perma - archives .org/warc /20170303200708/ http ://
id.loc.gov/
3 WARC -Date: 2018 -03 -27 T17 :43:38 Z
4 ...
5 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
Fig. 103: The archive perma.cc was using HTTP on 2018-03-27.
1 WARC -Type: response
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// perma - archives .org/warc /20170303200708/ http ://
id.loc.gov/
3 WARC -Date: 2018 -07 -08 T23 :34:13 Z
4 ...
5 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
6 Date: Sun , 08 Jul 2018 23:33:58 GMT
7 Location : https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20170303200708/ http :// id.loc.
gov/
8 ...
9 WARC -Type: response
10 WARC -Target -URI: https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20170303200708/ http ://
id.loc.gov/
11 WARC -Date: 2018 -07 -08 T23 :34:13 Z
12 ...
13 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
14 ...
Fig. 104: The archive perma.cc started using HTTPS on 2018-07-08.
1 WARC -Type: response
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webharvest .gov/ congress109th /20061114015422/
http :// www.dc.gov/
3 WARC -Date: 2017 -12 -30 T04 :56:45 Z
4 ...
5 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
6 Location : https :// www. webharvest .gov/ congress109th /20061114015422/ http
:// www.dc.gov/
7 ...
Fig. 105: The archive webharvest.gov was using www on 2017-12-30.
Archives may serve requested mementos in iframes. For example, webarchive.org.uk
began supporting the option mp for loading the archived content into an iframe. Therefore,
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1 WARC -Type: response
2 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webharvest .gov/ congress109th /20061114015422/
http :// www.dc.gov/
3 WARC -Date: 2018 -01 -30 T21 :59:52 Z
4 ...
5 HTTP /1.1 301 Moved Permanently
6 Location : https :// webharvest .gov/ congress109th /20061114015422/ http ://
www.dc.gov/
7 ...
Fig. 106: The archive was omitting “www.” on 2018-01-30.
any new requests for mementos from this archive will result in 302 redirect to a URI-M
that has mp after the timestamp.
The URI-M change may also be referred to as TimeMap change, where archives respond,
at different times, with various TimeMaps of the same URI-R. The TimeMap inconsistency
occurs for reasons including deduplication and redaction techniques of mementos, archival
restructuring, and transient errors [102]. The TimeMap change causes requests of the same
memento to redirect to different URI-Ms.
URI-M and Representation
∆H, ∆R = (S, URI-M’, C, H, R’): The URI-M and Representation change occurs when
one or more resources in the set comprising a composite memento redirects to a different
memento, with different values for both Memento-DateTime and HTTP entity body.
Figure 107 shows that requesting the same base HTML file
https://web.archive.org/web/20080828005922id /http://www.evangelcogdayton
.org/
at two different times results in two different HTTP entities. The first HTTP request is
made on November 17, 2017, and the archive responded with 200 OK as shown in Figure
107. We requested the same memento (URI-M) on December 28, 2017. The memento with
the Memento-Datetime August 28, 2008 00:59:22 GMT redirects to the URI-M with the
Memento-Datetime November 02, 2009 15:16:09 GMT
https://web.archive.org/web/20090211151609id /http://www.evangelcogdayton
.org:80.
which has a different HTTP entity.
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(a) The image was HTTP 200 OK on 2017-11-17. (b) The request redirects (i.e., 302) on 2017-12-28.
Fig. 107: Requesting the base HTML file web.archive.org/web/20080828005922id_
/http://www.evangelcogdayton.org/ at two different times. The second request on De-
cember 28, 2017 redirects to a memento that has a different HTTP entity.
The 302 Redirects are issued based on what resources are available or can be served by
the archive at the time of the HTTP requests (i.e., this is also called a TimeMap change as
explained in the previous section). Figures 108 and 109 show other examples where changes
in URI-Ms (through 302 Redirects) resulted in different HTTP entities. The HTTP entity
change in Figure 107 occurs in the base HTML file, while changes in the HTTP entities in
Figures 108 and 109 affect embedded images within composite mementos. Furthermore,
the different images in Figure 109 look the same, but we were able to identify differences
between the two images using the image comparison tool Resemble [8].
Timeout/Not resolved
The Timeout/Not resolved change occurs when one or more HTTP requests of resources
in the set comprising a composite memento has a connection timeout error. In general,
this type of change refers to a situation where there is no HTTP response returned from
the server, not even an HTTP status code. As shown in Figure 110, because of the connec-
tion timeout error, there is no WARC response record in the WARC file for the WARC
request record (i.e., WARC-Record-ID: <urn:uuid:fc...>). Similarity, Figure 111 shows
an example of an HTTP request that does not return an HTTP response because of the
timeout error. The later example uses cURL to download the memento, while the first
example (Figure 110) uses Squidwarc to download the memento and create the WARC file.
6.3 ONE IN SIX MEMENTOS PRODUCE DIFFERENT HASHES
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(a) The image was HTTP 200 OK on 2018-03-24. (b) The request redirects (i.e., 302) on 2018-03-27.
Fig. 108: Requesting the image web.archive.org/web/20110116134258id_/http:
//1.gravatar.com/avatar/117a6cc4203b951f11fc43f946106657?s=33&d=http%3A%2F%
2F1.gravatar.com%2Favatar%2Fad516503a11cd5ca435acc9bb6523536%3Fs%3D33&r=G
which is embedded in the memento https://web.archive.org/web/20110114074814/
http://www.copyblogger.com:80/popular-blogger/ at two different times. The first
HTTP request returns 200 Ok, but the second request redirects to a URI-M (with the
Memento-Datetime January 21, 2012 09:05:32 GMT) that has different HTTP entity.
We have calculated 39 hash values for each memento for a total 16,627 mementos. Table
14 shows the number of mementos per archive that have at least two different hashes.
The table indicates that most mementos, 14,707 out of 16,627 (88.45%), have at least two
different hashes, including all mementos from seven archives. We also show that about
11.55% of mementos (1,920) have only one distinct hash value. This means whenever the
hash is calculated, we always obtain the same hash value, which is the initial hypothesis of all
conventional fixity-based approaches. In other words, the conventional hashing algorithms
work properly only for 11.55% of our set of mementos. On the other hand, about 16.06%
(2,670) always produce a different hash. The latter case emphasizes the effect of JavaScript
in dynamically generating content causing different hashes. Figure 112 illustrates how the
pool of mementos that have at least two distinct hashes has increased over time. About
40.54% of mementos produced different hashes after download 2 on November 18, 2017.
Then, after 37 more downloads (within 420 days), this cumulative percentage had increased
to reach 88.45% by January 11, 2019.
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(a) The image was HTTP 200 OK on 2017-12-12. (b) The request redirects (i.e., 302) on 2017-12-25.
(c) Comparing the two images (mismatched pixels in
pink).
Fig. 109: Requesting the image https://perma-archives.org/warc/
20170101182814id_/http://umich.edu/includes/image/type/gallery/id/113/name/
ResearchDIL-19Aug14_DM%28136%29.jpg/width/152/height/152/mode/minfit which is
embedded in the memento https://perma-archives.org/warc/20170101182813/http:
//umich.edu/ at two different times. The first HTTP request returns 200 OK, while the
second HTTP request of the image redirects to a URI-M (with the Memento-Datetime
June 19, 2017 14:54:58 GMT) which has different HTTP entity that looks exactly
the same. The two images were compared using Resemble [8] (mismatched pixels are
marked in pink).
Figure 113 shows the distribution of the distinct number of hash values per memento.
Figure 114 shows the distribution of distinct number of hash values per memento by archive.
The blue bar indicates the number of mementos that always produce the same hash value,
while the red bar indicates the number of mementos that always produce different hashes.




3 WARC -Type: request
4 WARC -Target -URI: http :// archive .is /20041112085120/ http :// www. reuters .
com/
5 WARC -Date: 2018 -07 -22 T09 :38:27 Z
6 WARC -Concurrent -To: <urn:uuid:fc822790 -8d92 -11e8 -881e -739 ebb24b29a >
7 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid:fc8534d0 -8d92 -11e8 -881e -739 ebb24b29a >
8 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = request
9 Content - Length : 323
10
11 GET /20041112085120/ http :// www. reuters .com/ HTTP /1.1
12 Upgrade -Insecure - Requests : 1
13 User -Agent: Web Science and Digital Libraries Group ...
14 X-DevTools -Emulate -Network -Conditions -Client -Id:
E511D4DA01A1C06660C5329BEA3CB09F
15 Host: archive .is
Fig. 110: The memento with the URI-M http://archive.is/20041112085120/http:
//www.reuters.com/ is downloaded on 2018-07-22. Because of the connection timeout
error, no HTTP response, associated with the HTTP request of the memento, was rewritten
in the WARC file. The WARC file consists of 44 lines (only the last 14 lines are shown).
1 $ curl -i http :// webarchive .bac -lac.gc.ca :8080/ wayback /20060128020605/
http :// www. biostrategy .gc.ca/
2
3 $ curl: (56) Recv failure : Operation timed out
Fig. 111: An HTTP request returns the timeout error on 2018-09-05 (No HTTP response
returned for the request). Timeout errors are not considered as HTTP events, so they would
not show up in WARC files.
that always produce a different hash value. On the other hand, most mementos from
archive.is have a maximum of five distinct hashes because this archive does not preserve
the original JavaScript code, so no JavaScript code is executed at replay time [84]. The
reason for mementos from archive.is having five distinct hashes is the transformation
of the original content applied by the archive which includes using multiple TLDs and
transient errors. Similar to archive.is, most mementos from collectionscanada.gc.ca
have a maximum of four distinct hashes because the Memento-Datetime of these mementos
(Table 3) is between 2005 and 2007 when JavaScript was less common. In general, early web
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TABLE 14: Mementos per archive that produced at least two different hashes, the same
hash, or always different hashes.
Archive URI-Ms
with at least two
different hashes (%)
always produced
the same hash (%)
always produced
a different hash (%)
webarchive.loc.gov 1,594 1,241 (77.85) 353 (22.14) 139 (8.72)
wayback.vefsafn.is 1,589 1,138 (71.62) 451 (28.38) 99 (6.23)
webcitation.org 1,585 988 (62.97) 587 (37.03) 179 (11.29)
arquivo.pt 1,569 1,563 (99.62) 6 (0.38) 857 (54.62)
web.archive.org 1,566 1,447 (92.40) 119 (7.60) 288 (18.39)
archive.is 1,396 1,379 (98.78) 17 (1.22) 0 (0)
wayback.archive-it.org 1,383 1,383 (100) 0 (0) 216 (15.62)
swap.stanford.edu 1,222 1,021 (83.55) 201 (16.45) 308 (25.20)
nationalarchives.gov.uk 994 986 (99.20) 8 (0.8) 243 (24.45)
europarchive.org 979 979 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
webharvest.gov 712 712 (100) 0 (0) 123 (17.27)
veebiarhiiv.digar.ee 488 310 (63.52) 178 (36.48) 94 (19.26)
webarchive.proni.gov.uk 469 469 (100) 0 (0) 119 (25.37)
collectionscanada.gc.ca 351 351 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
webarchive.org.uk 349 349 (100) 0 (0) 5 (1.43)
archive.bibalex.org 199 199 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
perma-archives.org 182 182 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total 16,627 14,707 (88.45) 1,920 (11.55) 2,670 (16.06)
pages were relatively static [85], and recent pages are more interactive and more difficult to
archive [86, 177]. In general, the less often JavaScript is used in mementos to dynamically
add content, the more chances we get repeatable hashes.
6.4 QUANTIFYING THE TYPES OF CHANGES
We compared consecutive hashes for each memento. Each time any two consecutive hash
values are different, we identify one and only one type of change causing the different hashes.
In other words, we assign at most one type of change even though other categories might
apply. For example, if we detected that the set of resources comprising a memento at time t0
varies from the set at t1, then this change is marked as Set, and other categories of changes
are not considered, because if sets are different, it implies that hashes will be also different.
Similarly, if sets are identical, but there are some differences in the resources’ HTTP status
codes, then we assign the type of change Status, and no other types are considered. The




Fig. 112: The number of mementos which have at least two hashes increases over time.
Fig. 113: The distribution of all 16,627 mementos for distinct number of hash values
(blue=11.55% (1,920 mementos), red=16.06% (2,670 mementos)).
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Fig. 114: The distribution of mementos per archive for distinct number of hash values.
3. URI-M or Headers
4. Representation
5. URI-M and Representation
Figure 115 illustrates the types of changes affecting mementos for each download by
archive. A large number of mementos from each archive are producing different hashes
because of the Set change (marked in red), which is mainly caused by dynamic/random re-
sources generated after executing JavaScript. The Representation change (marked in yellow)
is shown in multiple archives. For example, in archive.is, when comparing downloads 10
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vs. 11, 11 vs. 12, and 13 vs. 14, we found that the archive refers to itself differently in the
index.html file using archive.li, archive.is, and archive.today at downloads 11, 12,
and 14, respectively, causing different hashes. The archives vefsafn.is, webcitation.org,
and perma-archives.org are also tagged with the Representation change because of vari-
ous reasons, such as (1) returning a rewritten page with HTTP 200 by the archive for raw
mementos’ requests, (2) computing hashes on rewritten content when raw mementos are
not provided by the archive, and (3) altering content by a third-party service (Cloudflare)
to prevent spam.
Figure 116 shows the types of changes affecting all mementos in each download. The
figure indicates that on average only about one-third of the mementos have changes when
comparing consecutive downloads. Download 11 (the first download in 2018) has the max-
imum number of mementos with changes, 7,557 (about 45% of the mementos).
In some cases, we can use the pattern of the hash values to infer the type of change that
might have occurred to cause the hash value to change. For instance, consider the pattern
of hash values X and Y for a URI-M:
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X Y X X X X X X X X X
In this example, there are 38 instances of X interrupted by one instance of a different hash
value Y. In this case, it is likely that the Y value was the result of a transient error, since the
hash values returned to X afterwards.
Another case, shown below with hash values of W and Z, may be the result of JavaScript
execution:
Z Z W Z W Z W W Z Z Z W Z W Z Z Z Z W W
W W Z W Z Z Z W W W Z W Z Z Z Z W Z W
The pattern alternates between W and Z seemingly without a regular pattern. This is similar
to the example from Figure 90 where the executed JavaScript randomly selects one of two
resources to include in the composite memento. Both hashes W and Z are considered to be
valid hashes for the memento.
A third example with hash values of V and T demonstrates a suspected update of the
replay system in an archive, similar to Figures 93 and 94:
V V V V V V V V T T T T T T T T T T T T
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
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Fig. 115: The types of changes affecting mementos for each download by archive.
After the hash value T begins consistently appearing, the hash value V would no longer be
considered valid. Further exploration of the pattern of hash values could help develop a
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Fig. 116: The types of changes affecting all mementos for each download.
model for the probability of rendering the same composite memento over time (i.e., proba-
bility of computing the same hash value).
6.5 MIGRATED AND MISSING MEMENTOS
Web archives are established with the objective of providing permanent access to me-
mentos. However, we shows five cases illustrated in Figure 117 where mementos became
permanently unavailable in their original archives. Unfortunately, in these cases, the original
archives from which the mementos (URI-Ms) have moved did not leave a machine readable
method of locating the corresponding URI-Ms in the new archives (e.g., using HTTP 301
Moved Permanently). However, we were able to manually discover the five new archives to
which the mementos have moved. For instance, the memento
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20051228174058/http://natio
nalatlas.gov/




Fig. 117: The number of mementos per archive. It shows the number of migrated and
missing mementos from four archive.
As shown in Figure 118, the representations of both mementos are almost the same except
the color of the banner used by each archive.
Table 15 shows the estimated migration date and the status of each original archive.
The HTTP requests to the homepage URIs of four original archives return 200 OK ei-
ther directly or after following redirects. The HTTP request to the fifth original archive
(internetmemory.org) does not return any HTTP response as shown in Figure 119 (i.e.,
not resolving or timeout error). Table 15 shows also the number of missing mementos
after each memento migration. A memento is considered “missing” if the values of its
Memento-Datetime, URI-R, or HTTP status code in the original archive do not match the
corresponding values in the new archive.
All mementos have been moved from the archives collectionscanada.gc.ca, webarchiv
e.proni.gov.uk, and http://perma-archives.org [179, 182–184]. Generally, mementos
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in Perma.cc were accessible through two different domains, perma.cc and perma-archive
s.org. Around February 2020, this archive no longer serves mementos under perma-
archives.org [175]. Mementos from the National Library of Ireland (NLI) collection
(https://www.nli.ie) have been moved from europarchive.org to internetmemory.org
before moving to archive-it.org. We are not certain if other archived collections used
to be available in both archives (europarchive.org and internetmemory.org also moved
to archive-it.org or to other web archives). Table 16 shows the number of mementos
grouped based on whether the values of Memento-Datetime, URI-R, and HTTP status
code have been changed or not. We present three examples of missing mementos.
(a) In www.collectionscanada.gc.ca. (b) In webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca.
Fig. 118: The representation (a) of a memento from the original archive and the represen-
tation (b) of its corresponding memento from the new archive.
1 $ date
2 Tue May 21 08:03:51 EDT 2019
3
4 $ curl http :// www. internetmemory .org
5 curl: (7) Failed to connect to www. internetmemory .org port 80:
Operation timed out
Fig. 119: After mementos migrated from http://internetmemory.org, the HTTP re-
quests to the archive return the timeout error.
The first missing memento example shows a change in the HTTP status code. The
memento
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TABLE 15: About 27% (537 out of 1981) of mementos are missing from the four archives






































provides a list of
URI-Rs. Clicking on
any will redirect to
archive-it.org
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is from 2012 and was available with 200 OK in the original archive (internetmemory.org).
We replayed the memento from our WARC files in 2018. The representation of the memento
is shown in Figure 120. The corresponding memento
http://wayback.archive-it.org/10702/20121223031837/http://www2008.org/
is not available in archive-it.org (i.e., returning 404 Not Found). Thus, we consider this
memento as missing because it was 200 in the original archive and returns 404 in the new
archive.
The second missing memento example shows a change in both the Memento-Datetime
and the URI-R. The request to the URI-M
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060304001905/http://www
.dhs.gov/




TABLE 16: The number of mementos based on what has changed. The number of missing
mementos are shown in bold.








Yes Yes Yes 302
No Yes Yes 28
No No Yes 18
No No No 2
No Yes No 1
europarchive.org/NLI → internetmemory.org Yes Yes Yes 979
internetmemory.org/NLI → archive-it.org
Yes Yes Yes 787
No Yes Yes 184
No No Yes 5
Yes No No 2
Yes Yes No 1
proni.gov.uk → archive-it.org
Yes Yes Yes 355
No Yes Yes 106
No No Yes 6
Yes Yes No 2
perma-archives.org → perma.cc No Yes Yes 164No No No 18
which once again redirected to the following URI-M that ended up with 200 OK:
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060304001907/http://www
.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
The request to the corresponding URI-M
http://webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20060304001905/http://www.d
hs.gov/
resulted in 302 Redirect to the URI-M
http://webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20140304192946/http://www.d
hs.gov/
which is 200 OK. Even though the HTTP status codes of the corresponding mementos are
identical, we consider the memento
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060304001905/http://www.d
hs.gov/
as missing because the corresponding memento can not be retrieved from the new arch-
ive with the same Memento-Datetime and URI-R. The Memento-Datetime of the final
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Fig. 120: The representation of the memento http://collections.internetmemory.
org/nli/20121223031837/http://www2008.org/. It is from 2012, and it was available
(200 OK) in the archive internetmemory.org between May 2018 and August 2018. We
replayed this memento from our WARC files.
URI-M (after following redirects) from the original archive is March 04, 2006 00:19:07
GMT while it is March 04, 2014 19:29:46 GMT for the final URI-M from the new arch-
ive (for a delta of 8 years). The URI-R of the final URI-M from the original archive is
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ while it is http://www.dhs.gov/ in the new archive.
The third example shows a set of 18 URI-Ms (below) from the original domain (perma-
archives.org). These 18 mementos can not be found in the new domain (perma.cc). For
example, perma.cc has no mementos for the URI-R www.consumer.ftc.gov as shown in
Figure 121, while the same URI-R has at least one memento available under the original
























1 $ curl -i https :// perma.cc/ timemap /link/https :// www. consumer .ftc.gov/
2
3 HTTP /2 404
4 date: Wed , 13 May 2020 02:36:33 GMT
5 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
6 x-memento -count: 0
7 server : cloudflare
8
9 404 page not found
Fig. 121: The new Perma archive does not have any mementos for the original page
www.consumer.ftc.gov.
Figures 123, 124, 125, and 126 depict the time difference between the Memento-Datetime
of final URI-Ms from the original archives (represented by the centered line at 0) and the
Memento-Datetime of the corresponding URI-Ms from the new archives. If the Memento-Dat
etime of a memento in the new archive is older than the memento’s Memento-Datetime in
the original archive, then the memento is placed on left side, otherwise it is placed on the
right. The memento migration from europarchive.org to internetmemory.org is not
included in the figures because it did not result in missing mementos.
As illustrated in Figures 124, 125 and 126, most of the differences in time between the
Memento-Datetime from the original archives and new archives are less than one minute.
Unexpectedly, we do not find any memento in perma.cc that has the same Memento-Datetime
compared to their corresponding mementos in the original domain (perma-archives.org).
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1 WARC /1.0
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20171022230759/ https
:// www. consumer .ftc.gov/
4 WARC -Date: 2018 -10 -20 T16 :20:39 Z
5 WARC -Record -ID: <urn:uuid :15 b9f480 -d484 -11e8 -ab64 - d71ba9b59307 >
6 Content -Type: application /http; msgtype = response
7 Content - Length : 31067
8
9 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
10 x-archive -orig -x- generator : Drupal 7 (http :// drupal .org)
11 status : 200
12 memento - datetime : Sun , 22 Oct 2017 23:07:59 GMT
13 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
14 link: <https :// perma - archives .org/warc /20171022230759/ https :// www.
consumer .ftc.gov />; rel =" memento "; datetime ="Sun , 22 Oct 2017
23:07:59 GMT", <https :// www. consumer .ftc.gov />; rel =" original ", <
https :// perma - archives .org/warc/ timemap /*/ https :// www. consumer .ftc.
gov />; rel =" timemap "; type =" application /link - format ", <https :// perma
- archives .org/warc/https :// www. consumer .ftc.gov />; rel =" timegate "
15 expires : Sat , 20 Oct 2018 20:19:26 GMT
16 date: Sat , 20 Oct 2018 16:19:26 GMT
17 ...
Fig. 122: The original Perma archive has at least one memento for the original page
www.consumer.ftc.gov.
This might be related to how indexing of WARC files is performed by the new archives.
Figures 127 and 128 show an example of a memento where the difference between the value
of its Memento-Datetime and the value of the Memento-Datetime from the new archive is
only three seconds. The HTTP request to the URI-M
http://webarchive.proni.gov.uk/20170701153654/http://www.fda.gov/




from the new archive returned 302 Redirect to the URI-M
http://wayback.archive-it.org/11112/20170701153657/https://www.fda.gov/
158
Fig. 123: Mementos migrated from collectionscanada.gc.ca to webarchive.bac-lac.
gc.ca.
Fig. 124: Mementos migrated from internetmemory.org to archive-it.org.
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Fig. 125: Mementos migrated from proni.gov.uk to archive-it.org.
There are three seconds difference in the Memento-Datetimes of the final URI-Ms.
New archives might use an updated version of a replay tool (e.g., OpenWayback) that
enables new features that were not supported by the original archives. For example, the
new archive (webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca) uses an updated version of OpenWayback that
allows accessing raw mementos and supports the Memento Framework. These features were
not available in the original archive collectionscanada.gc.ca.
It is possible that web archives permanently remove or prevent access to specific archived
content for security or copyright issues [185,186]. However, our research shows cases where
mementos become unreachable (i.e., migrate) from their original archives for unknown rea-
sons to us. In these cases, archives do not point to the corresponding URI-Ms in the new
archives or respond with the appropriate HTTP status codes that explain why users no
longer have access to certain collections. To mitigate this issue, the original archives, when
possible, can take one of the following actions:
• Respond with 301 Moved Permanently: Instead of responding with 404 Not Found
or 302 moved temporarily to the homepage of a new archive, archives can respond
with 301 to the corresponding URI-M in the new archive. For example, the End of
Term Archive (eot.us.archive.org) was established with the goal of preserving the
United States government web (with the Top Level Domain .gov). The domain name
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Fig. 126: Mementos migrated from perma-archives.org to perma.cc.
eot.us.archive.org is still under the control of the Internet Archive. Figure 129
shows an example of how the HTTP request to a URI-M in the End of Term Archive
redirects to the corresponding URI-M in the Internet Archive. This practice maintains
link integrity via “follow-your-nose” [187] from the old URI-M to the new URI-M.
Technically, enabling 301 Moved Permanently in a server can be achieved through
simple configuration steps. For example, for Apache web server [188], the mod rewrite
rule [189] can be used to perform automatic redirects and rewrite URI-Ms at the
request time. The rewrite rule example shown in Figure 130 can be used by the
original archive collectionscanada.gc.ca to redirect HTTP requests to the new
archive (bac-lac.gc.ca).
• Respond with the appropriate HTTP status code: If original archives determine
not to point to the new archives, they can respond with the HTTP status code 410
Gone to indicate that an archived resource used to exist in the archive but has been
permanently (and intentionally) deleted instead of responding with 404 Not Found
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1 ...
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .proni.gov.uk /20170701153654/ http ://
www.fda.gov/
4 WARC -Date: 2018 -10 -11 T10 :14:43 Z
5 ...
6 HTTP /1.1 302 FOUND
7 Location : http :// webarchive .proni.gov.uk /20170701153654/ https :// fda.gov
/
8 Memento - Datetime : Sat , 01 Jul 2017 15:36:54 GMT
9 ...
10 WARC -Type: response
11 WARC -Target -URI: http :// webarchive .proni.gov.uk /20170701153654/ https ://
fda.gov/
12 ...
13 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
14 ...
Fig. 127: Requesting a memento from the original archive, the archive responded with
302 Redirect to a URI-M that has the same Memento-Datetime but with lexigraphically
different URI-R.
1 ...
2 WARC -Type: response
3 WARC -Target -URI: @http :// wayback .archive -it.org /11112/20170701153654/
http :// www.fda.gov/@
4 WARC -Date: 2019 -01 -21 T05 :44:57 Z
5 ...
6 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
7 Location : ˜/11112/20170701153657/ https :// www.fda.gov /˜
8 ...
9 WARC -Type: response
10 WARC -Target -URI: ˜http :// wayback .archive -it.org /11112/20170701153657/
https :// www.fda.gov /˜
11 WARC -Date: 2019 -01 -21 T05 :44:57 Z
12 ...
13 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
14 ...
Fig. 128: Requesting the memento (from Figure 127) from the new archive, the archive
responded with 302 Redirect to a URI-M that has a different Memento-Datetime (three
seconds difference) but with lexigraphically different URI-R.
or 503 Service Unavailable.
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1 $ curl --head --location --silent http :// eot.us. archive .org/eot
/20120520120841/ http :// www2.ed.gov/ espanol / parents / academic /
matematicas / brochure .pdf | egrep -i "( HTTP /|ˆ location :)"
2
3 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
4 Location : https :// web. archive .org/web /20120520120841/ http :// www2.ed.gov
/ espanol / parents / academic / matematicas / brochure .pdf
5 HTTP /2 200
Fig. 129: The HTTP requests to URI-Ms in the End of Term Archive ideally redirect to
the corresponding URI-Ms in the Internet Archive.
1 # With mod_rewrite
2 RewriteEngine on
3 RewriteRule "ˆ/ webarchives /(\d{14}) /(.+)" http :// webarchive .bac -lac.
gc.ca :8080/ wayback /$1/$2 [L,R=301]
Fig. 130: HTTP requests to URI-Ms in collectionscanada.gc.ca are redirected by an
Apache rewrite rule to the corresponding URI-Ms in the new archive bac-lac.gc.ca.
6.6 ARCHIVE-LEVEL CHANGES
Figure 131 shows how each web archive behaved based on comparing consecutive down-
loads of mementos. Each cell represents the percentage of mementos with changes at a
particular download compared with the previous download (white indicates no change,
while dark blue indicates a large percentage of mementos have changed). For example,
the mementos of the NLI collection in europarchive.org became unreachable in download
21. We discovered the new location starting from download 24 (i.e., internetmemory.org
presented in the next row). Then, these NLI mementos in internetmemory.org became in-
accessible, returning 403 Error, at download 31. We manually discovered the new location,
archive-it.org, of these disappeared mementos starting from download 39.
The heatmap in Figure 131 can be used to visualize the overall performance of each
archive and to identify points in time where major changes occur. For instance, looking
at webarchive.org.uk, we noticed that the performance of the archive before download
20 is totally different from the performance after download 20. From the WARC files, we
knew that the archive had upgraded the replay service to a new version of PyWb—the
archive began supporting the option mp for loading the archived content into an iframe. In
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general, we should be cautious in interpreting the heatmap because multiple consecutive cells
with similar colors do not always imply better performance. For example, there are some
periods where all mementos from particular archives were not available, like mementos from
perma-archives.org in downloads 25, 26, and 27 (i.e., returning 500 Internal Server
Error between July 31, 2018 and August 19, 2018), so the white cells indicate no changes
in mementos, but they were actually unavailable during those three downloads. We added
annotations to the heatmap to explain some major archive-level changes.
Fig. 131: An annotated heatmap to show archive-level changes when comparing consecutive
downloads. Light blue=no (few) mementos with changes compared to a previous download,
and dark blue=most of the mementos have one or more changes.
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6.7 URI-M-BASED AND ENTITY-BASED HASHING
Our study (Chapter 6.3) shows that about 88.45% of mementos produce at least two
different aggregated hash values. One of the reasons why we get different hash values is
that we use multiple components in hash calculation including URI-Ms, HTTP response
headers and entity bodies, and HTTP status codes. Any small change (e.g., JavaScript
creates URI-Ms with random values) affecting one or more of these components comprising
a composite memento will result in different hash values.
In this section, we introduce two additional techniques, URI-M-based and entity-based
hashing techniques for generating hash values on composite mementos. We want to assess
how these two hashing techniques can help produce repeatable hash values on composite
mementos.
6.7.1 URI-M-BASED HASHING TECHNIQUE
In the URI-M-based hashing technique we only consider the URI-Ms of resources, com-
prising a composite memento, in hash calculation. Therefore, any changes in HTTP response
headers/entities and status codes will not affect final hash values. The final hash values are
generated using a Merkle tree (introduced in Chapter 6.1), so the only difference here is
that we consider only the URI-M of each resource to generate root hashes on a composite
memento. This technique is to address the question whether or not the set of URI-Ms of a
composite memento has changed over time.
For example we downloaded the composite memento https://perma.cc/R84B-LJWJ
at two different times on April 10, 2020 and April 24, 2020. In both downloads, there
were 37 resources embedded in the composite memento. We generated two aggregated
hashes values on the composite memento after each download. The first aggregated hash
value was calculated based on URI-Ms, and we used URI-Ms, HTTP headers/entities,
and status codes to generate the second aggregated hash value. We did not notice any
change in the resulting URI-M-based hash value. It was 87e2c8b9f717b826ac8c7d71
6d05d07f21c8ce23c47409b79812637b3c0ac23d in both downloads. The two other hash
values were different (i.e., 086907181ba3cfe0c4478971f7bd9924363b9fcfe4923f5fc771a0
2955a624b8 on April 10th and bde3cd7c25b22527e2d8a77c20181906c82fe5a058ea623417f
0501d04856ef0) because the HTTP entity of the based HTML file of the composite had a
string generated randomly as a result of Cloudflare’s Email Address Obfuscation (Chapter
6.2). This example indicates that there is no change in the set comprising the composite
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memento over time even though the HTTP entity body of the base file has changed.
6.7.2 ENTITY-BASED HASHING TECHNIQUE
The entity-based hashing technique considers only the HTTP entity bodies of resources
comprising a composite memento in the hash calculation. It answers the question whether
or not a composite memento contains the same HTTP entity bodies over time of embedded
resources with the 200 OK status code. Thus, this technique concerns about observing the
entity bodies of resources regardless of the locations (or URI-Ms) from which these resources
are retrieved. We expect this technique to produce more repeatable hash values than other
techniques because, in many cases, archival redirects (i.e., TimeMap changes) or changes in
HTTP response headers will not affect the resulting hash values.
For example, we downloaded the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20160110010525/http://sharehouse-bonbon.com/
two times on April 10, 2020. The resulting aggregated hash values calculated on only
the HTTP entities were identical, while the aggregated hash values computed using only
the URI-Ms were different. This is because the same HTTP entity of the embedded CSS






The example shows that we can still generate repeatable aggregated hash values on HTTP
entity bodies of composite mementos even if their URI-Ms change over time.
6.7.3 WE ALWAYS DETECT NEW HASH VALUES AFTER EACH DOWN-
LOAD
We introduced three techniques for generating final hash values on composite mementos:
1. URI-M-based hashing (Chapter 6.7.1): Each resource in a composite memento is rep-
resented by only the hash of the resource’s URI-M, hash(URI-M)
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2. Entity-based hashing (Chapter 6.7.2): Each resource in a composite memento is rep-
resented by the hash of the resource’s HTTP entity body, hash(HTTP entity body)
3. Hashing based on different components (Chapter 6.1): Each resource in a composite
memento is represented by the hash value calculated on the HTTP response head-
ers, entity body, URI-M, and status code of the resource, hash(HTTP headers, HTTP
entity body, URI-M, status code)
We expect the entity-based hashing technique to produce more repeatable hash values
than the other techniques. As shown in Chapter 6.7.2, changes in only URI-Ms, HTTP
response headers, or HTTP status codes of any resource embedded in a composite memento
will not affect the final hash value calculated by the entity-based hashing technique.
We compare the three techniques by generating several animated GIF files1 for each
archive to show the number of resources requested each time we download the set of me-
mentos from the archive. The blue, red, green colors in Figures 133, 134, and 135 indicate
that the URI-M-based, all components based, and entity-based hashing techniques are used,
respectively. The unique resources (or their hashes) are represented by points/dots in the
figures and stacked in rows, so each point represents one resource. The location of resources
do not change regardless of the download number, and the number of unique resources in-
creases over time (i.e., new resources are requested in each download). The only special
meaning to the position (x, y) of a resource is that resources appear on the bottom of the
figures (e.g., download 1) are requested before resources appear at the top (e.g., download
39).
For example, Figure 133 shows the number of URI-Ms requested in each download. Any
red point indicates that the URI-M is requested, otherwise it is not requested (marked in
grey). We have several observations from Figures 133, 134, and 135 (additional Figures for
other archives are available in [190]):
• Ideally, the same number of resources should be requested in each download (e.g.,
illustrated in Figure 132(a)). However, our study indicates that new resources are
requested on every download (e.g., illustrated in Figures 132(b), 132(c), and 132(d)).
• The number of requested URI-Ms in Download 1 (baseline download) in Figure 133
is only 40,500 compared to the total number of resources requested in downloads 1-
39, which is 81,035 URI-Ms. Download 1 requested only 50% of the total number of
1The animated GIFs are available at https://github.com/oduwsdl/mementos-fixity/tree/master/
hashing_techniques
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(a) Download 1, 20, and 39 (expected). (b) Download 1 (actual results).
(c) Download 20 (actual results). (d) Download 39 (actual results).
Fig. 132: Resources (URI-Ms) requested in downloads 1, 20, and 39 from the Internet
Archive. Blue = URI-M is requested, Gray = URI-M is not requested. Total URI-Ms
requested in downloads 1-39 is 81,035. (a) represents the ideal case where the same resources
are requested in every download, (b), (c), and (d) show the actual results.
resources seen by Download 39.
• Looking at the three figures, we always observe new resources after each new download.
New resources or hash values are marked in purple rectangles. As we explained in
Chapter 6.2, these new resources are generated or caused by JavaScript or archival
redirects. Figures 136 shows the number of new resources or hash values detected
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after each download from the Internet Archive.
• The colored area (points with blue, red, or green color) under the baseline download
line in Figures 133, 134, and 135 are denser than areas above the baseline download
line. This indicates that resources requested in Download 1 have a higher chance
of getting requested in the future than new resources requested in downloads 2-39.
Table 17 shows that the probability of requesting resources again in future downloads
depends on the download they were first requested at.
TABLE 17: The probability of requesting resources again in future downloads depends on
the download they were first requested at. Only downloads 1-20 are shown.
Download number at which







1 0.89 0.94 0.89
2 0.38 0.77 0.38
3 0.17 0.76 0.17
4 0.18 0.81 0.18
5 0.06 0.46 0.06
6 0.07 0.57 0.07
7 0.15 0.76 0.15
8 0 0.50 0
9 0 0.36 0
10 0 0.40 0
11 0 0.22 0
12 0 0.25 0.12
13 0 0 0
14 0 0.83 0
15 0 0.6 0
16 0 0.75 0
17 0 0 0
18 0 0.50 0
19 0 0 0
20 0 0 0
• Figure 135 demonstrates that the entity hashing technique produces fewer new hash
values than the other techniques. For example, most of the HTTP entity bodies (about
88%, 30,203 entity bodies out of 34,202) appear in Download 1.
As shown in Chapter 6.5, mementos have been moved from the European Web Archive
europarchive.org to internetmemory.org before moving to archive-it.org. Figure 137
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(a) Download 1. (b) Download 2.
(c) Download 3. (d) Download 4.
(e) Download 5. (f) Download 39.
Fig. 133: Resources (URI-Ms) requested in the first five downloads and download 39 from
the Internet Archive. Blue = URI-M is requested, Gray = URI-M is not requested. Total
URI-Ms requested in downloads 1-39 is 81,035.
170
(a) Download 1. (b) Download 2.
(c) Download 3. (d) Download 4.
(e) Download 5. (f) Download 39.
Fig. 134: Each point = hash(HTTP response headers, HTTP entity body, HTTP
status code, URI-M). Only downloads 1-5 and 39 are shown. We download 1,566 com-
posite mementos from the Internet Archive in each download. Red = the hash value is
observed, Gray = the hash value is not observed.
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(a) Download 1. (b) Download 2.
(c) Download 3. (d) Download 4.
(e) Download 5. (f) Download 39.
Fig. 135: Entities returned in the first five downloads and download 39 from the Internet
Archive. Green = Entity is returned, Gray = Entity is not returned.
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(a) URI-M-based hashing technique. (b) Including the HTTP response headers and entity,
status code, and URI-M in hash calculation.
(c) Entity-based hashing technique.
Fig. 136: New resources observed per download from the Internet Archive using the three
techniques of hashing.
shows that entity-based hashing technique produces fewer new hash values compared to re-
sults from the URI-M-based hashing technique for mementos originally from europarchive.
org. That is because most of the returned HTTP entity bodies from europarchive.org and
internetmemory.org are identical, while their URI-Ms are different. Figure 137 (a, c, e)
also shows that all URI-Ms requested between Download 1 and 23 have not been requested
in Downloads 24 to 38 since the mementos moved to a new archive. Similarly, URI-Ms
requested between Download 1 and 38 will not be requested after Download 39.
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6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we used our collected dataset of 16,627 mementos to conduct a study to
identify and quantify the types of changes that cause different fixity information on compos-
ite mementos. For each memento, we have 39 hash values generated after downloading each
memento 39 times over a time span of 14 months. We defined several types of changes that
cause different hash values including, Set, Status code, Headers, Representation, URI-M,
URI-M and Representation, and Timeout/Not resolved.
We found that 88.45% of mementos have at least two different hashes, including all
mementos from seven archives. Only 11.55% of mementos always produce the same hash,
while 16.06% of mementos always produce a different aggregated hash value after each
replay. Factors like the availability of raw mementos, JavaScript, changes in TimeMaps,
transient errors have great impact on the number of distinct hash values generated on each
memento.
We found that three web archives had either changed their domain or moved to different
web archives. Mementos from collectionscanada.gc.ca are now available at webarchive.
bac-lac.gc.ca (raw mementos become available after this change), and mementos from
webarchive.proni.gov.uk are now available at archive-it.org. Mementos that were
served under perma-archives.org are now available at perma.cc. We also found that
mementos of the National Library of Ireland (NLI) archived collection (https://www.nli.
ie) have been moved from europarchive.org to internetmemory.org before moving to
archive-it.org. In all of these memento migration cases, there are always some mementos
that cannot be accessed in their new domain/archive. These mementos were available in
the original domain.
Some web archives have applied major changes over time. For example, webcitation.
org no longer accepts any archival requests after July 9, 2019, and perma.cc no longer
serves any memento whose creation is not initiated explicitly by users. Other archives have
started using HTTPS rather than HTTP and/or the subdomain www.
We created a heatmap that allows us to detect archive-level changes. The heatmap can
be used to visualize the overall performance of each archive and to identify points in time
where major changes occur, For example, through the heatmap we were able to identify
archives that recently start to use a new version of their replay system. We also introduced
two additional hashing techniques, entity-based and URI-M-based, that allows us to generate
multiple aggregated hash values on a composite memento. We found that there are some
mementos that always produce new hash values regardless of the hashing techniques used
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in the hash calculation.
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(a) Download 1 (URI-M-based hashing). (b) Download 1 (entity-based hashing).
(c) Download 24 (URI-M-based hashing). (d) Download 24 (entity-based hashing).
(e) Download 39 (URI-M-based hashing). (f) Download 39 (entity-based hashing).
Fig. 137: Entity-based technique produces fewer new hash values compared to results from
URI-M-based hashing technique for mementos from europarchive.org.
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CHAPTER 7
ARCHIVE ASSISTED ARCHIVAL FIXITY VERIFICATION
FRAMEWORK
This chapter explains our study toward addressing RQ3:
RQ3: How can we store and retrieve fixity information independently from the web
archives from which the associated mementos are preserved?
In this chapter, we introduce two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to
disseminate fixity information to web archives and verify the fixity of mementos [191]. In the
Atomic approach, the fixity information of each archived web page is stored in a separate
JSON file, or manifest, published on the web, and disseminated to several on-demand web
archives. In the Block approach, we batch together fixity information, or records, of multiple
archived pages to a single binary-searchable file, or block. The block then is published at a
well-known web location before being disseminated to archives.
This work introduces a basic, yet extensible, format of fixity information in the form
of a structured manifest file. However, the main contribution of this study focuses on
the structure of the manifest file and the two suggested approaches of disseminating fixity
information (or manifests) rather than strength, applicability, extension, scope, or security of
the manifest. The framework describes how manifests are generated, published, discovered,
and used to verify mementos. The proposed framework does not require any change in
the infrastructure of web archives. It is built based on well-known standards, such as the
Memento protocol, and works with current archives’ APIs. The framework allows for the
generation of manifests for selected resources instead of incurring the overhead of creating
manifests for all archived resources.
We performed two evaluations for the fixity dissemination approaches. In the first study
(Chapter 7.2), we selected 1,000 mementos from archive.org and only considered the
HTML file in hash calculation. This first study focused more on disseminating fixity in-
formation and retrieving archived fixity information, rather than the structure of fixity
information. In the second study, we used our full set of 16,627 mementos from 17 public
web archives (Chapter 5) to ensure that our framework can work with any memento from
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any web archive. The second study also used a new manifest file structure to include fixity
information about not only the base HTML file but also all web resources embedded in a
composite memento. The new manifest structure also contains (1) hash values generated
by the URI-M-based (Chapter 6.7.1) and entity-based hashing techniques (Chapter 6.7.2),
and (2) multiple aggregated hash values generated by three hashing techniques.
7.1 METHODOLOGY FOR DISSEMINATING AND VERIFYING
FIXITY
The process of fixity verification of mementos can broadly be described in three phases:
1) generating manifests for mementos, 2) disseminating those manifests into different web
archives, and 3) at a later date, generating manifests of the current state and comparing
them with their corresponding previously archived versions. We have two approaches for
manifest dissemination, namely, Atomic and Block.
7.1.1 MANIFEST GENERATION
A manifest (identified by URI-Manif) consists of metadata summarizing fixity informa-
tion of a memento. A manifest can be generated at or after a memento’s creation datetime.
The proposed structure of a manifest file is illustrated in Figure 138 and has the following
components:
• @context: The URI where names used in the manifest file are defined.
• created: The creation datetime of the manifest. It must be equal to or greater than
the memento’s creation datetime.
• URI-R, URI-M, and Memento-Datetime: The URI of an original resource, the
URI of a memento, and the datetime when the memento was created, respectively.
• @id: The URI that identifies a published manifest file (URI-Manif).
• http-headers: Selected HTTP Response headers of the memento. As proposed by
Jones et al. [92], we insert the Preference-Applied header to specify options used to
retrieve the memento. For example, Original-Content refers to the raw memento—
accessing unaltered archived content because archives by default return the memento
after transforming its content.
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1 {
2 " @context ": "http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu /",
3
4 " created ": "Sun , 23 Dec 2018 11:43:55 GMT",
5
6 "@id": "http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /20181223114355/
7 c6ad485819abbe20e37c0632843081710c95f94829f59bbe3b6ad3251
8 d93f7d2 /https :// web. archive .org/web /20181219102034/ https:
9 //2019. jcdl.org /",
10
11 "uri -r": "https ://2019. jcdl.org /",
12
13 "uri -m": "https :// web. archive .org/web /20181219102034/ https ://2019.
14 jcdl.org /",
15
16 "memento - datetime ": "Wed , 19 Dec 2018 10:20:34 GMT",
17
18 "http - headers ": {
19
20 "Content -Type ": "text/html; charset =UTF -8",
21
22 "X-Archive -Orig -date ": "Wed , 19 Dec 2018 10:20:36 GMT",
23
24 "X-Archive -Orig -link ": "<https ://2019. jcdl.org/wp -json />; rel
25 =\" https :// api.w.org /\"" ,
26
27 "Preference - Applied ": "original -links , original - content "
28 },
29 "hash - constructor ": "( curl -s $uri -m' && echo -n '$Content -Type
30 $X -Archive -Orig -date $X -Archive -Orig -link ')
31 | tee >( sha256sum ) >( md5sum ) >/dev/null
32 | cut -d ' ' -f 1
33 | paste -d':' <(echo -e 'md5\nsha256 ') -
34 | paste -d' ' - -",
35
36 "hash": "md5 :969 d7aba4c16444a6544bdc39eefe394 sha256 : c68a215eb1
37 c3edbf51f565b9a87f49646456369e51791a86106a6667630737a6 "
38 }
Fig. 138: A manifest showing fixity information of the memento https://web.archive.
org/web/20181219102034/https://2019.jcdl.org/
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• hash-constructor: The commands that calculate hashes. The variable $uri-m is
replaced with the uri-m value and the selected headers (e.g., $Content-Type) are
replaced with the corresponding values in the http-headers The hashes are gener-
ated on both the HTML of a memento and selected response headers, and they are
calculated using two different hashing algorithms, MD5 and SHA256, so even if the two
functions are vulnerable to collision attacks, it becomes difficult for an attacker to
make both functions collide at the same time [192].
• hash: The hash values calculated based on commands defined in hash-constructor.
7.1.2 ATOMIC DISSEMINATION
In the Atomic approach, each memento that we are interested in verifying should have
at least one corresponding manifest file containing fixity information of the memento. Once
generated, the manifest should be published on the web and disseminated to different web
archives. The main concept of this approach is to store the fixity information of a memento
in different archives in addition to the archive in which the memento is preserved. This
practice of maintaining content separately from its fixity information is recommended by
the TRAC report [103]. Manifests can be disseminated and archived through four steps:
1. Push a web page into one or more archives. This will create one or more mementos,
URI-M.
2. Generate a manifest by computing the fixity information of the memento.
3. Publish the manifest at a well-known location, URI-Manif.
4. Disseminate the published manifest in multiple archives. This will generate archived
manifests, URI-M-Manif.
We briefly describe the steps involved in generating, publishing, and disseminating fix-
ity information of mementos with examples. Figure 139 shows the web page https:
//2019.jcdl.org pushed into multiple archives, resulting in four mementos. The Python
module ArchiveNow [193] can be invoked via the command-line interface or user interface
for simultaneously disseminating a web page into on-demand web archives.
Next, as shown in Figure 140, for each memento, a manifest is generated and published
on the web at the Archival Fixity server,
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Fig. 139: A web page is pushed into multiple archives: archive.org, archive.is,
perma.cc, and webcitation.org.
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu
so that archives are able to access and capture those manifests. For example, the manifest
of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
is available at the URI-Manif
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/2018122408
5329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
This URI-Manif is a generic URI, which means if the Archival Fixity server creates
another manifest for the same memento (marked in red), the server will publish it using
the same generic URI. For this reason, the generic URI must always redirect to the most
recent manifest of a memento, since each published manifest is made available on the web
using a URI that contains the hash of the manifest. This URI is called a trusty URI (as
explained in Chapter 3.2.1). This 302 Redirect from the generic URI to the trusty URI
has two advantages. First, having a trusty URI will help validate the manifest content,
as the hash included in the URI is the hash of the content it identifies. Second and more
importantly, we can use the generic URI to discover manifests in the Archival Fixity server
and archived manifests in the archives. Therefore, even in cases where the Archival Fixity
server is unavailable or compromised, we can still can discover manifests in the archives
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Fig. 140: Compute fixity and publish it on the web








Figure 142 shows an example of retrieving all mementos (the TimeMap) from the Internet
Archive of the URI-Manif:
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/2018122408
5329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
As Figure 143 shows, requesting the memento of the manifest (with generic URI) found
in the TimeMap results in 302 Redirect to the archived manifest (with the trusty URI).
Figure 145 shows how the live web, the archive, and the Archival Fixity server are related
in the Atomic approach.
Generally, we build trust in the content of memento from the time when fixity information
is computed and published. One of the best scenarios is when a manifest is generated at
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1 $ curl -sIL https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /https :// web.
archive .org/web /20181224085329/ https ://2019. jcdl.org/ | egrep
2 -i "( HTTP /|ˆ location :)"
3
4 HTTP /2 302
5 location : https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /20181224093024/8
6 c31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9afa80580ab5052001174be59c6a
7 73a/https :// web. archive .org/web /20181224085329/ https ://2019.
8 jcdl.org/
9 HTTP /2 200
Fig. 141: The manifest identified with the generic URI redirects to the manifest with the
trusty URI.
1 $ curl -i http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link/https ://
2 manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web /20181
3 224085329/ https ://2019. jcdl.org/
4
5 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
6 Server : nginx /1.15.8
7 Date: Wed , 01 May 2019 05:38:20 GMT
8 Content -Type: application /link - format
9 Transfer - Encoding : chunked
10 Connection : keep -alive
11 X-App - Server : wwwb -app38
12 X-ts: ----
13 X- location : cdx -p
14 X-Cache -Key: httpweb . archive .org/web/ timemap /link/https :// manifest .ws -
15 dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web /201812
16 24085329/ https ://2019. jcdl.org/US
17 X-Page -Cache: MISS
18
19 <http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web
/20181224085329/ https ://2019. jcdl.org />; rel=" original ",
20
21 <http :// web. archive .org/web/ timemap /link/https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.
edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web /20181224085329/ https
://2019. jcdl.org />; rel="self"; type =" application /link - format "; from
="Mon , 24 Dec 2018 09:33:54 GMT",
22
23 <http :// web. archive .org >; rel=" timegate ",
24
25 <http :// web. archive .org/web /20181224093354/ http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu
.edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web /20181224085329/ https
://2019. jcdl.org />; rel="first memento "; datetime ="Mon , 24 Dec 2018
09:33:54 GMT",
Fig. 142: Retreiving the TimeMap of a manifest from the Internet Archive. In this example,
the TimeMap contains only one memento.
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1 $ curl -sIL http :// web. archive .org/web /20181224093354/ http :// manifest .
2 ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /https :// web. archive .org/web /2018122408532
3 9/ https ://2019. jcdl.org/ | egrep -i "( HTTP /|ˆ location :)"
4
5 HTTP /1.1 302 Found
6 Location : /web /20181224093354/ http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifes
7 t /20181224093024/8 c31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9afa80580
8 ab5052001174be59c6a73a /https :// web. archive .org/web /20181224
9 085329/ https ://2019. jcdl.org/
10 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
Fig. 143: The archived manifest with the generic URI redirects to the archived manifest
with the trusty URI.
Fig. 144: Push the fixity information into multiple archives
Fig. 145: The Atomic approach. The generic URI (URI-Manif) redirects to the most
recent trusty URI, so when the archive captures the generic URI, the archive follows the
302 Redirect and captures the trusty URI as well. This figure is a modified version of an
original diagram contributed by Herbert Van de Sompel (from DANS).
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ingest by the archive. In other words, the archive crawls a web page and immediately after
that computes and publishes its fixity information.
The final step is to push the published manifest into multiple archives. In the exam-
ple shown in Figure 144, the fixity information (or the manifest) of the memento from
archive.org is disseminated to the same archive and other three archives, which are
archive.is, perma-archives.org, and webcitation.org.
7.1.3 BLOCK DISSEMINATION
As opposed to the Atomic approach, in the Block approach we batch multiple manifests
together in a single binary-searchable file, along with some additional metadata (using the
UKVS file format [194,195]), and add the reference of the previously published latest block.
Then, we generate the content-addressable identity of the block, compress it, and archive
it into multiple web archives by making it available at a well-known content-addressable
URI (and allow people to keep local copies anywhere). While we make a chain of blocks,
we are not attempting to create yet another Blockchain [196]. Manifests’ chain of blocks
are limited in scope as we do not need to worry about consensus, eventual consistency,
or proof-of-work because these blocks are generated and published by a central authority.
Linking blocks in a chain using their content-addressable hashes provides tamper-proofing,
and enables discovery of previous blocks (starting from the latest or anywhere in the middle
of the chain). Additionally, as long as we are depending on an archived page to be available
in the archive, we can count on the archived metadata about the page to be available too.
Creation and dissemination of manifest blocks is performed in the following steps:
1. Identify a set of URI-Ms for their manifests to be included in the same block. (A
strategically chosen set may improve block compression factor and enable a more
efficient lookup for verification later.)
2. Generate their individual manifests in the form of a single-line JSON file (exclude @id
field, needed in case of records being placed in a block, and eliminate many common
fields that can go in the headers of the block).
3. Prefix each manifest JSON line with the Sort-friendly URI Reordering Transform
(SURT) [197] of the corresponding URI-M.
4. Write these lines in a UKVS file along with the metadata headers as illustrated in
Figure 148.
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5. Add the content-addressable hash of the latest published block in the metadata as the
previous block.
6. Sort the file using LC ALL=C locale.
7. Calculate the content-addressable hash (e.g., SHA256) of this block.
8. Name the file using its content-addressable hash.
9. Compress the block file to reduce its size before archiving it.
10. Publish the compressed block file at a URI that contains its hash (using a trusty URI).
11. Make the entrypoint (the well-known URI) redirect to the latest block’s URI (as
illustrated in Figure 146).
12. Add a Link response header with appropriate links to navigate through the chain of
blocks, which is visually illustrated on the landing page as shown in Figure 147. (A
similar approach of creating bidirectional linked list of HTTP messages was used in
the HTTPMailbox [198].)
13. Archive the entrypoint in multiple web archives, which will implicitly archive the latest
block as, well due to the redirect.
14. Optionally, for further tamper-proofing, post the URI of the newly published block on
immutable platforms not controlled by a single authority (e.g., Twitter and GitHub’s
Gist).
Although the number of public web archives is increasing [14,15], only a few support an
on-demand web archiving service. However, a small number (greater than one) of indepen-
dent on-demand archives can suffice for the purpose of disseminating manifests.
The Block dissemination approach has a number of advantages over the Atomic approach.
It requires far fewer network requests to push it to web archives and creates significantly
fewer independently published manifest resources to keep track of mementos. By bundling
multiple manifests in a single file, The Block yields a significant compression factor due
to the repeated boilerplate content in each manifest file. As web archives die and new
ones come to life, these blocks can be replicated and migrated externally to other places
efficiently. In the case of the Atomic, approach we might lose historical manifests as old web
archives die without donating their holdings to live archives. Moreover, these blocks are
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1 $ curl -IL https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ blocks
2
3 HTTP /2 302
4 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
5 date: Mon , 21 Jan 2019 22:27:14 GMT
6 location : https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ blocks /59 bc17511de502b7a7bd
7 f39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b
8 server : ArchivalFixity /0.1
9 content - length : 417
10
11 HTTP /2 200
12 accept - ranges : bytes
13 cache - control : immutable
14 content - disposition : attachment ; filename ="59 bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020
15 c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b .ukvs.gz"
16 content - encoding : gzip
17 content -type: application /ukvs
18 date: Mon , 21 Jan 2019 22:27:14 GMT
19 etag: "59 bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b
20 "
21 expires : Tue , 22 Jan 2019 10:27:14 GMT
22 last - modified : Fri , 11 Jan 2019 18:19:00 GMT
23 link: <https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ blocks /59 bc17511de502b7a7bdf39
24 b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b >; rel="self", <https ://
25 manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ blocks /3 c4575450979f4283ffb5a1b385450a
26 c4c82f1b746de34385dbc177e493a6096 >; rel="prev", <https :// manifest
27 .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ blocks /7 bbf757046ac0a0a60015a1cb847c3189160d18c
28 809 b210073822df157609e01 >; rel="first", <https :// manifest .ws -dl.
29 cs.odu.edu/ blocks /59 bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd71356
30 04 edb2a8e3e89540b >; rel="last"
31
32 server : ArchivalFixity /0.1
33 content - length : 15227
Fig. 146: Requesting the Blocks entrypoint https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks
187
Fig. 147: The landing page showing a chain of blocks.
more tamper-proof than atomic manifests due to chaining. On the other hand, the Block
approach has the disadvantage of shifting the burden of lookup of a specific record in the
entire chain of blocks to the user or a service that provides verification. While individual
blocks are binary searchable for fast lookup, as the number of blocks increases, one has to
scan through all of them. However, this can easily be solved by scanning the entire chain
once and creating a search index over the SURT field.
7.1.4 VERIFYING FIXITY OF MEMENTOS
Verifying the fixity of a memento in both the Atomic and Block approaches can be
achieved through three common steps:
(a) For the given memento, discover one or more manifests URI-Manif. In the Atomic
188
1 ! context [" http :// oduwsdl . github .io/ contexts / fixity "]
2 ! fields {keys: [" surt "]}
3 !id {uri: "https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu /"}
4 !meta { created_at : "20190111181327"}
5 !meta { prev_block : " sha256 :
d4eb1190f9aaae9542fd3ad8a3c4519450cfb00845b632eb2b3f4f098a34144d "}
6 !meta {type: " FixityBlock "}
7 org ,archive ,web)/web /19961022175434/ http :// search .com/ {< Single line
JSON as illustrated in Figure 2>}
8 org ,archive ,web)/web /19961219082428/ http :// sho.com/ {< Single line JSON
>}
9 org ,archive ,web)/web /19961223174001/ http :// reference .com/ {< Single line
JSON >}
10 ...
Fig. 148: A sample Block with metadata headers and records
approach, this step requires also discovering archived copies URI-M-Manif of the man-
ifest.
(b) Recompute current fixity information of the memento.
(c) Compare current fixity information with discovered manifests.
In the Atomic approach, we can discover a manifest of a given memento through the
Archival Fixity server. Which manifest is returned depends on the server’s API. For example,
the server may respond with the closest manifest to the memento’s creation date or return
the manifest that is closest to a given datetime (i.e., via a TimeGate). Once a manifest
is discovered, we may use TimeGates and/or TimeMaps to retrieve its archived copies
available in web archives. Again, it is possible to discover archived manifests using the
generic URI even without the Archival Fixity server being involved. Next, we compute
current fixity information by generating a new manifest for the given memento. Then, we
compare current hash values in the new manifest with the hashes in the discovered archived
manifests. In this compression step, we should only consider independent copies of the
manifest. For example, if an archived manifest is delivered from the same archive where the
memento is from, then this copy of the manifest should not be considered independent. In
other cases, two manifests might be discovered in two cooperating archives (e.g., we know
archive-it.org is a service established by the Internet Archive).
In case of the Block approach, the fixity verification server (or any equivalent tool) needs
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to have access to all the blocks, either over HTTP (e.g., from a web archive) or stored lo-
cally. These blocks are then scanned for one or more matching records for the given URI-M.
Corresponding single-line JSON entries (as shown in Figure 148) are extracted as historical
fixity records for comparison. Remaining steps for creating current fixity information, com-
paring with the historical records, and generating the response summary are the same as in
the case of Atomic approach.
Due to the immutable nature of blocks we can only have back references, creating a single
linked list pointing from the most recent blocks to the older ones. With the help of some
external metadata, our archival fixity block server provides bidirectional navigational links
for easy navigation along the chain back and forth (as illustrated in Figure 146 with first,
last, prev, and next link relations in the link header). The content of these blocks is sorted
to enable fast lookup in each block using binary search, but the chain of blocks has to be
scanned linearly, which can decrease the throughput as the number of blocks increases. To
deal with this issue, one can create an inverted index of existing blocks, treating URI-Ms as
the keyword and blocks as the document. Additionally, the chain of blocks is in chronological
order, which makes it easy to create a lightweight skip index to identify segments of the
chain that were created around certain points of time in the past. Creating large blocks
with a slowly growing chain will be more efficient than a rapidly growing chain of small
blocks. However, an optimal block size can be decided based on how long one is willing to
wait for enough records to be available for a new block creation and on the largest size of
a single block that can easily be stored in web archives. Creating blocks with strategically
grouped URI-Ms (e.g., mementos of nearby datetime values, URI-Rs from a set of domains,
or URI-Ms from a set of archives) can also improve the efficiency of lookup (or indexing).
7.2 INITIAL EVALUATION OF ATOMIC AND BLOCK
APPROACHES
We conducted an initial study on 1,000 mementos from the Internet Archive, which are
a subset of the larger set of URI-Ms described in Chapter 5. We did not take the size of
mementos into consideration (i.e., the number of embedded resources, such as images and
JavaScript/CSS files) because, at this point, we compute fixity based on only the returned
raw HTML content of the base file. The main reason for choosing a small set, only 1,000
URI-Ms, is because the study requires pushing at least 12 manifests for each memento in
multiple archives. Sending too many archiving requests to archives might result in technical
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issues, such as blocking IP addresses. For example, webcitation.org1 responded with
“WebCite has flagged your IP address for suspicious activity” after making 100 requests,
but the issue was resolved after contacting the archive. perma.cc on the other hand allows
users to freely submit a maximum of 10 URIs per month. Fortunately, the archive supported
us for this study by increasing this limit, so we were able to disseminate more manifests to
the archive. Part of the evaluation is measuring the time it takes to generate, disseminate,
and verify manifests in the Atomic and Block approaches. In addition, we want to compare
the size of files created in both approaches and whether all mementos are going to be verified
successfully.
We wrote Python scripts for performing different functions:
• generate atomic(): Accepts a URI-M and returns the fixity information of the me-
mento in JSON format. We generated 3,000 manifests. The main purpose of gener-
ating three manifests for each memento is because we are interested in reporting the
average time for generating a manifest for each memento.
• publish atomic(): Submits a given JSON file to the Archival Fixity server at https:
//manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu. The server will insert @id and created metadata
before publishing the new manifest on the web.
• disseminate atomic(): Pushes a published manifest into different archives using
ArchiveNow. In our study, we used archive.org, archive.is, perma.cc, and webcita
tion.org resulting in creating 12,000 archived manifests (i.e., 3,000 URI-M-Manif in
each archive). We used the Generic URI to push manifest into archives. Again, this
URI always redirects to the trusty URI. If archives consider a “302 Redirect” as a
separate resource, then the total number of archived resources created in the four
archives was 24,000.
• verify atomic(): Accepts a URI-M. It discovers a manifest closest to the memento’s
creation datetime. In addition, the function discovers archived copies of the manifest
in the four archives using TimeGates and TimeMaps. Then, it computes current fixity
information using generate atomic(). Finally, it compares current fixity information
with the discovered manifests and their archived copies. As a result, for each URI-M,
the function returns either “Verified” or “Failed” with other information, such as hash
values, URI-Manifs, and URI-M-Manifs.
1The archive webcitation.org no longer accepts archiving requests after July 9, 2019. Our study was
conducted prior to this date.
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• generate block(): Accepts multiple JSON files. It generates one or more blocks
depending on the selected block size. In this study, we set it to 100 manifests per
block, so the total number of generated blocks was 10.
• disseminate block(): Pushes a block into two archives (archive.org and perma.cc).
Again, because we are interested in calculating the average time for disseminat-
ing a block, each block is pushed three times into both archives, resulting in cre-
ating 60 archived blocks (i.e., 30 per archive). We did not use archive.is and
webcitation.org because .gz files were not handled correctly by those archives.
• verify block(): Accepts a URI-M and discovers fixity information of the URI-M from
the published blocks. Then, it computes current fixity information using generate atomic().
Finally, it compares current and discovered fixity. The function returns either “Veri-
fied” or “Failed” with other information, such as hash values.
In addition to the Python scripts, we implemented the Archival Fixity server that is
responsible for publishing and discovering manifests and blocks. For example, Figure 149
shows a request for discovering the closest manifest’s creation date to December 22, 2018
for the given memento. The server response indicates that the closest manifest was created
on December 12, 2018.
1 $ curl -I https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest / 20181222 /https ://
2 web. archive .org/web /20171115140705/ http :// rln.fm/
3
4 HTTP /2 302 Found
5 content - length : 501
6 content -type: text/html; charset =utf -8
7 date: Thu , 10 Jan 2019 09:16:40 GMT
8 location : https :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest / 20181212074423 /bd
9 669 de8835e38d54651fe9d04709515beec0c727db82a5366f4bc2506e103
10 d8/https :// web. archive .org/web /20171115140705/ http :// rln.fm/
11 server : ArchivalFixity /0.1
Fig. 149: Discovering the closest manifest to December 22, 2018 for the memento web.
archive.org/web/20171115140705/http://rln.fm/.
The selected number of records per block affects the total size of all blocks and the
time required to generate these blocks. Figure 150 illustrates that creating large blocks
with a slowly growing chain is more efficient than a rapidly growing chain of small blocks.
As mentioned in Chapter 7.1.4, one factor of choosing the optimal number of records in
each block is the largest size of a single block that can easily be stored in web archives.
For example, we tested the Internet Archive (IA) to identify the largest single file that the
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archive can accept for preservation. After submitting multiple files with different sizes, we
found that IA can accept up to 800 MB, and beyond that the archive returns “504 Gateway
Timeout”.
Fig. 150: The effect of the selected number of records per block.
Figure 151 illustrates the distribution of the average time taken to generate manifests.
We generated three manifests for each memento, and calculated the average time, so the
the total number of generated manifests is 3,000. The manifest generation time includes: 1)
downloading the raw HTML content using the Requests module in Python, 2) calculating
fixity information of the downloaded content, and 3) storing the fixity information locally
in JSON format. We noticed that the average size of the generated manifest files is 1,157
bytes. This size represents 2.79% of the actual download HTML content, which is 41,392
bytes on average. The total size of all manifests is 1,156,657 bytes, while the total size of the
blocks is 176,128 bytes. This indicates that the Block approach requires less storage space
than the Atomic approach to store the fixity information of the same number of mementos.
As expected, the time for disseminating manifests and blocks was the longest compared
with other operations, such as generating and verifying manifests. Figure 152 shows that
pushing manifests into webcitation.org (WebCite) takes more time than other archives.
On average, we wait for 33.82 seconds before WebCite finishes processing an archival re-
quest of a manifest, while the manifest disseminating average time drops down dramatically
in the other three archives as Table 18 indicates. We observed that archive.org and
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Fig. 151: Generating manifests of mementos.
webcitation.org add a few seconds response delay after receiving the first tens of archiv-
ing requests. In sum, it takes about 1.25X, 4X and 36X longer to disseminate a manifest
to perma.cc, archive.org, and webcitation.org, respectively, than archive.is, while
it takes 3.5X longer to disseminate a block to archive.org than perma.cc. The average
dissemination time of blocks in archive.org and perma.cc is shown in Figure 153.
Given a collection of N mementos and K web archives, the total number of resources
that we are creating in the K archives by the Atomic and Block approaches are (N ∗ K)
and (k ∗ (N/B)) respectively, where B is the selected block size. In our study, N = 1, 000,
katomic = 4, kblock = 2, and B = 100. Then a total of 12, 000 resources were created by the
Atomic approach and only 60 resources were created by the Block approach considering the
fact that we repeated the dissemination process for three times.
TABLE 18: Average time (in seconds) for disseminating and downloading of manifests
and blocks.
Operation archive.is perma.cc IA WebCite
Manifest dissemination 0.94 1.18 3.74 33.82
Block dissemination - 1.37 4.80 -
Manifest download 0.47 0.60 1.42 4.55
Block download - 0.30 7.19 -
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Fig. 152: Disseminating manifests to four archives.
Fig. 153: Disseminating blocks to two archives.
195
Fig. 154: Discovering manifests by both approaches.
Figure 154 shows the time required to discover manifests for each memento from the
Archival Fixity server. Figure 162 illustates the total time for verifying the fixity of all
mementos by both approaches. The verification time includes discovering manifests, com-
puting current fixity information, downloading copies of manifests (in the Atomic approach),
and comparing manifests. On average, the verification time of a memento is 6.65 seconds
by the Atomic approach and 1.49 seconds by the Block approach, so the Block approach
performs 4.46X faster than the Atomic approach on verifying the fixity of memento. Al-
though we have predicted that some mementos might not be verified for reasons such as an
archive responds with HTTP 500 Error, we have not yet encountered any failed cases (i.e.,
all mementos are verified successfully).
7.3 EVALUATION USING A NEW MANIFEST FILE STRUCTURE
AND LARGER SET OF MEMENTOS
We performed a new evaluation on the Atomic and Block approaches for several reasons.
In our previous study (Chapter 7.2), we used only mementos from archive.org. In this
new study, we want to include mementos from various public web archives (17 archives) to
ensure that our framework can work with any memento from any web archive.
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Fig. 155: Verifying mementos by both approaches.
We also describe a new manifest file structure that contains fixity information about
not only the base HTML file but also about any web resource (e.g., images) embedded in
a composite memento. This is important because, as we described (Chapter 1.4), a single
hash value calculated on only the base HTML file of a composite memento will not help
detecting changes on any embedded resources. The new manifest structure should also
include hash values generated by the URI-M-based (Chapter 6.7.1) and the entity-based
hashing techniques (Chapter 6.7.2). For each resource in a composite memento, we create
other important hash values to be included in the manifest file. These hash values can help
detecting whether a particular resource has small or big changes over time. Finally, we will
compare results from the previous evaluation (Chapter 7.2) with results from the new study.
For example, will the average manifest generation time change in the new study?
7.3.1 NEW MANIFEST FILE STRUCTURE
Our new proposed structure of the manifest file should include fixity information about
the base HTML file and all resources embedded in a composite memento. It should also
contain hash values generated by the three hashing techniques described in Chapter 6.7 and
other hashes values for estimating the level of changes in a resource over time. The new
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structure of the manifest file is illustrated in Figure 156 and has the following components:
• @context: The URI where names used in the manifest file are defined.
• created: The creation datetime of the manifest. It must be equal to or greater than
the memento’s creation datetime.
• URI-M: The URI of a memento.
• @id: The URI that identifies a published manifest file (URI-Manif).
• composite-memento-entity-hash: An aggregated hash value computed using a
Merkle tree, built on only the HTTP entity bodies of all resources comprising a com-
posite memento.
• composite-memento-URI-M-hash: An aggregated hash value computed using a
Merkle tree, built on only the URI-Ms of all resources comprising a composite me-
mento.
• composite-memento-overall-hash: An aggregated hash value using a Merkle tree,
calculated based on the HTTP response headers and entity bodies, the HTTP status
codes, and URI-Ms of all resources comprising a composite memento (Chapter 6.1).
The manifest file also has the following components for each resource comprising a
composite memento:
• http-headers: Selected HTTP Response headers of the resource. As proposed by
Jones et al. [92], we may insert the Preference-Applied header to specify options
used to retrieve the memento. For example, Original-Content refers to the raw
memento—accessing unaltered archived content because archives by default return
the memento after transforming its content.
• status-code: The HTTP status code of the resource returned from the archive.
• URI-M: The URI of the resource.
• entity-hash: The hash value calculated on the HTTP entity body of the resource.
• overall-hash: The hash value calculated on the HTTP headers and entity, HTTP
status code, and URI-M of the resource.
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1 {
2 " @context ": "http :// oduwsdl . github .io/ contexts / fixity ",
3 " created_at ": "Wed , 08 Apr 2020 02:22:56 GMT",
4 "@id": "http :// manifest .ws -dl.cs.odu.edu/ manifest /20200408022256/
d5dd6bf95219300d642cd03356d541eceb2a7fef9efd62c1b531453875bf1f04 /
https :// web. archive .org/web /19970104075414/ http :// www.un.org
:80/" ,
5 "composite -memento -uri -m-hash": "8 bb453d8aa ... db5f5fbf6 ",
6 "composite -memento -entity -hash": " cdf47062a ...3 ebe030b0 ",
7 "composite -memento -overall -hash": "69 ca5a85 ... b9206930 ",
8 "uri -m": "https :// web. archive .org/web /19970104075414/ http :// www.un.
org :80/" ,
9 " resources ": [
10 {
11 "http - headers ": ["X-Archive -Orig -last - modified ", "Content -Type
", "X-Archive -Orig -date", "Memento - Datetime ", "X-Page -Cache
"],
12 "entity -phash": null ,
13 "entity -hash": " ba140a5bede7f10bea0 ...7514725862 eda82a003 ",
14 "overall -hash": "3 e4133b3766c2a58d6f ...23 f5f95a206a1ba9878 ",
15 "entity - simhash ": 9695187482751709335 ,
16 "uri -m": "https :// web. archive .org/web /19970104075414/ http ://
www.un.org :80/" ,
17 "status -code": "200"
18 },
19 {
20 "http - headers ": ["X-Archive -Orig -last - modified ", "X-Archive -
Orig -date", "Memento - Datetime ", "Content -Type", "X-Page -
Cache "],
21 "entity -phash": "87 d5798529a75a58 ",
22 "entity -hash": " d9305a4da88570700d92 ...17 c0c0f72b9f4e514b9 ",
23 "overall -hash": " de002fbe292372199e6 ...6059044 f4695f0dda2c ",
24 "entity - simhash ": null ,
25 "uri -m": "https :// web. archive .org/web /19970315165323 im_/http
:// www.un.org/ homepage .gif",
26 "status -code ": "200"
27 },
28 {
29 "http - headers ": [" Content -Type", "Memento - Datetime ", "X-Page -
Cache "],
30 "entity -phash": "219 d1a8362a71040 ",
31 "entity -hash": " d5fd59c929e1c62b17b ... d5e321f64a919e4294e ",
32 "overall -hash": "7 df9dde47fa5bab643 ... cef3c84694bb1db8b1c ",
33 "entity - simhash ": null ,
34 "uri -m": "https :// web. archive .org/web /20120129120857/ http ://
web. archive .org/ screenshot /http :// www.un.org /",




Fig. 156: A manifest showing fixity information of the memento https://web.archive.
org/web/19970104075414/http://www.un.org:80/. This composite memento consists of
three resources.
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• entity-phash: The hash value generated on the entity body of a resource using phash
hashing function [114, 115]. We can use phash to find how different/similar images
are.
• entity-simhash: The hash value generated on the entity body of a resource using
simhash hashing function [108]. We can use simhash to find how different/similar text
files are.
7.3.2 RESULTS OF THE ATOMIC AND BLOCK APPROACHES EVALUA-
TION ON 16K MEMENTOS
The main difference between this study and the previous study (Chapter 7.2) is that we
used a larger set of mementos, 16,608 from 17 public web archives, and the new manifest file
structure (Chapter 7.3.1). This new study requires pushing at least one manifest file for each
memento into multiple web archives. We only encountered one issue in sending about 16k
archival requests to web archives: archive.is rejected all archival requests after accepting
and successfully handling about 11k requests, but the issue was solved after contacting the
archive administrator. We also had to exclude webcitation.org from this study because the
archive currently does not accept any archival requests [184], but we still consider creating
fixity information for mementos from this archive.
We want to measure the time taken to generate, disseminate, and verify manifests in the
Atomic and Block approaches. In addition, we want to compute the size of files created in
both approaches.
We used modified versions of Python scripts from the previous study for performing
different functions:
• generate atomic(): Accepts a URI-M and returns fixity information of the memento
in JSON format. We generated 16,608 manifests (one manifest per memento). We are
interested in reporting the time for generating a manifest for each composite memento.
We must download the composite memento in order to generate its fixity information
(cf. downloading only the base HTML file of a memento in our previous study).
• publish atomic(): Submits a given JSON file to the Archival Fixity server at https:
//manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu. The server will insert @id and created metadata
before publishing the new manifest on the web.
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• disseminate atomic(): Pushes a published manifest into different archives using
ArchiveNow. In our study, we used archive.org, archive.is, and perma.cc result-
ing in creating 49,824 archived manifests (i.e., 16,608 URI-M-Manif in each archive).
We used the Generic URI to push manifest into archives. Again, this URI always redi-
rects to the trusty URI. If archives consider a “302 Redirect” as a separate resource,
then the total number of archived resources created in the four archives was 99,648.
• verify atomic(): Accepts a URI-M. It discovers a manifest closest to the memento’s
creation datetime. In addition, the function discovers archived copies of the manifest
in the four archives using TimeGates and TimeMaps. Then, it computes current fixity
information using generate atomic(). Finally, it compares current fixity information
with the discovered manifests and their archived copies. As a result, for each URI-M,
the function returns either “Verified” or “Failed” with other information, such as hash
values, URI-Manifs, and URI-M-Manifs.
• generate block(): Accepts multiple JSON files. It generates one or more blocks
depending on the selected block size. In this study, we set it to 1038 manifests per
block, so the total number of generated blocks was 16.
• disseminate block(): Pushes a block into two archives (archive.org and perma.cc).
Each block is pushed three time into both archives resulting in creating 32 archived
blocks (i.e., 16 per archive). We did not use archive.is because .gz files were not
handled correctly by this archive.
• verify block(): Accepts a URI-M, and discovers fixity information of the URI-
M from the published blocks. Then, it computes current fixity information using
generate atomic(). Finally, it compares current and discovered fixity. The function
returns either “Verified” or “Failed” with other information, such as hash values and
the number of verified resources.
In addition to these Python scripts, we used the same Archival Fixity server from our
previous study.
As in our previous study, the result of this study also indicate that creating large blocks
with a slowly growing chain is more efficient than a rapidly growing chain of small blocks, as
shown in Figure 157. Figure 158 shows the time taken to generate manifests, and Table 19
shows the median and the average time to generate manifest files per archive. We generated
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one manifest for each memento, so the the total number of generated manifests is 16,608.
The manifest generation time includes:
• downloading a composite memento using Squidwarc
• downloading the raw version of each resource comprising the composite memento
• computing the fixity information for the downloaded content
• storing the fixity information locally in a JSON file
The manifest generation time in this study takes longer than the time taken to generate
manifest files in our previous study. It is because in this study all resources comprising a
composite memento must be download, while in the previous study, only the base HTML
file is downloaded. The total size of the generated manifest files is 366 MB, and the total
size of the downloaded composite mementos is 31.12 GB. The median size of a manifest
file is 15.29 KB, and the median size of a composite memento is 1143.85 KB. Therefore,
this size of a manifest represents 1.33% of the size of a composite memento. The total size
the generated blocks is 274 MB. This indicates again that the Block approach requires less
storage space than the Atomic approach to store fixity information of the same number of
mementos.
Fig. 157: The effect of the selected number of records per block.
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Fig. 158: Generating manifests of 16,608 mementos.
Unlike the previous study, this study shows that verifying mementos took the longest
time compared with other operations, such as generating and disseminating manifests. Fig-
ure 159 shows that pushing manifests into archive.org takes a much longer time than other
archives. On average, we wait for 5.36 seconds before archive.org finishes processing an
archival request of a manifest, while the manifest disseminating average time drops down in
the other two archives as Table 20 indicates. In sum, it takes about 1.09X and 4.54X longer
to disseminate a manifest to perma.cc, archive.org, respectively, than archive.is, while
it takes 9.20X longer to disseminate a block to archive.org than perma.cc. The average
dissemination time of blocks in archive.org and perma.cc is shown in Figure 160.
The total number of resources created by the Atomic approach was 16, 603 ∗ 3 = 49, 824
and only 16 ∗ 2 = 32 resources were created by the Block approach.
Figure 161 shows the time required to discover and download manifests of each memento
from the web archives and Archival Fixity server. Figure 162 illustrates the total time for
verifying the fixity of all mementos by both approaches. The verification time in Figure 162
does not include the time for discovering manifests, computing current fixity information,
or downloading copies of manifests (in the Atomic approach). If we include all of these
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TABLE 20: Average time (in seconds) for disseminating and downloading of manifests
and blocks.
Operation archive.is perma.cc IA
Manifest dissemination 1.18 1.29 5.36
Block dissemination - 1.66 15.28
Manifest download 0.85 0.89 2.09
Block download - 4.45 11.51
factors in the memento verification time, then on average, the verification time of the fixity
of a memento would be 58.31 seconds by the Atomic approach and 55.32 seconds by the
Block approach, so the Block approach performs 1.05X faster than the Atomic approach on
verifying the fixity of memento.
In addition to the final hash values calculated on a composite mementos using the URIM-
based, entity-based, and complete hashing techniques, we can use the hash values of embed-
ded resources, which are also stored in the manifest file, to detect how many resources are
verified in the composite memento and how many resources are not. For example, Figure
163 shows the composite memento
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Fig. 159: Disseminating manifests to three archives.
http://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20160701161239/http://www.catanddog
firstaid.com/en/
consists of 89 resources (or URI-Ms) including the URI-M of the base HTML file. Most of











Fig. 160: Disseminating blocks to two archives.
The number of verified resources varies in Figure 163 because it depends on the hashing
technique used to generate final hash values. For example, using the entity hashing tech-
nique, we have 49 different HTTP entity bodies, and only one of them has not been verified.
The results also show the number of distinct URI-Ms (90 in Figure 163) that are previously
seen when replaying the same composite memento in the past. Those URI-Ms are stored in
the manifest files.
Table 21 shows the number of verified mementos (out of 16,608 mementos) by each
hashing technique: the URIM-based hashing technique, entity-based technique, and the hash
technique that is based on all components of a composite memento (i.e., complete hashing).
The table indicates that without fulfilling the hashing guidelines (defined in Chapter 4),
only 50.14%, 20.66%, and 14.21% of mementos could be verified using URIM-based, entity-
based, and complete hashing technique, respectively. However, when we considered these
predefined guidelines when generating final hash values, the percentage of verified mementos
increased to 52.72%, 72.98%, and 48.72%. We excluded 1,302 mementos before we even
started the process of verifying their fixity because the current download of the content
of these composite mementos had transient errors (e.g., incomplete HTTP entity bodies),
and based on one of the predefined hashing guidelines, we cannot generate hash values on
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Fig. 161: Discovering and downloading manifest files in the Atomic/Block approaches per
archive.
mementos with transient errors. The main reason why we still observe unverified mementos
even after considering the predefined guidelines is because of JavaScript, which dynamically
adds/loads different embedded resources each time the composite memento is replayed.
Other reasons include archival redirects and the lack of raw mementos by some archives.
7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we introduced two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to
disseminate fixity information to web archives and verify the fixity of mementos. In the
Atomic approach, the fixity information of each archived web page is stored in a single
JSON file, or manifest, published on the web, and disseminated to several on-demand web
archives. In the Block approach, we batch together fixity information, or records, of multiple
archived pages to a single binary-searchable file, or block. The block then is published at
a well-known web location before disseminating to archives. Therefore, the Block approach
creates fewer web resources than the Atomic approach.
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Fig. 162: Verifying mementos by both approaches.
TABLE 21: The number of verified mementos by each hashing technique with/without




of mementos Hashing technique
The number of verified




URIM-based hashing 8,328 (50.14%)
Entity-based hashing 3,432 (20.66%)




URIM-based hashing 8,069 (52.72%)
Entity-based hashing 11,170 (72.98%)
Complete hashing 7,457 (48.72%)




2 " Verified ": "No",
3 " time_in_seconds_to_verify_memento ": 0.10734762391075492 ,
4 "composite -memento -uri -m-hash ": {
5 "prev ": ["74973 ee7babc593c3992603f3840cbfd8c21e8309295fb134b1f7
6 224 f6bfc9d8 "],
7 " current ": " ac2fef76667ff2ade4fc6e791a79c3ee34859fb988dc580754e
8 36 bb62c3631db ",
9 " resources ": {
10 " current_requested ": 89,
11 " current_verified ": 85,
12 " prev_requested ": 90
13 }
14 },
15 "composite -memento -entity -hash ": {
16 "prev ": [" f8516f6c544b444f7791cab326c7fdd7786030d08ed7475071bce
17 6842787 f0c7 "],
18 " current ": " ea6bdb1a4bf3ccfea1adf5b0d4456084c144e9f7ac450f71fec
19 08 fdb9e24f0b3 ",
20 " resources ": {
21 " current_requested ": 49,
22 " current_verified ": 48,
23 " prev_requested ": 48
24 }
25 },
26 "composite -memento -overall -hash ": {
27 "prev ": ["88 c93d2e7b6025a294338e2ca9bc1086f57ee8c430fbbca71b618
28 8907051 d549 "],
29 " current ": " b06986478e9d536d57eab34b55c3c0fd4c4ca0e0a7a8b003011
30 0 d0442845b0f2 ",
31 " resources ": {
32 " current_requested ": 89,
33 " current_verified ": 72,




Fig. 163: The results of the verification process of a mementos shows the final hash values
generated by the URIM-based, entity-based, and complete hashing techniques. For each
hashing technique, the results also show the number of verified resources of the composite
memento.
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This chapter also describes the evaluation of the two approaches using 16,627 memen-
tos and four different public web archives. The manifest generation time varies from one
archive to another. For example, it takes about 15 seconds to generate fixity information
on a memento from bac-lac.gc.ca on average, while it is 441 seconds by Perma.cc. We
find that it takes about 1.09X and 4.54X longer to disseminate a manifest to perma.cc,
archive.org, respectively, than archive.is, while it takes 9.20X longer to disseminate a
block to archive.org than perma.cc. The Block approach performs 1.05X faster than the
Atomic approach on verifying the fixity of mementos since the verification time of the fixity
of a memento is 58.31 seconds by the Atomic approach on average and 55.32 seconds by the
Block approach. Our study also shows that without fulfilling the hashing guidelines (defined
in Chapter 4), only 50.14%, 20.66%, and 14.21% of mementos could be verified using the
URIM-based, entity-based, and complete hashing technique, respectively. However, when
we considered these guidelines when generating final hash values, the percentage of verified
mementos increased to 52.72%, 72.98%, and 48.72%.
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CHAPTER 8
CONTRIBUTIONS, FUTURE WORK, AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we summarize how we have addressed our three research questions. We
also describe the contributions, future work, and conclusions.
8.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
RQ1: Can we identify and quantify the types of changes on the playback of
archived web pages that prevent generating repeatable fixity information?
Our goal was to introduce a framework that could be used to verify the fixity on the
playback of archived web pages. In order to achieve that, we need to generate repeatable fix-
ity information (e.g., hash values) based on the playback of mementos. Chapter 6 describes
our 14-month study on a dataset of 16,627 mementos selected from 17 public web archives.
Chapter 5 describes multiple methods we used to collect the dataset. We download each
memento 39 times and compute their fixity information by following our initial predefined
guidelines (Chapter 4.1). We identify and quantify several changes causing the same me-
mento to have different fixity information over time. These changes may affect the HTTP
status codes, the HTTP response headers and entity bodies, and the URIs-M of resources
comprising an archived page.
We find that 88.45% of archived web pages produce more than one unique hash value
when replayed at different times. About 16% of mementos always produce different hashes.
Our study also shows that archived collections or archives may migrate to other archives.
The migration process of mementos from one archive to other may cause multiple mementos
to disappear.
RQ2: Given the types of changes identified in the playback of mementos,
can we define the final guidelines for generating repeatable fixity information
(defining an archive-aware hashing function)?
We first define initial guidelines for generating fixity information on the playback of
archived web pages (Chapter 4.1), and based on the results of our study (Chapter 6) on
16k mementos, we define additional guidelines (Sections 4.2 and 6.7) for generating fixity
information.
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The new guidelines highlight the importance of using several aggregated hash values
generated using multiple hashing techniques: URI-M-based and entity-based hashing tech-
niques (Chapter 6.7.2). The new guidelines also indicate that the archive-aware hashing
function should produce fixity information for each resource comprising the composite me-
mento. These hash values can help us detect which resource in the composite memento has
changed over time.
RQ3: How can we store and retrieve fixity information independently from
the web archives from which the associated mementos are preserved?
Chapter 7 describes the framework that we use to store and discover fixity information
of a memento independently from the web archive preserving the memento. The framework
introduces two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to disseminate fixity in-
formation to web archives and verify the fixity of mementos. In the Atomic approach, the
fixity information of each archived web page is stored in a single JSON file, or manifest,
published on the web, and disseminated to several on-demand web archives. In the Block
approach, we batch together fixity information, or records, of multiple archived pages to a
single binary-searchable file, or block. The block then is published at a well-known location
before disseminating to archives.
8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation contributes to the field of web archiving by introducing a framework
for verifying the fixity of archived web pages. Our contributions include the following:
• We defined several guidelines (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) that should be followed to generate
repeatable fixity information on the playback of archived web pages [178].
• We described four methods for creating datasets of archived web pages. We used these
methods to create a dataset of 16,627 mementos from 17 public web archives (Chapter
5) [170].
• We monitored and tracked 16,627 mementos for 14 months to identify and quantify
types of changes on the playback of these mementos. We find that 88.45% of mementos
produce more than one hash value, and only 11.55% of mementos always produce the
same hash values [199].
• We found that 1002 mementos became permanently unavailable in their original
archives (Chapter 6.5). Even though the original archives from which the mementos
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have moved did not leave a machine readable method of locating the corresponding
URIs in the new archives, we were able to manually discover the new archives to which
the mementos have moved [179,182–184].
• We found that about 54% of mementos that have moved from their original web
archives, are missing. We call a memento “missing” if the values of the Memento-
Datetime, the URI-R, and the final HTTP status code of the memento in the original
archive are not identical to the values of the corresponding memento in the new archive
or if we could not find a corresponding memento in the new archive. (Chapter 6.5)
[179,182–184].
• We created a heatmap to illustrate archive-level changes (Chapter 6.6). We used the
heatmap to visualize the overall performance of each archive and to identify points in
time where major changes occur, For example, through the heatmap we were able to
identify archives that recently started to use a new version of their replay system .
• We introduced two hashing techniques (Chapter 6.7) for generating multiple aggre-
gated hash values on composite mementos. These techniques are entity-based hashing
technique and URI-M-based hashing technique [190].
• We developed ArchiveNow, a tool for disseminating web pages in public web archives
(Chapter 7.1.2) [200,201].
• We introduced two approaches, Atomic and Block, that can be used to disseminate
fixity information to web archives and verify the fixity of mementos (Chapter 7) [191,
202].
8.3 FUTURE WORK
Future work includes the use of emerging standards, such as Web packaging [155, 156].
Web Packaging is introduced with the objective to distribute web pages packaged in a way
that allows receivers to verify that the content is from a particular origin, and view the
content offline. We were not able to use Web Packaging in our work because it is currently
not supported by any web archive even though it may become an Internet standard in the
near future [162]. Regarding our work of verifying the fixity of composite mementos, we
want to explore how Web Packaging can be used by archives to deliver composite mementos.
Some advantages of using web packaging might include:
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• Web packaging may become an Internet standard in the near future [162]. Browsers
that support web packaging can render composite mementos, without the need to load
more resources from the archive.
• Using web packaging we can download a composite memento, packaged in a single
file, with a single HTTP request. This should reduce playback-related changes, such
as transient errors and TimeMap changes. In addition to the WARC format, web
packaging can be viewed as another way of aggregating web resources in a single
file. Web packaging can also be considered as replacement of WARC format in the
future [160].
We want to compare our current archive-aware hashing approach with the web packaging
based approach. We want to know the number (and size) of resources that each approach
generates and the time required by each approach to (1) generate fixity information, and
(2) verify the fixity of mementos. We also want to investigate how each approach performs
in terms of generating repeatable fixity information and reducing the number of transient
error and other replay-related changes.
8.4 CONCLUSIONS
We introduce a framework for checking the fixity on the playback of archived web pages.
After conducting a 14-month study on 16,627 mementos from 17 public web archives, we
identify and quantify changes causing the same archived pages to produce different fixity
information over time. Changes may affect the HTTP status codes, the HTTP entity bodies
and headers, and the URI-Ms of one or more resources comprising a composite memento.
We learn that most changes are caused by JavaScript, the TimeMap inconsistency, the
lack of raw mementos, transient errors, and others, which makes the process of generating
repeatable fixity information complicated. We found that 88.45% of mementos produce
at least two different hashes, including all mementos from seven archives. Only 11.55%
of mementos always produce the same hash, while 16.06% of mementos always produce a
different aggregated hash value after each replay.
Based on the results of our study, we define several guidelines for generating repeatable
fixity information. These guidelines together create our archive-aware hashing function.
One of the guidelines, for instance, indicates that we should generate multiple aggregated
hash values on the same composite memento, and each of these aggregated hash values is
generated using a different hashing techniques, such as entity-based hashing technique and
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URI-M-based hashing technique.
Our framework also introduces two approaches, Atomic and Block, that we can use to
disseminate fixity information to web archives. For each memento, the Atomic approach
creates a single JSON file, or manifest, containing the fixity information. This file is then
published on the web and disseminated to several on-demand web archives. The Block ap-
proach requires batching together fixity information of multiple archived pages to a single
binary-searchable file, or block. Similar to the Atomic approach, the file then is published at
a well-known web location before it is disseminated to multiple web archives. We use three
web archives to evaluate the two approaches: archive.org, perma.cc, and archive.is.
We find that it takes about 1.09X and 4.54X longer to disseminate a manifest to perma.cc
and archive.org, respectively, than to archive.is, while it takes 9.20X longer to dissem-
inate a block to archive.org than to perma.cc. The verification time of the fixity of a
memento is 58.31 seconds on average using the Atomic approach and 55.32 seconds using
the Block approach, so the Block approach performs 1.05X faster than the Atomic approach
on verifying the fixity of memento (Chapter 7).
The framework is built based on well-known web archiving standards, such as the Me-
mento protocol, and it does not require changes in the current web archiving infrastructure.
The framework allows any user to generate fixity information on the playback of mementos
at any time, preserve fixity information independently from the archive delivering the con-
tent, and verify the fixity of archived pages. Our framework allows web archives to monitor,
track and verify the fixity of web archives.
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